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2. Initially, the Appellant was appointed in the office of the Block Development Officer as Mukhya Sevika. The said Office was part of the Department of Rural Development and Panchayatraj in the State of Karnataka. Consequent to reorganization of the Department, Government of Karnataka passed an order on 3.1.1979 consequent to which, 175 posts of Mukhya Sevikas (a post to which the Appellant was appointed in the Department of Rural Development) were abolished. Simultaneously, 117 posts of Mukhya Sevikas were created in a new Department called the Department of Women and Children's Welfare. The existing incumbents in the cadre of Mukhya Sevikas numbering 117, in the Department of Rural Development were, by the aforesaid order, deemed to have been "transferred" to the Department of Women and Children's Welfare. It so happened, that while there was a promotional avenue from the post or Mukhya Sevikas to the post of Probation Officer Grade II in the Department of Rural Development in which the Appellant was initially appointed, there was no such promotional post in the Department of Women and Children's Welfare. The result was that the Appellant could not get any promotion whatsoever.

6. We have heard learned Counsel for the Appellants and the learned Counsel for the Respondents.

7. The crucial issue is as to the effect of order dated 3.1.1979 under which the deceased Appellant stood transferred from the Department of Rural Development to the Department of Women and Children's Welfare. The relevant portion of the order dated 3.1.1979 clearly indicates that 175 posts of Mukhya Sevikas were abolished in the Department of Rural Development and 117 posts of Mukhya Sevikas were created in the new Department of Women and Children's Welfare. It is not, therefore, a case of the posts being transferred from the Department of Rural Development to the Department of Women and Children's Welfare along with the promotional avenues which were available in the former Department. In respect of the abolition of the posts of Mukhya Sevikas held by the Appellant in the Department of Rural Development there has been no challenge. The right of promotion to the posts of Probation Officer Grade II, in our view, came to an end along with the abolition of the posts of Mukhya Sevikas in the Department of Rural Development. It would have, in fact, been open to the Government not to have "transferred" the erstwhile incumbents to the new posts of Mukhya Sevikas created in the Department of Women and Children's Welfare. But the Government appears to have thought that instead of going for fresh recruitment in the new Department, it would be fair and just to re-appoint those who were holding the posts of Mukhya Sevikas in the Department of Rural Development and they were treated as persons "transferred" to the new Department under the relevant Rules. This was obviously done to maintain continuity in service and with a view to count the previous service for the purpose of pension and other benefits. If there was no promotional avenue in the new Department to which the Appellant was regarded, it obviously would not be permissible to the Tribunal or to this Court to issue a direction that the promotional avenue should stand created with retrospective effect from 3.1.1979, the date on which the posts were abolished in the Rural Development Department.