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2. Aggrieved by the order dated 25th September, 2013 whereby the leave to defend application of the Petitioner was dismissed for the reason the same was filed beyond the period of 15 days, the present petition has been preferred.

3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner states that the learned ARC wrongly relied upon the decision in Prithpal Singh vs. Satpal Singh (Dead) through LRs, 2010 (2) SCC 15. The High Court being the Court of original jurisdiction as well as the Court of Appeal it has inherent powers to condone the delay and thus the same should be considered by this Court and on the facts of the case the delay be condoned. It is further stated that in Prithpal Singh (Supra) the applicability of law of limitation was directly not in consideration and the only issue was whether the Controller can recall an order of eviction by applying the provisions of Order 9 Rule 13 read with Order 37 Rule 4 and Section 151 CPC. It is further submitted that dehors the delay in the application for leave to defend being not condoned, the learned Trial Court was bound to look into the fact that the eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (in short 'the DRC Act') was not maintainable and the same was maintainable only under Section 22 of the DRC Act. Reliance is placed on Madan Mohan Lal vs. P.Tandon, 21 (1982) DLT 16 and Superior Exim Pvt. Ltd. vs. Sitar Ram Goel, RC Rev. No.401/2012 decided on 14th August, 2012.

4. Learned counsel for the Respondent on the other hand further states that Section 22 of DRC Act is not applicable to the present case as the four conditions mentioned in the said provision do not apply to the facts of the present case. Reliance is placed on Satnam Kaur and others vs. Ashlar Stores P. Ltd., 158 (2009) DLT 62.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

6. The Respondent filed the eviction petition before the learned ARC under Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act stating that the Respondent was a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, Shri Vinod Nair is the Principal Officer and Attorney of the Respondent Company and is duly authorized to sign, verify and institute the present petition. It is further stated that Shop No. 32, 9062, Ram Bagh, Azad Market, Delhi-110006 has been let out to the Petitioner for commercial purposes from where the Petitioner was carrying his business activity. It was stated that the Respondent Company was incurring losses for a long time and thus to revamp its business, the Respondent Company requires place for building proper infrastructure and office to be used by its employees as per the plan finalized. The Respondent Company is in the process of hiring more than 40 new employees and therefore it has to build up a new and bigger office. The Respondent Company requires the said shop bona fidely for its own use and for the use of its employees and Respondent Company does not have any alterative or suitable non-residential premises. The Respondent Company is presently accommodating in shop No.21 of the said complex. It is further stated that the Respondent Company has initiated similar process of eviction against the other ten tenants in various shops in the complex.

10. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further stated that even if the leave to defend application of the Petitioner was not to be allowed and the averments in the eviction petition are to be taken on their face value the same do not attract provision of Section 14 (1) (e) DRC Act and eviction petition only under Section 22 of the DRC Act could have been filed. Section 14 (1) (e) and Section 22 of the DRC Act provide as:

14 (1)(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.

12. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon the decision of this Court in Madan Mohan Lal (supra) where this Court held that if the company or a body corporate requires the premises for the use of its employees Section 22 DRC Act alone would apply and not Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act. The said decision was rendered by this Court before the decision of the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (dead) by LRs vs. Union of India and another, 2008 (5) SCC 287 when Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act was applicable to the residential premises only and thus this Court held that if the premises was required for the residence of the employees then Section 22 of the DRC Act would be applicable. As noted from the contents of the eviction petition, the Respondent clearly stated that the tenanted premises was required to expand its business and for this reason it requires the premises for its own use and the use of its employees. The tenanted premises was required as a commercial premises and not as a residential premises for the employees. Even if the employees sit in the office, the same cannot be said that the premises are required for the use of the employees. There is no gainsaying that it is for the use of the company itself. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel in Superior Exim Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is also not applicable because in the eviction petition therein the landlord had stated that he required the premises to fulfill the need of residential accommodation of the employees.