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(i) The power of judicial review under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution is an inviolable part of its basic structures. This power cannot be ousted by an Act of Parliament i.e. the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007.
(ii) Section 14 of the Act itself provides for judicial review by the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. There exists clear and recorded legislative intent behind the specific provisions.
(iii) Article 227(4) of the Constitution does not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court over the Armed Forces Tribunal as no such Tribunal existed when Article 227(4) of the Constitution was substituted.

88. They further supplemented:

"It is not only in one case but also subsequently in a number of cases, the Supreme Court reiterated that principle. Many High Courts have reiterated that principle. When in another Bill, that is, National Tax Tribunal was being processed in this Committee Room by another Committee, there also many hon. Members of the Standing Committee said that in view of L. Chandrakumar's case, you cannot have a touch tribunal from which you can directly go to the Supreme Court and we had accede that before that Committee tha article 226 is still there with the High Court. The minute you abolish article 226, then it will be treated by the Supreme Court as a violation of the essential characteristics of the basic structure of the Constitution, which is a limitation even on the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution."

(emphasis added)

76. To express our opinion on the issue whether the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts and in the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution, we must first attempt to understand what constitutes the basic structure of the Constitution. The doctrine of basic structure was evolved in Kesavananda Bharati case (1993 4 SCC 225). However, as already mentioned, that case did not lay down that the specific and particular features mentioned in that judgment alone would constitute the basic structure of our Constitution. Indeed, in the judgments of Shelat and Grover, JJ., Hegde and Mukherjea, JJ. and Jaganmohan Reddy, J., there are specific observations to the effect that their list of essential features comprising the basic structure of the Constitution are illustrative and are not intended to be exhaustive. In Indira Gandhi case, (1975 Supp SCC 1), Chandrachud, J. held that the proper approach for a Judge who is confronted with the question whether a particular facet of the Constitution is part of the basic structure, is to examine, in each individual case, the place of the particular feature in the scheme of our Constitution, its object and purpose, and the consequences of its denial on the integrity of our Constitution as a fundamental instrument for the governance of the country. (supra at pp. 751-

24. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in R.K. Jain vs. Union of India & ors., (1993) 4 SCC 119, observed:

"66. In S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India this Court held that the primary duty of the judiciary is to interpret the Constitution and the laws and this would predominantly be a matter fit to be decided by the judiciary, as judiciary alone would be possessed of expertise in this field and secondly the constitutional and legal protection afforded to the citizen would become illusory, if it were left to the executive to determine the legality of its own action. The Constitution has, therefore, created an independent machinery i.e. judiciary to resolve disputes, which is vested with the power of judicial review to determine the legality of the legislative and executive actions and to ensure compliance with the requirements of law on the part of the executive and other authorities. This function is discharged by the judiciary by exercising the power of judicial review which is a most potent weapon in the hands of the judiciary for maintenance of the rule of law. The power of judicial review is an integral part of our constitutional system and without it, there will be no government of laws and the rule of law would become a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality. The judicial review, therefore, is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. The basic and essential feature of judicial review cannot be dispensed with but it would be within the competence of Parliament to amend the Constitution and to provide alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial [pic]review, provided it is no less efficacious than the High Court. It must, therefore, be read as implicit in the constitutional scheme that the law excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 permissible under it, must not leave a void but it must set up another effective institutional mechanism or authority and vest the power of judicial review in it which must be equally effective and efficacious in exercising the power of judicial review. The tribunal set up under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was required to interpret and apply Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 in quite a large number of cases. Therefore, the personnel manning the administrative tribunal in their determinations not only require judicial approach but also knowledge and expertise in that particular branch of constitutional and administrative law. The efficacy of the administrative tribunal and the legal input would undeniably be more important and sacrificing the legal input and not giving it sufficient weightage would definitely impair the efficacy and effectiveness of the Administrative Tribunal. Therefore, it was held that an appropriate rule should be made to recruit the members; and to consult the Chief Justice of India in recommending appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members of the Tribunal and to constitute a committee presided over by Judge of the Supreme Court to recruit the members for appointment. In M.B. Majumdar v. Union of India when the members of CAT claimed parity of pay and superannuation as is available to the Judges of the High Court, this Court held that they are not on a par with the judges but a separate mechanism created for their appointment pursuant to Article 323-A of the Constitution. Therefore, what was meant by this Court in Sampath Kumar case ratio is that the tribunals when exercise the power and functions, the Act created institutional alternative mechanism or authority to adjudicate the service disputations. It must be effective and efficacious to exercise the power of judicial review. This Court did not appear to have meant that the tribunals are substitutes of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. J.B. Chopra v. Union of India merely followed the ratio of Sampath Kumar."