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18. For the above reasons, I would answer the question referred to us in the negative.

Reilly, J.

19. I agree that, if a decree for mesne profits is not only silent in regard to interest but properly interpreted does not award interest the executing Court cannot allow interest. I agree that an executing Court can never grant interest on mesne profits unless interest has been explicitly or implicitly awarded by the Court which fixes the mesne profits. The duty of the executing Court in this, as in other cases, is to carry out the decree, not to add to it nor vary it in any way; but it is a duty not always easy to perform. The absence of the word "interest" from the decree is not always decisive. "Mesne profits" by the definition of that expression in Section 2(12), Code of Civil Procedure, means (1) "those profits which the person in wrongful possession .... actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received", which I will call the "net income", plus (2) interest on that net income. But it is open to the Court which makes the decree to award the net income without also awarding interest, and, if that is done, the duty of the executing Court is merely to carry out the decree so made. The executing Court however sometimes finds a difficulty because the effect of the decree in this respect is not clear. The Court which makes the decree should always make its meaning clear but sometimes does not do so. The executing Court has then the duty of interpreting the decree. Cases are met in which the decree first awards "mesne profits"--which in itself by the definition in the Code means net income plus interest--and then goes on to specify in kind or in money the rate of the net income. When the decree is framed in that way, the proper interpretation of it is in my opinion that the Court making the decree intended to give the net income fixed and also by implication in the use of the expression; "mesne profits" intended to give interest, and, the interest not being specified, will be at the Court rate, namely, 6 per cent. per annum. In other cases without saying anything explicitly about interest a lump sum is fixed either as total or for each; year in such a way as to indicate that is all that is awarded--perhaps because interest has been calculated and included in the lump sum, perhaps because it has been refused. If it is clear that nothing more than the lump sum has been awarded, the executing Court is not interested in the reason but has only to carry out the decree as made. But the exact significance of the decree is again a matter of interpretation. Sometimes the fact that interest is mentioned in respect of some other amount in the same decree but is not mentioned in respect of the amount described in the decree as "profits" or "mesne profits" indicates that interest on the net income has been refused. There again the executing Court has to interpret the decree and so ascertain the intention of, the Court which made it. All these are instances of badly drawn decrees, the results of careless work. But unfortunately such decrees are sometimes--indeed too often--made, and executing Courts have to make the best of them. A little time ago my brother Anantakrishna Aiyar and I had to interpret a decree for mesne profits in A.A.O. No. 348 of 1928. There the decree awarded "mesne profits" and then fixed a rate of net income in money without mentioning interest explicitly. We interpreted that to mean that the net income mentioned and interest at 6 per cent. were awarded as mesne profits. The reason that decree was not better worded may have been that it was mainly based upon a compromise between the parties. But it is not only compromise decrees which are worded obscurely in this respect, and, where there is obscurity, the executing Court has the duty of interpretation. Section 34(2) is not of much help in such oases as the failure to mention interest explicitly is not decisive when the expression "mesne profits", which ordinarily includes interest, is used.

20. I cannot answer the question put to us with the simple "Yes" or "No". My answer is that, even if the decree "is silent as to interest" in the sense that the word "interest" does not appear in it, nevertheless, if by the use of the expression "mesne profits" combined with a reference to a rate of income or in any other way the decree indicates that interest is awarded, the executing Court must give it and, no rate of interest being mentioned, should give it at the Court rate of 6 per cent. But this result, when reached, must be reached solely by interpretation of the decree, not by the use of any supposed discretion in the executing Court. And, as the Court making the decree has the right to refuse interest, any indication that it has done so must be allowed full weight by the executing Court. "Silence" so complete that there is no indication at all that any interest has been awarded would itself be an indication that interest has been refused. In every case in which the intention of the decree is not expressed with unquestionable clearness it is the duty of the executing Court to ascertain that intention by interpretation. But I may add that it is the duty of the Court making the decree to make its intention in the matter so clear that there is no room for interpretation.

21. If I may express an opinion regarding the decree in the suit out of which this reference has arisen, I interpret it as not awarding interest on the future mesne profits fixed, an indication of that intention in spite of the use of the expression "mesne profits" being found in the fact that no interest is mentioned in respect of those profits, though interest is explicitly awarded on the past kannipattam.

22. I agree that in reading the judgment of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Girish Chunder Lahiri v. Shoshi Shikhareswar Roy (1900) L.R. 27 I.A. 110 : I.L.R. 27 C. 951 : 10 M.L.J. 356 (P.C.) we must remember that they were dealing with a case in which mesne profits had to be fixed in execution under the Code of 1882, a duty which can never properly fall on the executing Court under the present Code. I agree also that the application of that judgment in Rajah of Bobbili v. Ayyagari Sodemma (1927) 53 M.L.J. 619 was incorrect, though the interpretation which the learned Judges in the latter case put upon the decree before them, which had not been drawn with sufficient care, may have been right.