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18. In Sukumar Guha v. Naresh Chandra Ghosh, [AIR 1968 Cal. 49.] a Single Judge (Hon'ble Amresh Roj, J.) referring to section 114, Illustration (f) of Act, 1872, section 106 of Act, 1882 and section 27 of Act, 1897 said that presumption under section 27 of Act, 1897 can arise only when a notice is sent by registered post while there may arise a presumption under section 114 of Act, 1872 when notice is sent by ordinary post or under certificate of posting. Both the presumptions are rebuttable. When the cover containing notice has been returned to the sender by postal authorities, then that fact is direct proof of the fact that the notice sent by post was not delivered to the party to whom it was addressed. Whether it was tendered and, if so, to whom tendered, remains a matter to be ascertained on evidence. If acceptable evidence is available that it was tendered to the party personally, then such facts may bring the service of notice within the second mode, namely, tendered or delivered personally to such party. If however, tender or delivery is not to the party personally but to a member of his family or a servant, then it may be effective tender or delivery only when the notice was addressed to the residence of the party. Such personal tender or vicarious tender may be effective even if it was through the agency of post office, and proof of that tender comes from testimony of any person present at the event, and not only by examining the postman. Here what I finds that when Court talks of evidence, we read it in the context of section 114 of Act, 1872. A registered envelop received back from postal authority with the endorsement of postman of "refusal" will constitute a valid evidence to show that it was served upon the addressee but he refused to accept unless proved otherwise and for that purpose examination of postman for constituting a prima facie evidence, further, would not be required, in view of section 14 of Act, 1898. This section 14 of Act, 1898 has been omitted from consideration by the Court.

19. This Court in Wasu Ram v. R.L. Sethi, [1963 AWR 472.] said:

"The question whether a communication sent through the post was received by the address is one of fact, but in many cases it may be difficult and inconvenient if not impossible, to produce the postal official who delivered the letter or the money order. To obviate this difficulty the Evidence Act permits certain presumptions to be made under certain circumstances, section 16 provides that "when there is a question whether a particular act was done, the existence of any course of business, according to which it naturally would have been done, is a relevant fact". The illustration (a) to this section explains that in a question "whether a particular letter was despaired, the facts that it was the ordinary course of business for all letter put in a certain place to be carried to the post, and that particular letter was put in that place, are relevant". Section 114 provides that the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and proper business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Illustration (e) to this section says that "the Court may presume that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed"; and Illustration (f) says that the Court may presume that "the common course of business has been followed in particular cases". The combined effect of these two sections is to raise a presumption that a communication sent by post was received in the ordinary course by the addressee, and if it was returned to the sender with the endorsement "refused", the postman must have tendered it but delivery could not be made because of the refusal of the addressee. These presumptions are based on human experience and common sense. Our experience tells us that millions of letters which are posted are delivered in due course to the address, though in exceptional cases letters do get lost. The onus of proof is on the person who asserts that the abnormal happened in his case and the communication sent by post did not follow its normal course to destination."

33. This Court has followed the above decision in Noor Mohammad v. XIV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur Nagar. [2006 (63) ALR 244.] Therein Revisional Court reversed Trial Court's order on the ground that tenant has tendered rent to landlord through money order which was received with the endorsement "refusal" by postman but when landlord denied tender of money order, tenant did not examine postman and hence failed to discharge burden lying upon him. In other words, the Revisional Court said that it is the sender who should examine the postman and not the sendee/addressee for whom the postal authorities have endorsed that it has refused to accept the article. This view of the Revisional Court was reversed by this Court, by ob serving:

"In respect of endorsement of refusal by the postman, there is no necessity to examine the postman to prove that. If there is any such duty then it is for the person denying tender by the postman."

34. This Court also in Brij Nandan Gupta v. HI Addl. District Judge, Rampur, [ Writ-A No. 24853 of 1989, decided on 30.7.2012, reported in 2012 (94) ALR 593.] in para 21 of judgment said:

"Similarly, if a notice has been sent by landlord by registered post and it is received back with an endorsement made by an official of Post Office namely Postman that il was refused by the addresee, presumption of service upon addressee shall be drawn unless the tenant prove that the letter was never offered to him by the Postman and endorsement made thereon is not correct. The tenant's bare denial would not be sufficient in such a case and he will have to prove his case by adducing relevant evidence. Such denial can be by making statement on oath and in such case onus would shift on the landlord to prove that refusal was by the tenant which he can show by summoning the postman and adducing his oral evidence. However, this is one aspect of the matter. Sometimes from the conduct of tenant or other circumstances, his denial even if on oath, can justifiably be disproved by the Court without having Postman examined."