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The petition was listed before Hon'ble Mr. Justice Yogeshwar Dayal of Delhi High Court. After hearing arguments, the Hon'ble Court was pleased to dismiss the petition filed by the petitioner Shri P.S. Shukla asking for directions for not putting the handcuffs when escorted from jail to the court and back to the Jail. In view of the circumstances of the case, it was observed that no directions were needed. However, it came to my notice that the requirements of Punjab Police Rules contained in Volume III Chapter 25 Rule 26, 22, 23 and High Court Rules and orders Volume III Chapter 27 Rule 19 are not being complied with. I would also draw the attention of all concerned to the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice R.N. Aggarwal in Vishwa Nath Versus State, Crl. Misc. Main No. 430 of 1978 decided on 6-4-1979 wherein it has been observed that a better class under-trial be not handcuffed with out recording the reasons in the daily diary for considering the necessity of the use of such a prisoner is being escorted to and from the court by the police, use of handcuffs be not reported to unless there is a reasonable expectation that such prisoner will use violence or that an attempt will be made to rescue him. The practice of use of handcuffs be followed in accordance with the rules mentioned above. In plain language, it means that ordinary Indian under- trials shall be routinely handcuffed during transit between jail and court and the better class prisoner shall be so confined only if reasonably apprehended to be violent or rescued.

Insurance against escape does not compulsorily require hand cuffing. There are other measures whereby an escort can keep safe custody of a detenu without the indignity and cruelty implicit in handcuffs or other iron contraptions. Indeed, binding together either the hands or the feet or both has not merely a preventive impact, but also a punitive hurtfulness. Manacles are mayhem on the human person and inflict humiliation on the bearer. The Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. II (1973 Edn.) at p. 53 states "handcuffs and fetters are instruments for securing the hands or feet of prisoners under arrest, or as a means of punishment." The three components of 'irons' forced on the human person must be distinctly understood. Firstly, to handcuff is to hoop harshly. Further, to handcuff is to punish humiliatingly and to vulgarise the viewers also. Iron straps are insult and pain writ large, animalising victim and keeper. Since there are other ways of ensuring security, it can be laid down as a rule that handcuffs or other fetters shall not be forced on the person of an under-trial prisoner ordinarily. The latest police instructions produced before us hearteningly reflect this view. We lay down as necessarily implicit in Arts. 14 and 19 that when there is no compulsive need to fetter a person's limbs, it is sadistic, capricious despotic and demoralizing to humble a man by manacling him. Such arbitrary conduct surely slaps Art. 14 on the face. The criminal freedom of movement which even a detainee is entitled to under Art. 19 (see Sunil Batra, supra) cannot be cut down cruelly by application of handcuffs or other hoops. It will be unreasonable so to do unless the State is able to make out that no other practical way of forbidding escape is available, the prisoner being so dangerous and desperate and the circumstance so hostile to safe-keeping.

Some increase in the number of escorts, arming them if necessary, special training for escort police, transport of prisoners in protected vehicles, are easily available alternatives and, in fact, are adopted in some States in the country where handcuffing is virtually abolished, e.g. Tamil Nadu.

Even in cases where, in extreme circumstances, handcuffs have to be put on the prisoner, the escorting authority must record contemporaneously the reasons for doing so. Otherwise, under Art. 21 the procedure will be unfair and bad in law. Nor will mere recording the reasons do, as that can be a mechanical process mindlessly made. The escorting officer, whenever he handcuffs a prisoner produced in court, must show the reasons so recorded to the Presiding Judge and get his approval. Otherwise, there is no control over possible arbitrariness in applying handcuffs and fetters. The minions of the police establishment must make good their security recipes by getting judicial approval. And, once the court directs that handcuffs shall be off no escorting authority can overrule judicial direction. This is implicit in Art. 21 which insists upon fairness, reasonableness and justice in the very procedure which authorises stringent deprivation of life and liberty. The ratio in Maneka Gandhi's case and Sunil Batra's ease (supra), read in its proper light, leads us to this conclusion.

Rule 26.22 read with rule 26.21-A of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 draw a distinction between "better class"

undertrial prisoners and "ordinary" undertrial prisoner 35 a basis for determining who should be handcuffed and who should not be. As I have observed, the appropriate principle for a classification should be defined by the need to prevent the prisoner escaping from custody or becoming violent. The social status of a person, his education and habit of life associated with superior mode of living seem to me to be intended to protect his dignity of person. But that dignity is a dignity which belongs to all, rich and poor, of high social status and low, literate and illiterate. It is the basic assumption that all individuals are entitled to enjoy that dignity that determines the rule that ordinarily no restraint should be imposed except in those cases where there is a reasonable fear of the prisoner attempting to escape or attempting violence. It is abhorrent to envisage a prisoner being handcuffed merely because it is assumed that he does not belong to "a better class", that he does not possess the basic dignity pertaining to every individual. Then there is need to guard against a misuse of the power from other motives. It is grossly objectionable that the power given by the law to impose a restraint, either by applying handcuffs or otherwise, should be seen as an opportunity for exposing the accused to public ridicule and humiliation. Nor is the power intended to be used vindictively or by way of punishment. Standing order 44 and the Instructions on Handcuffs of November, 1977, reproduced by my learned brother, evidence the growing concern at a higher level of the administration over the indiscriminate manner in which handcuffs are being used. To my mind, even those provisions operate somewhat in excess of the object to be subserved by the imposition of handcuffs, having regard to the central principle that only he should be handcuffed who can be reasonably apprehended to attempt an escape or become violent.