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It is true that repeal by implication is not ordinarily favoured by the Courts but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests has been stated in Maxwell on 'Interpretation of Statutes' (Twelfth Edition) at page 193 tuhs:
"If, however, the provisions of a later enactment are so inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of an earlier one that the two cannot stand together the earlier is abrogated by the later . (vide Kutner V. Phillips)[1891] 2 Q.B. 267 at 272.
"It is true, as already pointed out, that on a question under Art. 2541) whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the State, no question of repeal arises; but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests, namely, that if the subject matter of the later legislation is identical with that of the earlier, so that they cannot both stand together, then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment, will be equally applicable to a question under Art. 254(2) whether the further legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as that of the State law. We must accordingly hold that section 2 of Bombay Act No. XXXVI of 1947 cannot prevail as against sec. 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act No. XXXIV of 1946 as amended by Act No. LII of 1950."

The aforesaid principle of implied repeal has been approved and applied in a couple of other decisions of this Court, particularly in T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe and Another [1983] I S.C.R. 905. D In the instant case the two pieces of legislation are so inconsistent with or repugnant to each other that both cannot stand together and such repugnancy arises from a) the conferal of power to levy duty on two different bodies, namely, the State Government under the Ordinance and the Municipality under the appropriate Act and obviously the exercise of the power concurrently by both the bodies would be incongruous and entirely destructive of the object for which the power was conferred, and (b) the enhanced rate of duty prescribed by the Municipal Rules and Bye-laws - a situation similar to enhanced punishment provided by a later enactment. Having regard to such repugnancy obtaining between the two pieces of legislation dealing with the r same subject matter the later in point of time will have the effect of displacing the former by necessary implication. That such implied repeal or displacement was within the contemplation of the legislative authority which issued the Ordinance of 1949 will be amply clear if regard is had to the object with which the Ordinance came to be promulgated. The avowed object of the Ordinance was to enable the State Government to levy and collect octroi duty in towns and cities of the erstwhile State of Saurashtra and to pass on the duties so collected by it to those towns and cities until Municipalities therein were constituted under the appropriate Act and those Municipalities made their own Rules and Bye-laws enabling them to levy and collect octroi and other usual Municipal taxes; clause (9) of the Ordinance made express provision for making over such collections to concerned towns and cities. That such was the object of the Ordinance has been clearly stated by this Court in Mulchand Odhavji v. Rajkot Borough Municipality, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 685. In other words the Ordinance and the Government Rules framed thereunder were a stop gap measure, being transitional in character which would automatically cease to operate no sooner the concerned Municipality (here Dharangadhra Municipality) made and published its own Octroi Rules and ye-laws under the appropriate Act.

To counter Act the inference of implied repeal, strong reliance was placed by Counsel for the appellant on the language used in rule and Bye-law 3 which state that these Rules shall come into force after the exemption from the Ordinance and the Rules thereunder has been granted and according to Counsel such Language negative any suggestion of implied repeal. In our view rule 3 as well as Bye-law proceed on a mistaken assumption of law that the exemption from the Ordinance and the rules framed thereunder was necessary before the Municipal Rules and Bye-laws could be enforced. Once the Municipal Rules and ye-laws are validly made and also validly brought into force by following the requisite procedure prescribed in that behalf under the appropriate Act the earlier Government Rules would stand pro-tanto repealed notwithstanding what is contained in Rule 3 or Bye-law 3. The legal effect of such a provision (as is contained in Rule 3 or Bye-law 3) would not be and is not to restrain or prevent the municipalities from bringing into force its Rules and Bye-laws by following the prescribed procedure. The real aim and object of Rule 3 or Bye-law 3 sees to be to prevent double taxation. If the insertion of Rule 3 or Bye-law 3 was because of a wrong belief or assumption made in the matter of the legal position the Court has to disregard such belief or assumption, for, it is well settled that the beliefs or assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law' (vide Lord Radcliffe in Inland Revenue V. Dowdell O'Mahoney & Co. Ltd. 1952 All England Law Reports 531 at 544). Therefore, the Municipal Rules and Bye-laws 1965 having been validly brought into force after following the prescribed procedure in that behalf, the Government Rules under the Ordinance got impliedly repealed.