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6. Plaintiff No.2 was examined as PW1 and he marked Exs.P1 to P9, while the power of attorney of defendant No.1 was examined as DW1 who marked Exs.D1 to D4. Based on the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court dismissed the suit on the following grounds.

(i) Under Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, the right of pre-emption is only available amongst Class-I heirs, while in the present case, defendant No.2 was not the Class-I legal heir along with plaintiffs and defendant No.3.

9. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that the case of the plaintiffs is based merely on an agreement found in the partition in the year 1966 and that agreement was never effected to during the lifetime of the husband of defendant No.2. He submitted that after the death of husband of defendant No.2, she and her children were no longer Class I legal heirs along with the plaintiffs and therefore, were not bound by the agreement. In this regard, he relied upon the judgment of a co-ordinate bench of this Court in GANESHAPPA AND OTHERS VS. KRISHNAMMA AND OTHERS reported in ILR 2005 KAR 358. Even otherwise, they contend that Section 22 of the Act did not create an absolute bar against alienation but only gave a preferential right to the sharers to purchase the property. He submits that since the defendant No.2 and her legal heirs are not Class I heirs, the plaintiffs cannot invoke Section 22 of the Act. Alternatively, he contended that if the plaintiffs were not invoking Section 22 of the Act, but were basing their claim on the partition in the year 1966, such an agreement which acted as a restraint against the defendant No.2 exercising her rights of ownership, is to be held illegal and inoperative. He also contended that the suit is filed in the year 1996 to annul the sale deeds of the year 1989 and 1992 and therefore, under Article 97 of the Limitation Act, the suit is clearly barred by law of limitation.

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family comprised of plaintiff No.1, deceased father-in-law of defendant No.2 and defendant No.3 were divided amongst the plaintiff No.1, husband of defendant No.2 and defendant No.3 in terms of the partition deed dated 24.11.1966. The agreement entered into between them creating a right of pre- emption, therefore did not correspond to a statutory right recognized under Section 22 of the Act.

16. Further, the plaintiffs and defendant No.2 are not heirs belonging to Class I of the Schedule to the Act. When the partition deed was executed in the year 1966, it was the husband of defendant No.2 who was privy to the agreement that he would first offer the property to the other heirs in the event he desired to sell it. Therefore, such a contemplation in the agreement bound only the plaintiffs, the husband of defendant No.2 and the defendant No.3 and not defendant No.2 and her legal heirs. Therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to seek enforcement of the agreement. Even otherwise, the plaintiffs did not make any efforts to seek determination by applying to the Court to decide the consideration payable but he waited for more than 7 years and 4 years respectively to