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2. Chapter XXXIX, Criminal P. C, deals with bail. It begins with Section 496 which provides for bail in bailable cases. Then comes Section 497 which provides for bail in non-bailable cases, and the main restriction provided by Section 497 is that bail shall not be granted if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the person asking for bail has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life. There is an exception to this in the case of persons below 16 years of age, or a woman or any sick or infirm person.

12. Learned Government Advocate however urges that in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in 'Jan-am Das v. Emperor' AIR 1945 PC 94 (I) this view taken by the High Courts in India is incorrect, and that the power conferred on the High Court and the Sessions Judge Under Section 498 is controlled by the provisions of Section 497. It may however be mentioned that 'Jairamdas's case (I)' was not directly concerned with the question whether the power granted by Section 498 to the High Court or the Sessions Judge was controlled by Section 497. The joint there for decision was whether it was open to the High Court to grant bail to a convicted person Under Section 498 in a case where that person had been granted special leave to appeal by His Majesty in Council.

During the course of this judgment their Lordships while reviewing the provisions of Chapter XXXIX remarked that the scheme of Chapter XXXIX is that Sections 496 and 497 provide for the granting of bail to accused persons before trial, and the other sections of the chapter deal with matters ancillary for subsidiary to that provision.

It is on these words that the learned Government Advocate strongly relies and urges that as the provisions in Section 498 are ancillary and subsidiary, they could not have been intended to confer extended powers on the High Court and the Sessions Judge irrespective of Section 497. There are not many cases of the period after this decision of the Privy Council on this point, but we may notice the views that are available,

13. In 'Kripa Shankar v. Emperor' AIR 194"8 All 26 (J) it was held that the powers conferred Under Section 498 upon a Sessions Judge were not handicapped by the restrictions in Section 497, though 'Jairamdas's case (I)' was not referred to in this case.

14. in 'Amir Chand v. The Crown' AIR 1950 EP 53 (FB) (K) a Full Bench of the East Punjab High Court was considering the question of what is colloquially called anticipatory bail. In that connection, Das C. J., as he then was, in the referring order remarked that Section 498 was ancillary or subsidiary to Sections 496 and 497 according to the Judicial Committee, and the first and the last sentences of Section 498 were clearly ancillary or subsidiary to Sections 496 and 497 in that they worked out the provisions of those last mentioned sections, and it was rather curious, to say the least, that the Legislature would introduce a far reaching provision conferring on the High Court and the Court of Session a wholly new and independent power for granting bail which was contrary to the etymological meaning of the term "bail" in a sort of parenthesis sandwiched between two provisions with which it had nothing to do and which two provisions were clearly ancillary or subsidiary to Sections 496 and 497.