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21. Protection of life and personal liberty - No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.

Article 19(1) is couched in positive language, as far as the citizens are concerned viz. "All citizens shall have the right (a) to freedom of speech and expression; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) to form associations or unions; (d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; (e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and (g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Article 21 is available to any person. He need not to be a citizen of this country. In order to constitute "deprivation", within the meaning of Article 21, there must be some direct, overt and tangible act threatening the fullness of the life of a person or a member of the community, as distinguished from a vague or remote act threatening the quality of life of people at large. It is well-settled that the right to life enshrined in Article 21 means something more than mere survival. It includes the right to live with human dignity. It includes all aspects of life which go to make a man's life meaningful, complete and worth living.

28. Realize was also placed on the decision in Francis Coralie Mullin v. Adminisuator Union Territory of Delhi and Ors. . This was a case of detention under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 and the question was whether the detenu's right under Article 21 included a right to consult a legal adviser and to meet the members of his family. Referring to its earlier Judgments, the Apex Court held that the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes with it viz. the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter, facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. It was, therefore, held that any form of torture or cruel inhuman or degrading treatment to even a detenu would be offensive to human dignity and constitute an inroad into his right to live and would be prohibited by Article 21, unless it is in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Obviously, no law which authorises and no procedure which leads to such torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can ever stand the test of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. Such a law would plainly be unconstitutional and void being hit by the provisions of Articles 14 and 21. The relevant observations are to be found in para 8. We do not think that the ratio of the above decision in Francis' case can have any application to the question raised before us.

31. Sbri Sawant, the learned Advocate General, has on the other hand, invited our attention to certain decisions of the Apex Court to contend that there is no such righl available to the petitioner, as is claimed before us. In para 19, we have already referred to the case of P.D. Sha.mdasa.nl AIR 1952 SC 59 (supra) and reproduced the observation of the Apex Court. Relying upon the said observations, Shri Sawant contended that criminals like Arun Gavli and Ramesh Sharma can not insist that the State must give them armed police protection round the clock. He contends, and in our opinion rightly, that granting of armed police protection to such criminals round the clock would be putting a premium on their criminal activities and would create a very odd situation in the society. Wherever these criminals go, they would be safely protected by armed police round the clock. This may protect not only their life and personal liberty, but would encourage and facilitate their indulging in crime. As indicated earlier, with the modern telecommunication systems being available to persons like the petitioner, we are of the view that granting armed police protection round the clock to the petitioner, would encourage and facilitate his indulging in crimes. For instance, if armed police guard is provided to the petitioner at his residence round the clock, nothing prevents him from contacting his 'friends' on cellular phones without being disturbed or threatened by his enemies. What he apprehends is the threat to his life and personal liberty from his enemies and not by any State action which alone is forbidden by the mandate of Article 21. It is clear to vis from the observations of the Apex Court in P.D. Shamdasani's case that what Article 21 protects is only invasion of a person's right to life and personal liberty by the State. If there is a threat to the petitioner's right to life and personal liberty by a rival criminal, it is difficult to spell out a right under Article 21 in favour of the petitioner to the extent that the State must provide him with armed police guard round the clock. As mentioned in para 20 above, the ratio of the decision in P.D. Shamdasani's case has been specifically approved by the Apex Court in Vidya Sharma's case in .

41. The above two decisions in Kharak Singh's case and Gouind's case were recently considered by the Apex Court in Mr. 'X' v. Hospital 'Z' (1998) 8 SCC 296 : 1998 AIR S.C.W. 3662 : 1998 (5) J.T. 626 : 1998 (6) Scale 230. The appellant's blood was to be transfused to another and, therefore, sample thereof was tested at the respondent hospital and he was found to be H.I.V. (+). On account of disclosure of this fact, the appellant's proposed marriage to one 'A', which had been accepted, was called off. Moreover, he was severely criticized and was also ostracised by the community. The appellant approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission for damages against the respondent on the ground that the information required, under medical ethics, to be kept secret was disclosed illegally and that, therefore, the respondent was liable to pay damages to the appellant. The Commission dismissed the petition on the ground that the appellant could seek his remedy in the Civil Court. Before the Apex Court, the appellant contended that the principle of "duty of care" applicable to persons in medical profession included the duty to maintain confidentiality and that the said duty had a correlative right vested in the patient that whatever came to the knowledge of the doctor would not be divulged. The appellant added that for violating that duty as well as for violating the appellant's right to privacy, the respondent was liable for damages to the appellant. Rejecting the appellant's contentions, the Apex Court held that, it was true that in the doctor-patient relationship, the most important aspect was the doctor's duty of maintaining secrecy. A doctor cannot disclose to a person any information regarding the patient which he has gathered in the course of treatment nor can the doctor disclose to any one else the mode of treatment or the advice given by him to the patient. It is the basic principle of jurisprudence that every right has a correlative duty arid every duty has a correlative right. But the rule is not absolute. It is subject to certain exceptions in the sense that a person may have a right but there may not be a correlative duty. The case of 'X' fell within the exception. In para 21 of the Judgment, the Apex Court referred to the right to privacy as culled out of the provisions of Article 21 and other provisions of the Constitution relating to Fundamental Rights read with the Directive Principles of State Policy. It referred to the decisions (supra) in Kharak Sinyh's case and Gouind' case. A reference was then made to the decision in R. Rqjagopal v. State of T.N. . and it was observed in para 26 of the Judgment that as one of the basic Human Rights, the right of privacy is not treated as absolute and is subject to such action as may be lawfully taken for the prevention of crime or disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedoms of others. This, in our view, assumes importance in the background of the petitioner's case where he claims armed police protection round the clock. It was again reiterated in para 28 of the Judgment that though the right to privacy is an essential component of the right to life envisaged by Article 21, the right was not absolute and may be lawfully restricted for the prevention of crime, disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedom of others. In para 44 of the Judgment, the Apex Court concluded that where there is a clash of two fundamental rights, as was in the case of 'X' before the Apex Court viz. the appellant's right to privacy as part of right to life and Ms. Y's right to lead a healthy life which was her fundamental right under Article 21, the right which would advance the public morality or public interest would alone be enforced through the process of Court, the reason being that moral considerations cannot be kept at bay and the Judges are not expected to sit as mute structures of clay in the hall known as Court room, but they have to be sensitive, "in the sense that they must keep their fingers firmly upon the pulse of the accepted morality of the day." In the facts of the case, the Apex Court concluded that "AIDS" was the product of undisciplined sexual impulse. Sex with persons suffering from "AIDS" or possibility thereof has to be avoided as otherwise they would infect or communicate the dreadful disease to others. It was, therefore, held that the Court cannot assist such a person viz. 'X' to achieve that object. In this view of the matter, the appeal filed by 'X' was dismissed.