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6. In the light of the aforesaid factual backdrop and pleadings, we have heard Mr. Darius Khambata, the learned Senior Counsel for respondent no.1 - State, Mr. Navroz Seervai, the learned Senior Counsel for respondent no.3, Mr. Srikrishna Ganbavale, the learned Counsel for Mr. Anup Dange, the applicant - Intervenor in IA1602/2021, Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Anil Singh, the learned Additional Solicitor General for respondent no.2 - CBI on the point of maintainability of the petition. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, we have perused the material on record including the pleadings in the previous proceedings which have been referred to in the instant petition.

7. Mr. Khambata, the learned Senior Counsel for respondent no.1 - State, submitted that the instant petition purportedly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is completely untenable before the High Court in the face of the remedy available to the petitioner under the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 ("the Act, 1985") before the CRIWP1843-2021.DOC Central Administrative Tribunal. Inviting the attention of the Court to the provisions of Sections 14, 15, 28 and 33 of the Act 1985 Mr. Khambata urged that the Central Administrative Tribunal has been conferred with exclusive jurisdiction in relation to all service matters concerning a member of any All Indian Services. Recourse to writ jurisdiction is thus simply impermissible.

8. Amplifying the challenge Mr. Khambata urged that in the face of the provisions contained in the Act, 1985, and judicial interpretation thereof, the issue is not confined to mere existence of an alternate remedy. It traverses beyond the traditional self-imposed restraint on the writ courts, in the face of existence of an alternate remedy, and bears upon the rationale of exercise of jurisdiction when exclusive jurisdiction is conferred upon the Tribunal constituted under the Act, 1985. To bolster up this submission Mr. Khambata placed a strong reliance on the Seven Judge Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and others1 and another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and another vs. Subahs Sharma2 1 (1997) 3 SCC 261.

2 (2002) 4 SCC 145.

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9. Mr. Khambata further submitted that the substratum of the petitioner's claim that he is being victimized and the actions initiated against the petitioner are mala fide can very well be enquired into by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In any event, according to Mr. Khambata, the petitioner cannot have immunity from all the actions for all the time, for the only reason that the petitioner made certain allegations against the functionary of the State. Moreover, the action cannot be scuttled, without inquiry, in a manner known to law, on account of the mala fide or vendetta of the person at whose instance the action is initiated. To bolster up this submission, Mr. Khambata placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Sheonandan Paswan vs. State of Bihar & others,3 State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others 4 and M. Narayandas vs. State of Karnataka and others. 5