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and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced ...... as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed", and the argument on the interpretation of this section was two- fold: (1) that the word 'repeal' used in the opening paragraph was not confined to express repeals but that the word was comprehensive enough to include cases of implied repeals; (2) Alternatively it was submitted that even if the expression 'repeal' in s. 6 be understood as being confined to express repeals, still the principle underlying s. 6 was of general application and capable of being attracted to cases of implied repeals also.

This laid down the law as it was prior to the U.K. Inter- pretation Act, 1890 which by s. 38(2) made provision for a saving of the type we now have in s. 6 of the Indian General Clauses Act, 1897 which we have extracted earlier. The submission of Mr. Setalvad-learned Counsel for the respondent-was very simple. He said that s. 6 on its terms applied only to express repeals.Here we have a case not of an express repeal but of the supersession of a State enactment by a law having bythe Constitution superior efficacy. it would, therefore, bea mere disapperrance or supersession of the State enactment or at the best a case of an implied repeal. In this connection he invited our attention to some observations to be found in the decision of this Court in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay (2) already referred to. The Court was there concerned with the legality of the prosecution of the appellant for contravention of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. The offence had been committed before the Constitution came into force and a prosecution launched earlier was pending after January 26, 1950. The enactment which created the offence was held to be void under Art. 19(1) (a) read with Art. 13 as being inconsistent with one of the Fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. In the circumstances, the point that was debated before this Court was whether the prosecution could be continued after the enactment became void. The majority of the Court held that the Constitution was prospective in its operation and that -Art. 13(1) would not affect the validity of proceedings commenced under pre-Constitution laws which were valid up to the date of the Constitution coming into force, for to hold that the validity of these proceedings were affected would in effect be treating the Constitution as retrospective. They therefore considered that there was no legal objection -to the prosecution continuing. Fazl Ali, J. who dissented (1) [1829] 9B. & C. 750 at 752. (2) [1951] S.C.R. 228.

(2) [1819] 9 B. & C. 750.

(3) [1963] 1 S.C.R. 242.

expression is of sufficient amplitude to cover cases of implied repeals. In this connection there is a passage in Craies on Statute Law, Fifth Edition at pages 323 and 324 which appears to suggest that the provisions of the corresponding s. 38 of the English Interpretation Act were confined to express repeals. On page 323 occurs the following:

"In Acts passed in or since 1890 certain savings are implied by statute in all cases of express repeal, unless a contrary intention appears in the repealing Act", and on the next page:

There is, however, no express decision either in England or, so far as we have been able to ascertain, in the United States on this point. Untrammeled, as we are, by authority, we have to inquire the principle on which the saving clause in s. 6 is based. It is manifest that the principle underlying it is that every later enactment which supersedes an earlier one or puts an end to an earlier state of the law is presumed to intend the continuance of rights accrued and liabilities incurred under the superseded enactment unless there were sufficient indications-express or implied-in the later enactment designed to completely obliterate the earlier state of the law. The next question is whether the application of that principle could or ought to be limited to cases where a particular form of words is used to indicate that the earlier law has been repealed. The entire theory underlying implied repeals is that there is no need for the later enactment to state in express terms that an earlier enactment has been repealed by using any particular set of words or form of drafting but that if the legislative intent to supersede the earlier law is manifested by the enactment of provisions as to effect such supersession, then there is in law a repeal notwithstanding the absence of the word 'repeal' in the later ,statute. Now, if the legislative intent to supersede the earlier law is the basis upon which the doctrine of implied repeal is founded could there be any incongruity in at- tributing to the later legislation the same intent which s. 6 presumes where the word 'repeal' is expressly used. So far as statutory construction is concerned, it is one of the cardinal principles of the law that there is no distinction or difference between an express provision and a provision which is necessarily implied, for it is only the form that differs in the two cases and there is no difference in in- tention or in Substance. A repeal may be brought about by repugnant legislation, without even any reference to the Act intended to be repealed, for once legislative competence to effect a repeal is posted, it matters little whether this is done expressly or inferentially or by the enactment of repugnant legislation. If such is the basis upon which repeals and implied repeals are brought about it appears to us to be both logical as well as in accordance with the principles upon which the rule as to implied repeal rests to attribute to that legislature which effects a repeal by necessary implication the same intention as that which would attend the case of an express repeal. Where an intention to effect a repeal is attributed to a legislature then the same would in our opinion, attract the incident of the saving found in s. 6 for the rules of construction embodied in the General Clauses Act are, so to speak, the basic assumptions on which statutes are drafted. If this were the true position about the effect of the Central Act 67 of 1957 as the liability to pay the fee which was the subject of the notices of the demand had accrued prior to June 1, 1958 it would follow that these notices were valid and the amounts due thereunder could be recovered notwithstanding the disappearance of the Orissa Act by virtue of the superior legislation by the Union Parliament.