Allahabad High Court
Kedar Nath Misra And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Ors. on 7 August, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003(4)AWC3369
Author: M. Katju
Bench: M. Katju, R.S. Tripathi
JUDGMENT M. Katju, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed for a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned order dated 23.7.1998, Annexure-4 to the writ petition and for a mandamus to the respondents not to interfere with the petitioners' business of stamp vendors.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
3. In paragraph 3 of the writ petition it is stated that the petitioners were given stamp vendors licence on various dates mentioned in the said paragraph. It is alleged that the petitioners have been functioning as stamp vendors since their appointment and their licences have been renewed from time to time. True copy of the licence is Annexure-1 to the writ petition.
4. In paragraph 4 of the writ petition it is stated that the petitioner No. 1 made an application to respondent No. 2, A.D.M. (Finance/ Revenue), Maharajganj, on 30.3.1998 for renewal of his licence for the year 1998-99 and the petitioner No. 3 made an application dated 19.6.1998 for renewal of the licence. True copies of the same are Annexure-2 to the writ petition. True copy of the application for the 1997-98 is Annexure-3 to the writ petition.
5. It is alleged in paragraph 6 of the writ petition that the petitioners deposited the requisite fee for renewal of the licence but the respondents have not renewed their licences and by the impugned order dated 23.7.1998 has cancelled the same vide Annexure-4 to the writ petition.
6. It is alleged that the petitioner's licence were renewed regularly every year and they have no other source of income to maintain their families. It is alleged in paragraph 9 of the writ petition that the petitioners always demanded the stamps upto the valuation of Rs. 2 but the treasury failed to supply the same resulting in decreasing sale of stamps by the petitioners. It is alleged in paragraph 10 of the writ petition that the respondents did not give show cause notice to the petitioner before cancelling the licence. It is alleged that a concocted story has been mentioned in the cancellation order. It is alleged that the petitioner has always followed the guidelines and orders contained in the G.O. dated 3.12.1998, while doing the business of selling stamps.
7. A short counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. In paragraph 7 it is stated that under Rule 151A of the U. P. Stamps Rules, 1952, a written application has to be moved within one month prior to the date of expiry of the licence. Rule 151A has been quoted in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit. In the impugned order cancelling the petitioners' licence it has been alleged that the sale of stamps by the petitioners was very low. Since there was black marketing of the stamps, the authorities decided that the licences of such stamp vendors whose turnovers have been very low should be cancelled. The stamp vendors get only 1% as commission and in case his turnover is very low he would naturally be induced to do black marketing as he would not be able to meet his expenses and earn livelihood.
8. It appears from the impugned order that the Secretary, Institutional Finance by his order dated 3.12.1988, directed that the licences of stamp vendors whose earning was low should not be renewed. Also those whose licences have not been renewed for two or three years should not get their licences renewed.
9. In our opinion, this is not a fit case for exercise of our discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution. It appears that a policy decision has been taken by the Secretary, Institutional Finance, U.P. by his order dated 3.12.1988 and it is not for this Court to sit in appeal over that decision. The Court should exercise judicial restraint in such matters and should not ordinarily interfere with administrative decisions.
10. As held by the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 11, the modern trend points towards restraint in interfering with administrative decisions. Judicial review is directed to the decision making process and not to the merits of the decision itself. The Court does not have expertise in these matters and should not ordinarily interfere in the decisions of the administration unless they are clearly illegal. We see no illegality in the impugned administrative decision. The scope of judicial review is limited to the Wednesbury principle as stated by the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular case (supra).
11. As regards the allegation that the petitioners were not given opportunity of hearing, we are of the opinion that the requirement of opportunity of hearing arises only when there is some right in favour of a party. The petitioner's licence had expired and in our opinion, they have no right to get renewal under Rule 151A. Rule 151A, states that the Collector may on an application renew the licence. It does not say that the Collector shall renew the licence. It is a settled principle of Interpretation that while sometimes the word 'may' can be read as 'shall', ordinarily the word 'may' means 'may' and not 'shall' vide Madan Lal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd.. AIR 1962 SC 1543; Chinnamarkathian alias Muf.hu Gounder v. Ayyavoo alias Periana Gounder, AIR 1982 SC 137, etc. (See also 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G. P. Singh, 8th Edn. Page 361). Hence, it is in the discretion of the Collector to renew the licence or not, and there is no right of the petitioner to get renewal. Since the petitioner has no right, there is no question of grant of opportunity of hearing to him.
12. Thus, there is no force in this writ petition and it is dismissed.