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"As long as this form of decree is understood to be of a preliminary nature and the Court still retains full power over the action, I do not see any particular harm in the continuance of its use."

In Mahomed Ali Sahib v. Abdul Khadir Sahib, 59 M. l. J. 351 Jackson J. said with reference to the observations of Schwabe C. J.:

"This with all respects lays down an eminently sensible rule of procedure . . . . and there is really no ruling really to the contrary."

3. Thiruvenkatachariar J. referred to the scope of Section 35, Specific Relief Act. Even with reference to that, the conclusion finally reached by the learned Judge was that so long as the Court retained its power under Section 35(c), Specific Relief Act to rescind the contract the Court had power to extend the time originally granted by it, obviously because the suit was still pending before the Court. That brings it exactly within the scope of the principle laid down by Schwabe C. J. Idumbu Parayan v. Pethu Reddi, 43 Mad. 357 : (A. I. R. (7) 1920 Mad. 99), is directly in point. There the learned Judges held that where a decree in a suit for partition provided inter alia that the plaintiffs could recover certain properties from the alienees on payment of a sum of money into Court by a certain date without any provision as to the effect of non-payment and the plaintiff paid the money on a subsequent date the Court had jurisdiction to extend time for payment. The learned Judges observed that the decree was in terms and in effect one for redemption and the Court had jurisdiction to extend the time under Order 34, Rule 8, Civil P. C. Should an alternative basis be needed for the jurisdiction of the Court to extend time for payment that should be found in Order 34, Rule 8. But even without that, on the basis of the principles laid down in Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Rahiman Sahib, 46 Mad. 148 : (A. I. R. (10) 1923 Mad. 284), the Court obviously had jurisdiction to extend time.