Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law

"the consequences laid down in section 6 of the Act will apply only when a statute or regulation having the force of a statute is actually repealed. It has no application when a statute, which is of a temporary nature, automatically expires by efflux of time."

Reliance is also placed on the judgment reported as Jindal Oil Mill & Ors vs Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd AIR 1969 SC 1225.

9. It was contended on behalf of the Union of India, the Designated Authority as well as the domestic industry applicants, that the first proviso to Section 9A (5) of the CTA as well as a fair reading of Rule 6 do not lead to the conclusion that the intention to review and extend the anti-dumping duty, in the facts of a given case, have to be necessarily published and made available to all, before the expiry of the original notification. It was pointed out that in this case, the extension notification was in fact printed on 31-12-2013 in the Official Gazette. The compelling inference which the Court should draw, therefore, is that the requirement of Section 9-A (5) in that regard had been fulfilled. It was argued that the sunset review proposed by the impugned notification of 31-12-2013 is mandatory in terms of the W.P.(C) 1851/2014 & W.P.(C) 1866/2014 Page 7 judgment of this Court, in Indian Metal and Ferro Alloys v. Designated Authority, 2008 (224) ELT 375 Del.

24. This court holds that the petitioners' submission that a notification under Section 9A (1) issued after review is in the nature of temporary legislation, is merited. A statute is ordinarily perpetual, in the sense that no time is fixed for its duration. In that sense Section 9A is perpetual. However, that provision is merely enabling; it authorizes a levy of anti-dumping duty upon proof of injury, and upon fulfillment of other conditions. Once notified, the levy has effect - in terms of the notification and Section 9A (5) for five years. That levy is W.P.(C) 1851/2014 & W.P.(C) 1866/2014 Page 27 consequently, temporary as the duration is finite. In these circumstances, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which provides that notifications, bye-laws etc. validly made under a repealed law can continue to be in force, would have no application. This position was clarified by the Supreme Court in District Mining Officer and others v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. & Anr AIR 2001 SC 3134, where the question as to what is a "temporary statute", was examined and it was observed that:

"19......... A Statute can be said to be either perpetual or temporary. It is perpetual when no time is fixed for its duration and such a statute remains in force until its repeal which may be express or implied. But a Statute is temporary when its duration is only for a specified time and such a Statute expires on the expiry of the specified time, unless it is repealed earlier ..........Admittedly, to a temporary Statute, the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 will have no application .........A temporary Statute even in the absence of a saving provision like Section 6 of the General Clauses Act may not be construed dead for all purposes and the effect of expiry is essentially one of the construction of the Act......."