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11.2 It was also submitted that some other authority, which is alien to law is brought in, in the form of the former Lokayukt which is equally de hors the provision of the Statute. Referring to the impugned order, it was pointed out that ground (2) thereof wholly vitiates the impugned order. Reference was made to the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh and Another, (2012) 3 SCC 64, wherein the court has laid down various principles touching the grant of sanction under section 19 of the Act, to submit that the impugned order has been passed in breach of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court.

12.2 Next, it was submitted that the appointing authority in the case of a Minister is the Chief Minister. To buttress the said contention, reliance was placed upon the rules of business framed by the Government of Gujarat in exercise of powers under Article 166 of the Constitution, called the "Gujarat Government Rules of Business, 1990". Reference was made to rule 2(b) of the said Rules which defines "Council" to mean the Council of Ministers constituted under Article 163; as well as to rule 2(c) which says that "Minister" includes the Chief Minister and the Deputy Chief Minister but does not include a Minister of a State or Deputy Minister. Reference was made to the commentary in a book titled 'Commentary on Cabinet Government' by Sir Ivor Jennings for the purpose of contending that it is the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister as the case may be who desires that a person should be a Minister in his cabinet or not and is the person of his confidence. It would be the prerogative of the Chief Minister to ask the minister to resign. It was submitted that in substance and in effect, so far as a minister is concerned, it is the Chief Minister who decides whether or not he should be a minister and that it is the Chief Minister who has the ultimate authority over the minister. Hence, it is the Chief Minister who is the competent authority for the purpose of grant or otherwise of sanction under section 19 of the Act in respect of a Minister. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh (supra) it was submitted that in the said case the appellant therein had sought sanction of the Prime Minister and not the President. Thus, drawing an analogy, it would be the Chief Minister and not the Governor who would be the appropriate authority in the present case.

13.1 Referring to the provisions of section 19(2) of the Act, it was submitted that in the present case, the applicable provision is clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 19. Sub-section (2) of section 19 would operate only when there is a doubt as to who is the competent authority and that in the present case, since clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 19 would be applicable, the question of resorting to sub-section (2) thereof does not arise. It was, accordingly, urged that if at all the court is inclined to allow the petition, it would be sufficient if directions are given using the language employed in section 19 of the Act with a further direction to decide in accordance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh and Another (supra).

30. As regards the contention raised by the learned Public Prosecutor that in Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh (supra), the appellant had sought sanction from the Prime Minister and not the President and hence in the present case also the appropriate authority would be the Chief Minister and not the Governor, the same deserves to be stated only to be rejected. A perusal of the above decision of the Supreme Court shows that the question as regards who is the competent authority to grant sanction to prosecute was never in issue in the said case. It is trite that a decision is a precedent for the law that it lays down. In Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, the question before the Supreme Court was whether a complaint can be filed by a citizen for prosecuting a public servant for an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and whether the authority competent to sanction prosecution of a public servant for offences under the 1988 Act is required to take an appropriate decision within the time specified in clause (I)(15) of the directions contained in para 58 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226 and the guidelines issued by the Central Government, Department of Personnel and Training and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC). Thus, the said decision is not a precedent on the question as to who is the competent authority for the purpose of granting sanction under section 19 of the Act in the case of a Minister.