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7. As would immediately be evident from the narrative aforesaid of the Reference Petition, reference is sought unilaterally, without there being any instrument chargeable to stamp duty and without there being any person liable for such stamp duty or to remission thereof under Notification dated 25 th December, 1937 as admittedly being granted with respect to instruments of transfer between companies as described above and which remission, in the opinion of CCRA is not available / applicable since 1st October, 1958, inspite of dicta of this Court in Delhi Towers Limited supra and on which the petitioner CCRA in this Reference is seeking a judgment from this Court. Axiomatically, there was / is none to oppose the opinion expressed by the petitioner CCRA in the Reference Petition. We thus requested Mr. Rajeev Kumar Virmani, Senior Advocate to assist this Court as Amicus Curiae and to which he graciously agreed.

F. The position is placed beyond any pale of controversy by Section 59(2) of the Act which requires this Court to, after deciding the question raised in the Reference made by the CCRA, forward its judgment to the CCRA and mandates the CCRA to, on receipt of such copy "dispose of the case conformably to such judgment". If it were to be held that Reference by CCRA to this Court under Section 57 is permissible even in the absence of any instrument or document and in vacuum/abstract, merely on CCRA without any case before it seeking a legal opinion from this Court, there would be no question of the CCRA, on receiving the judgment of this Court disposing of the Reference, disposing of any case conformably to the judgment of this Court.

H. In Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd. supra, the Registrar of Documents being of the view that a document presented for registration was not sufficiently stamped, sent it to the Collector of Stamps. The Collector of Stamps was also of the view that the document was insufficiently stamped. The party to the document liable for stamp duty controverted. However the Collector of Stamps held the document to be insufficiently stamped and directed payment of deficient stamp duty and penalty. The party to the document liable for stamp duty filed a suit against the other party to the document, for declaration that the document did not fall in the class as held by the Collector but was of a different class and in the alternative for rectification of the document to truly reflect its intent. The suit was decided, directing rectification of the document. The outcome of the suit was reported to the Collector of Stamps and Reference under Section 57 of the Stamps Act demanded to the High Court. On the said request being not acceded to, the party to the document on whom demand for deficient stamp duty and penalty had been made, filed a writ petition seeking mandamus to the CCRA to make Reference under Section 57. The said writ petition was allowed and mandamus issued. The CCRA approached the Supreme Court. It was in this context that the Supreme Court held that the power vested in the CCRA under Section 57 is an obligation and for the benefit not only of the CCRA but also of the other party, liable to pay the assessed stamp duty and who is materially interested, also meaning that a Reference cannot be unilateral by the CCRA and there necessarily has to be a „other party‟. It was yet further held by the Supreme Court that a decision on a Reference is not necessarily based only on the reading of the entries in the Schedule to the Stamp Act but may also depend upon the true construction of the document, again meaning that a Reference in vacuum, without there being any case, is not maintainable. Noticing the scheme of the Stamp Act, it was further observed that Chapter VI containing Section 57 is about the liability of an instrument to duty and the adjudication thereof, again indicating that there can be no Reference in vacuum without stamp duty with respect to any instrument or document to be determined/adjudicated. It would thus be seen that this judgment, rather than supporting the maintainability of the Reference is to the contrary.

I. In Banarsi Das Ahluwalia supra, the contention of the CCRA which had been accepted by the High Court was, that since the Reference under Section 56 of the Act to the CCRA already stood disposed of and there was „no pending case‟, the demand of the person liable to stamp duty on the instrument subject matter thereof on the CCRA to make a Reference under Section 57 of the Act to the High Court was not sustainable. It was then the contention of the CCRA, that for CCRA to make a Reference under Section 57, there has to be „a pending case‟ before the CCRA. The said contention was rejected by the Supreme Court and it was held that the remedy available to a citizen under Section 57 cannot be negated merely because the CCRA has decided the Reference made to it or even if in pursuance thereto the deficient stamp duty and penalty has been paid/recovered. It was held that the Reference could be made thereafter also and if decided in favour of the person liable to stamp duty, the excess stamp duty and penalty paid could always be refunded. Reference in this regard was made to Section 59(2) supra requiring disposal of the case in conformity with the judgment on the Reference. It would thus be seen, that not only the said judgment also cannot be read as supporting a Reference in vacuum, as CCRA has sought in this case but the argument of CCRA itself then was contrary to what is contended before this Court. Merely because it was held in the context of the said judgment that there need not be a pending case, cannot be construed as meaning that even in the absence of a disposed of case or any specific document or instrument, Reference is maintainable.