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Jindal Steel & Powers Ltd. (for short the `informant') invoked the provisions of Section 19 read with Section 26(1) of the Act by providing information to the Commission alleging that M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (for short `SAIL') had, inter alia, entered into an exclusive supply agreement with Indian Railways for supply of rails. The SAIL, thus, was alleged to have abused its dominant position in the market and deprived others of fair competition and therefore, acted contrary to Section 3(4) (Anti-competitive Agreements) and Section 4(1) (Abuse of dominant position) of the Act. This information was registered by the Commission and was considered in its meeting held on 27th October, 2008 on which date the matter was deferred at the request of the informant for furnishing additional information. During the course of hearing, it was also brought to the notice of the Commission that a petition being Writ Petition (C) No.8531 of 2009, filed by the informant against the Ministry of Railways, was also pending in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. Vide order dated 10th November, 2009 the Commission directed the informant to file an affidavit with respect to the information furnished by it. The Commission also directed SAIL to submit its comments in respect of the information received by the Commission within two weeks from the date of the said meeting and the matter was adjourned till 8 th December, 2009. On 19th November, 2009 a notice was issued to SAIL enclosing all information submitted by the informant. When the matter was taken up for consideration by the Commission on 8th December, 2009, the Commission took on record the affidavit filed by the informant on 30th November, 2009 in terms of the earlier order of the Commission, but SAIL requested extension of six weeks time to file its comments. Finding no justification in the request of the SAIL, the Commission, vide its order dated 8th December, 2009, declined the prayer for extension of time. In this order, it also formed the opinion that prima facie case existed against SAIL, and resultantly, directed the Director General, appointed under Section 16(1) of the Act, to make investigation into the matter in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act. It also granted liberty to SAIL to file its views and comments before the Director General during the course of investigation. Despite these orders, SAIL filed an interim reply before the Commission along with an application that it may be heard before any interim order is passed by the Commission in the proceedings. On 22nd December, 2009 the Commission only reiterated its earlier directions made to the Director General for investigation and granted liberty to SAIL to file its reply before the Director General. The correctness of the directions contained in the order dated 8th December, 2009 was challenged by SAIL before the Competition Appellate Tribunal (for short, the `Tribunal'). The Commission filed an application on 28th January, 2010 before the Tribunal seeking impleadment in the appeal filed by SAIL. It also filed an application for vacation of interim orders which had been issued by the Tribunal on 11th January, 2010, staying further proceedings before the Director General in furtherance of the directions of the Commission dated 8th December, 2009. It will be useful to refer to the order passed by the Commission on 8th December, 2009 at this stage itself which reads as under:

3. In the meeting of the Commission held on 08.12.2009, the Commission took on record the affidavit filed by the informant on 30.11.2009 regarding the current status of the writ petition filed in the Delhi High Court and certified copies of all the orders passed by the Hon'ble High Court, in the matter, till date. However, SAIL did not file its reply within the stipulated time and requested to allow extension of time from 3.12.2009 for a further period of six weeks. The Commission considered the above request of SAIL. However, the Commission did not allow any further extension.

5. Secretary was accordingly directed to refer the case to DG for investigation and submission of the report within 45 days of the receipt of orders of the Commission. SAIL informed that they may furnish their views/comments in the matter to the DG."

As already noticed, the legality of this order was questioned before the Tribunal by SAIL on one hand, while, on the other hand the Commission had pressed its application for impleadment. In the application for impleadment it was averred by the Commission that it is a necessary and proper party for adjudication of the matter before the Tribunal and therefore, it should be impleaded as a party and be heard in accordance with law. Emphasis was also placed on Section 18 of the Act to contend that powers, functions and duties of the Commission were such that it would always be appropriate for the Commission to be impleaded as a party in appeals filed before the Tribunal. It was also averred in the application that intervention of the Commission at the appellate proceedings would not prejudice anybody. The very maintainability of the appeal before the Tribunal was also questioned by the Commission on the ground that the order under appeal before the Tribunal was a direction simpliciter to conduct investigation and thus was not an order appealable within the meaning of Section 53A of the Act. The Tribunal in its order dated 15th February, 2010, inter alia, but significantly held as under:

Having examined various legal issues arising in the present case, we will now revert back to the facts of the case in hand. It is clear that Jindal Steel, the informant, had made a reference to the Commission. The Commission had initiated proceedings and asked for further information from the informant and thereafter, had even issued notice calling upon SAIL to submit its views and comments. From the record it is clear that parties had appeared before the Commission. The SAIL had failed to file the reply and prayed for extension of time, which was declined by the Commission in its order dated 8th December, 2009. The Director General was asked to conduct the investigation, but liberty was granted to SAIL to file its views and comments during the pendency of the investigation. Since further time was declined, SAIL preferred an appeal before the Tribunal, which resulted in passing of the order impugned in the present appeal. We are unable to accede to the submission that the Commission is not a necessary or proper party before the Tribunal. On the contrary, the Regulations and even the interest of justice demands that for complete and effective adjudication the Commission be added as a necessary and proper party in the proceedings before the Tribunal. The direction issued by the Commission was set aside by the Tribunal and further time was granted to SAIL to file its further reply in addition to what has been filed on 15th December, 2009 and the Tribunal then directed the Commission to consider all such material and record a fresh decision. We have held that there is no statutory obligation on the Commission to issue notice for grant of hearing to the parties at the stage of forming an opinion under Section 26(1) of the Act unless, upon due application of mind, it finds it necessary to invite parties or experts to render assistance to and produce documents before the Commission at that stage. We are also unable to agree with the view expressed by the Tribunal that the inquiry commences as soon as the aspects highlighted in sub-section (1) to Section 19 are fulfilled and brought to the notice of the Commission. It is obvious that Regulation 18(2) was not brought to the notice of the Tribunal which resulted in error of law, particularly, when examined in the light of other provisions and scheme of the Act as well. The Commission, vide its order dated 8th December, 2009, had, for reasons stated therein, declined the extension of time to SAIL. This order of the Commission cannot be stated to be without jurisdiction or suffering from any apparent error of law. However, the Tribunal, in exercise of its judicial discretion, had interfered with the said order and granted further time to SAIL unconditionally. We do not propose to interfere in the exercise of the discretion by the Tribunal except to the extent of imposition of cost. We, therefore direct that SAIL should pay cost of Rs. 25,000/- to the informant for seeking extension of time. The cost shall be conditional, whereafter, the additional reply filed by SAIL would be taken on record and the Commission shall apply its mind to form a prima facie view in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act, if the report of the Director General has not been received as yet. In the event the report prepared by the Director General during the period 8th December, 2009 to 11th January, 2010 has been received, the Commission shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the principles of law enunciated in this judgment giving proper notice to the informant as well as to SAIL and pass appropriate orders.