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3. The defence was that the property was taken on rent for a period of five years and the defendant "did continue in the property as tenant since thereafter." It was denied that the occupation of the house by the Incharge, Training-cum-Extension Centre was unauthorised and illegal; that the property was occupied by the State of Uttar Pradesh and the said centre had no independent existence apart from the State. The liability to pay rent at the agreed rate was admitted but the claim of compensation for use and occupation was denied. The claim for possession was also refuted. The plea of undervaluation and deficiency in court-fees was also raised. In para 24 of the written statement, under the additional pleas, it was said that "in any case the plaintiff had himself executed the lease deed and it is for the defendant to complete the same in case it has not been completed. The lease deed is operative and binding on the plaintiff and the plaintiff is not entitled to challenge the same. It was then claimed that the house was held by the defendant as a tenant on payment of rent from the coffers of the Government which was accepted as such by the plaintiff and that the compliance of the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution has been fulfilled by implication. It was further pleaded that the contract had been ratified by holding over and payment of rent and retaining the possession, it was pleaded that "Article 299 of the Constitution is for the benefit of the defendant and it did not give any cause of action to the plaintiff to challenge the non-compliance thereof." It was then pleaded that no contract was being enforced by the suit and the provisions of Article 299 had been enacted "to enable the parties to enforce the contract" and "as such the non-compliance of Article 299 does not give any cause of action to the plaintiff to maintain this suit." Lastly, it was pleaded that "after the period of lease the plaintiffs has accepted the defendant as his tenant by holding over and by the provisions of U. P. Act XIII of 1972" that the plaintiff has also elected to treat the defendant as tenant and is now estopped from challenging the said character of the defendant and its interest in the property and finally the tenancy between the parties can be created by payment of rent and delivery of possession according to law which has been done in this case as such valid tenancy between the parties has been created by operation of law.

7. After hearing the appeal under Order 41 Rule 11 of the Civil P. C. the substantial question of law formulated, by this Court, while issuing notice of the appeal to the plaintiffs-respondents, was:--

"Whether the appellant State of U. P. could be treated to be a tenant of the house in suit although the deed of lease was signed by and on its behalf in accordance with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution only after the institution of the suit "

8. The pro forma lease signed by the second plaintiff and the Joint Director of Industries is Ext. Ka-6. It appears to have been put forth as the first plank of its defence before the trial court by the learned counsel for the Stale of Uttar Pradesh. The trial court me: the argument based on that document by saying that the period of five years from 1st Oct. 1968 had already expired when it was signed on behalf of the lessee on 1st Sept. 1976. The trial court appears to have accepted the argument of the plaintiffs that the document was not properly in conformity with the requirement of Article 299 of the Constitution and was not registered, and being unregistered, it was inadmissible in evidence.

9. The contention raised on the said pro forma lease. Ext. Ka 6, was repeated before lower appellate court. The lower appellate court held that having been signed on behalf of the State long after the expiry of the period of lease and after the institution of the suit, it could have no value in the eye of law and even if the signatures on behalf of the State were accepted to be proper, the document was inoperative inasmuch as it was unregistered.

10. The learned standing Counsel appearing for the State urged that whether there was no valid lease on account of non-compliance with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution, or whether the deed of lease even if properly executed was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, the effect was the same inasmuch as in either case a lease as contemplated by the parties did not come into existence or could not be given effect to for non-compliance with the mandalory provisions of law. He did not urge that any lease for five years came into being as envisaged by the parties when the pro forma lease was signed by the second plaintiff and was delivered to the local officers for being executed on behalf of the Slate of Uttar Pradesh, as the lessee bv an officer competent to sign and authenticate it on its behalf in accordance with the requirements of Article 299 of the Constitution. He further conceded that even if it were duly signed and authenticated in accordance with the requirements of Article 299 of the Constitution, and that too before the expiry of the term of five years, it would have been useless for being inadmissible on account of being unregistered. According to the learned standing Counsel the decision of the case did not, therefore, turn on the answer to the question formulated by this Court, while issuing notice of the appeal to the plaintiff-respondents after hearing under Order 41 Rule 11 C. P. C. I think the learned standing Counsel was righf in saying so. but he urged that the absence of a duly executed registered deed of lease, which is necessary according to law. does not necessarily lead to the result that the position of the defendants was not that of tenants. According to the learned standing Counsel, the delivery of possession over the property with the intention to create a lease, in the present case with the express intention of granting a lease for five years as evidenced by the delivery of the pro forma lease signed by the second plaintiff, coupled with the payment and acceptance of rent, in the absence of a contract, attracted the applicability of Section 106 of the T. P. Act. The result was that if, the letting was taken to be for manufacturing purposes, a lease from year to year, and if it was taken to be for residential purpose, a lease from month to month came into being by operation of law.

11. The contention on behalf of learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents was that a lease, by its very definition cannot come into being without a contract between the parties and a contract with the Government, in the sense of being an agreement enforceable at law, is impossible of coming into being without complying with the mandatory requirements of Article 299 of the Constitution, Consequently a lease to which the Government is a party cannot, come into being without an instrument in writing that complies with the requirement of Article 299 of the Constitution, and that being so a lease of immoveable property could be made in favour of the Government only by a registered instrument, even if it was for a term of less than one year. Learned counsel confined his argument to the case of a lease in favour of the Government for he did not want to enter into the controversy whether in view of Section 2 of the Government Grants Act, the provisions of Section 107 of the T. P. Act. could properly be applied to a lease made by and on behalf of the Government. The question which thus arises for determination in this appeal is whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case a tenancy from year to year or month to month could come into being in favour of the State of Uttar Pradesh under Section 106 of the T. P. Act.