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"The Appellant has brought to the notice of the High Court that a malady has been prevailing in the department of the State of Madhya Pradesh and the JDA. It may be true that the Appellant did not file any application questioning similar allotments but it is well-settled if an illegality is brought to the notice of the court, it can in certain situations exercise its power of judicial review suo motu"

This Court times without number, however, has laid down the law as regard limited scope of public interest litigation. It sounded note of caution for entertaining public interest litigation in service matters [See Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India and Others, (2004) 3 SCC 363], in questioning the validity or otherwise of a statute or when a statute is enacted in violation of the direction of a superior court [See Ashok Kumar Thakur v. State of Bihar & Ors. [(1995) 5 SCC 403]. But, we cannot also shut our eyes to the fact that this Court has entertained a large number of public interest litigations for protection of environmental and/ or ecology. [See .M.C. Mehta group of cases and T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and Others, (2006) 1 SCC 1] Public interest litigations, thus, have been entertained more frequently where a question of violation of the provisions of the statutes governing the environmental or ecology of the country has been brought to its notice in the matter of depletion of forest areas and/ or when the executive while exercising its administrative functions or making subordinate legislations has interfered with the ecological balance with impunity. The High Court of Bombay, therefore, cannot be faulted with for entertaining the writ petition as a public interest litigation.

A planning authority, therefore, must take into consideration all the relevant factors, although in a given case, one gets priority over the other. Ordinarily, it would not be for the court to substitute its decision to that of the planning authority unless an appropriate case is made out therefor. When, however, question of public interest comes up, the court indisputably would try to delicately balance the different factors, if possible. Both open space as also the other factors relevant for making the regulation would be in public interest. The question would, however, be as to which is of greater public interest. Public interest, thus, would be a relevant factor also for interpretation of the statute. Public interest so far as maintenance of ecology is concerned pertains to a constitutional scheme comprising of Articles 14, 21, 48A and 51A(g) of the Constitution of India, the other factors are no less significant. [See also T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad vs. Union of India and Others, (2002) 10 SCC 606, N.D. Jayal and Another vs. Union of India and Others, (2004) 9 SCC 362 and Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum vs. Union of India and Others, (1996) 5 SCC 647]. All concerned, namely, operating agencies, the State Government, the National Textile Mills as also BIFR interpreting the said regulation opined that sharing of land is imperative, but the question remains, to what extent? Whether radical changes were made in the year 2003, when the State made the aforementioned clarification would again be a question which is required to be posed and answered. Was such a clarification in consonance with the reports of Charles Correa Committee and the Ranjit Deshmukh Committee? Did 2000 acres of vacant land which would have been otherwise available come down to 50 acres? Had any balance been struck between the original concept of sharing of lands by Bombay Municipal Corporation, MHADA and the mill owners? It is in the aforementioned backdrop, the nature of change must be considered. The amendment in 2001, therefore, must be interpreted having regard to the provisions of the MRTP Act which professed increase in the ecological interest by providing more open space and not decreasing the same, but again the question would be "was there any reduction"? The amendments in the regulation must be construed in furtherance of the legislative policy and not in derogation thereof. But, while doing so, the past experience of the State which paved the necessities for modifying the earlier regulation should not be forgotten. A statutory scheme herein also by way of Section 22 clearly speaks about open spaces. The Legislative Act confers guidelines which advocates the necessity of environmental impact assessment. The State, when it exercises its power under Section 37 of the MRTP Act is required to act within the four-corners of the Act. Any modification or amendment must address the environmental consequences together with other relevant factors. As a logical corollary, it must also be determined as to whether the amendments amounted to a minor modification or substantive one. Literal interpretation of the Act and the Rules would give rise to many anomalies. It would not advance the object and purport of the Act. It would also create difficulties in implementing the statutory scheme. Having said so, we have no other option but, as indicated hereinbefore, to take recourse to the principles of purposive construction and interpret DCR 58 in accordance with the scope and object of the Act. For the said purpose, we may also have to consider various aspects of the matter. We would make an attempt in this behalf.

Ecological factors indisputably are very relevant considerations in construing a town planning statute. The court normally would lead in favour of environmental protection in view of the creative interpretation made by this Court in finding a right of environmental including right to clear water, air, etc. under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. But, in this case, we are not dealing with a similar problem. It must be borne in mind while interpreting DCR 58 that there exists a stark distinction between the interpretation of planning and zoning statutes enforcing ecology vis-`-vis industrial effluents and hazardous industries and those relating to concerted efforts at rehabilitating the industry. It is around this pivot that interpretation must revolve. It is also interesting to note that in American Jurisprudence 2d, wherein at page 496 of vol. 82, it is stated that zoning laws should be construed strictly in favour of the property owners and that they should not be extended by implication to include restrictions not clearly prescribed. Ecology in terms of DCR 58 has not been marginalized. The statute does not prescribe any fixed norm. It provides for guidelines. It has not been shown that the said guidelines have been violated. The environmental aspect considered in DCR 58 may not be to everybody's satisfaction but the regulation in question has to be interpreted having regard to the purport and object for which the same was enacted, meaning thereby, a holistic approach to a large number of problems.

"The significance of a development planning cannot therefore be denied. Planned development is the crucial zone that strikes a balance between the needs of large-scale urbanization and individual building. It is the science and aesthetics of urbanization as it saves the development from chaos and uglification. A departure from planning may result in disfiguration of the beauty of an upcoming city and may pose a threat for the ecological balance and environmental safeguards."

This, however, has no relevance in the present case. Whereas even in a case of town planning, the court may consider the action on the part of the State while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction in changing the user with all seriousness; it deserves particularly when it is contrary to the development plan, it may not do so where it is within the contours thereof. The question has to be considered having regard to the fact that in stead and place of industries which would have otherwise a far larger environmental impact vis-`-vis the buildings which would be constructed would be used for residential or commercial purposes. The problem will have to be addressed from the point of view that as a part of the scheme framed by the State in making DCR 58, the money would be invested not only for the purpose of revivial and / or rehabilitation of the sick or closed mills, the same would also give a boost to modernization and/ or shifting of mills and/ or parts thereof from residential area to outside the town of Bombay. It is not disputed that modernization and shifting of the mills from Bombay to the suburbs would go a long way in solving ecological problems of the town. If some mills opt for modernization, the ecological impact would be lesser than the mills which are existing for a very long time. While setting up modern mills in place of old ones, evidently approval of the Commissioner and sanction of the State in relation to the scheme would be imperative and while doing the exercise of scrutiny as regard environmental impact assessment would be required to be gone into. Furthermore, such a step would also be in consonance with the present economic policy of the State viz. the policy of disinvestment and privatization. Such a policy is not alien to the scheme of MRTP Act. We, however, fail to understand that if raising of construction by the mill owners had been questioned on ecological considerations why the Appellants failed and/ or neglected to raise such a contention as regard the constructions to be raised by MHADA. Construction of buildings, if results in an impact on ecology; it was expected that the writ petitioners  Respondents would question the validity thereof. They might have not done so having regard to the fact that the same would invite adverse comments from the workers. Even the mill owners did not question the constitutionality of such a provision presumably because they considered the provisions of DCR 58 as part of a package deal. Presumably, they also thought that if change of user is granted, even sale of a portion of land would compensate them for the portion they are required to surrender to MCGM by way of public greens and/ or housing schemes to be undertaken by MHADA.