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22. Mukherji, J., who delivered the leading judgment taking the view that the Privy Council in Tagore Case (1872-73) L.R.I.A. (Supp.) 47 : 9 Beng. L.R. 377 directly decided that the rule in that case applied to such office as that of shebait, ruled as follows:

The founder of a Hindu debuttar is competent to lay down rules to govern the succession to the office of shebait, subject to the restriction that he cannot create any estate unknown or repugnant to Hindu Law.

A person succeeding to shebaiti is a grantee or done of property and his right to succeed to the office is subject to the rule that a gift cannot be made by a Hindu to a person not in existence at the time of the gift.

36. The former suit was not one under Order 1, Rule 8, Civil Procedure Code. Order 1, Rule 8, applies only to cases where there are numerous persons having the same interest in a suit, when convenience requires that amongst the large number of persons so interested a few should be allowed to represent the whole. It is an enabling provision which entitles one party or a few to represent several persons who have a common cause of action. In the instant case, as discussed! above all the persons then having interest in the office of trusteeship must, on the materials on record, be held to have been made parties to the former suit. If the suit had gone to final judgment as originally constituted, clearly persons who had succeeded to the office after the parties on record in that suit would be bound by the result of the suit. Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure, 13th Edition. collecting decisions points out at page 83 that a shebait, a trustee of a Devasam, a Mutawalli, an administrator of the estate of a deceased person, each represents his successor and, therefore, a decree against Mm will bind his successor. In Madhavan v. Keshavan (1888) I.L.R. 11 Mad. 191 the uraima (managership) right over a certain Devasam. was vested in five Urallers (temple trustees) representing different Illams, and a suit was brought by one of the Urallers to recover) certain property alleged to have been illegally alienated by three other Uralers to a stranger. The suit was dismissed. At that time the adoption of the plaintiff, the 5th Uralar, entitling him to the uraima right was not recognised by the other Uralars and he succeded in establishing it only later. When the 5th trustee who had not been a party to the former suit brought a suit for the same purpose, it was held that the decree in the former suit was a bar to the second suit, on the ground that he must be deemed to claim under the plaintiffs in the former suit within the meaning of Section 13, Explanation V, corresponding to the present Section 11, Explanation VI of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision in Jherula Das v. Jalandhar Thakur (1912) I.L.R. 39 Cal. 887 is again authority for the position that decree against shebaits in honest suits bind the successors. The reason, it is observed in that case, is that shebaits with their predecessors and successors form one continuous representation of the idol and consequently subsequent shebaits are regarded as the same persons in law as their predecessors. In Veerabhadra Varaprasada Rao v. Vellanki Venkatadri (1900) 10 M.L.J. 114 it was held that in a suit for the income of a hereditary office a preceding office holder fully represents his successors in the matter of res judicata and limitation. In Aft. Moti Bala v. Debi Satyanand A.I.R. 1930 All 348 it was held that, with regard to endowed property, the successor in management of the endowed property may be considered as a legal representative of the prior manager of the same endowed property. The Judicial Committee observed in Propsunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo (1874-75) L.R. 52 I.A. 145 at 152 that it appears to be right and reasonable that judgments obtained against a former shebait in respect of debts so incurred should be binding upon succeeding shebaits, who, in fact, form a continuing representation of the idol's property.

It was held in that case by this Court that, as the creditor bona fide believed that the widow was the proper legal representative and got his decree without any fraud or collusion with her, and as; she was then interested in defending the estate and sufficiently represented the estate, the decree was binding on the nephew.

41. Again in Dolai Maliko v. Krushna Chandra , where on the death of one of the appellants some only of his heirs came on record, it is held by the Supreme Court that, unless there is fraud or collusion or there are other circumstances which indicate that there has not been a fair or real trial or that against the absent heir there was a special case which was not and could not be tried in the proceeding, there is no reason why the heirs who have applied for being brought on record could not be allowed to represent the entire estate, including the heirs not brought on record. Reference may also be made to Jagdish Chandra v. Kameswar Singh . In that case shebaits representing the deity were parties to the suit when it was institute. One of the shebaits was an executrix of the estate of a deceased shebait. She ceased to be a shebait when the heirs of the deceased came of age. The heirs did not apply for substitution. On the question of proper and effective representation of the deity, the Patna High Court observed:

...there is nothing to indicate that the suit as instituted was not properly framed and all the shebaits representing the deity were not parties to the suit. In that view of the matter it is unnecessary for me to examine the various decisions cited by the appellants to support the contention that all the 'shebaits' of the deity should have been impleaded as parties to the suit, because otherwise the suit could not proceed. These decisions, in my opinion, are no authority for this wide contention of the appellants; but in the present case I have already shown that all the shebaits representing the deity were parties to the suit when it was instituted and the Suit could not be said to be bad for defect of parties. If the 'shebaiti' interest devolved on these heirs during the pendency of the suit, it was open to them to apply for being added as parties, and they could not take advantage of their own omission to do so, because the entire 'shebaiti' interest was represented in the suit as originally framed.