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Yours faithfully, Sd/- S. NARASAPPA, Under Secretary to Government, Education Department."

In the case of P. Joseph John v. State of Travancore-Cochin (1955 SCR 1011) : (AIR 1955 SC 160) the Supreme Court observed thus (at pp. 164, 165 of AIR) :--

"Mr. Thomas argued that the show cause notice was not in accordance with the provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution in as much as it was not expressed to have been made in the name of the Rajpramukh. As above mentioned, this notice was issued on behalf of the Government and was signed by the Chief Secretary of the United State of Travancore-Cochin who had under the rules of business framed by the Rajpramukh the charge of the portfolio of "service and appointments" at the Secretariat level in this State. This was in our opinion substantial compliance with the directory provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution. It was held by this court in Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangar-kar v. State of Bombay (1952 SCR 612): (AIR 1952 SC 181) that clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 are directory only and non-compliance with them does not result in the order being invalid, and that in order to determine whether there is compliance with these provisions all that is necessary to be seen is whether there has been substantial compliance with those requirements. In the present case there can be no manner of doubt that the notice signed by the Chief Secretary of the State and expressed to be on behalf of the Government and giving opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him was in substantial compliance with the provisions of the article. The petitioner accepted the notice and in pursuance of it applied for further time to put in his defence. He was twice granted this time. In these circumstances, the con- tention of Mr. Thomas that as the notice was not expressed as required under Art. 166 it was invalid and therefore the requirements of Art. 311 were not satisfied in this case must be held to be devoid of force. We are satisfied that all the requirements of Art. 311 have been fully complied with in this case. It may also be mentioned that the High Court held that H. H. the Rajpramukh had intimation of the decision of the Council of Ministers and the action proposed to be taken against the petitioner and that in fact His Highness approved of the proposed action."

Further in paragraph22 (at p.211) of the same decision it is held thus:--

"The aforesaid decisions make the position quite clear that the provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution themselves are directory in nature and further that the rules framed by the Governor under clause (3) of the Art. 166 must be regarded as rules having been framed for more convenient transaction of business of the Government and are directory in character and not mandatory and any non-compliance thereof would be a mere procedural defect but would not confer any right upon any citizen to approach the Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution."

30. The legal positions that emerges from the decisions cited above are:--

(i) Compliance with the requirements of Art. 166 gives an immunity to the order inasmuch as it cannot be challenged on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor, but it can be established as a question of fact that the impugned order was issued in fact by the State Government or the Governor, and that the provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution are only directory and not mandatory in character;

(ii) The Business Rules framed by the Governor under Art. 166(3) of the Constitution are, for more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State;

(iii) All executive action of the Government of a State shall be taken in the name of the Governor and that the orders made in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in Rules. There is no specific or set form in which an executive order should be expressed. What is to be seen is whether there is substantial compliance of the requirements of Art. 166 of the Constitution.

31. In the instant case the third respondent did communicate the decision taken for reallocation of portfolios amongst some Ministers and sent the file for circulation even after issuing the order re-allocating the portfolios among the Ministers acting under Explanation I to Rule 5 of the Business Rules. Hence it cannot be said that the third respondent did not perform her duty as contemplated under Art. 167 of the Constitution. The petitioner has neither cited other instances nor placed any material before this Court to take a view that the respondent No. 3 failed to perform a duty as required under Art. 167 of the Constitution.