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“19. Yet another legislative insufficiency surrounding Section 9-A of the Act needs to be highlighted. This provision, as has been explained earlier by my learned brother, disqualifies a person from being a candidate if there subsists a contract entered into by him in the course of his trade or business with the appropriate government for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any works undertaken by, that government. It is followed by an explanation which is more or less a legal fiction. The rugged edges of ambiguity of Section 9-A especially as to how long and in what sense can a contract be said to be subsisting envelop the disbarment provision with subtle legal questions. The common man of India is the potential candidate and is he to risk his candidature on the niceties of the law of contracts? In this context we must remember that the vast and various developmental works undertaken by the State and its subsidiaries and executed by a large number of little construction contractors make it very desirable that the disqualificatory net should not be cast too wide to disfranchise innumerable persons and must be easy of ascertainment if uncertainty is not to overhang elections in our political system. In this very case several problems were mooted, somewhat difficult to answer. How long does a contract subsist? Is every liability arising on a breach of contract, a claim under the contract attracting the lethal coils of Section 9-A? If government money is involved in the execution of the work, does the contract necessarily become one with government? A host of other questions may mystify the legal import of the taboo Section 9-A sets out and yet every layman is imperilled by this vague provision in the exercise of his electoral right. Such a brooding fear and haunting provision is counter-productive and may perhaps have to be redrafted in the light of experience in court. These are problems not of high-sounding law but affecting the common man in the exercise of his most democratic right. Nietzsche once said: “The great problems are in the streets'. The inaugural error in the drawing up of our election law, as is illustrated by this case, is that sophisticated provisions amenable to logico-linguistic feats or subtle interpretation of civil law ill suit a regulatory area of the political process where the small individual offers himself for electoral contest. I choose to make these observations and draw the attention of the concerned instrumentalities only because in my humble view the court has an activist role to tell the nation, through its judgment or other designated channels where the law misfires, or how the law stands in need of reform. This case therefore induces me to make what may be regarded as obiter: