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159. In short, the doctrine of lis pendens, which Section 52 of the TPA encapsulates, bars the transfer of a suit property during the pendency of litigation. The only exception to the principle is when it is transferred under the authority of the court and on terms imposed by it. Where one of the parties to the suit transfers the suit property (or a part of it) to a third-party, the latter is bound by the result of the proceedings even if he did not have notice of the suit or proceeding.

41.3. It was canvassed on behalf of the subsequent transferee that it was a bona fide third party purchaser of the secured asset since it was neither arrayed as a party to the proceedings in the main appeals nor was issued a notice of the said proceedings either by the petitioner or by the bank. Repelling such contention, this Court referred to its previous decision in Sanjay Verma where it was held that the principle of lis pendens enshrined in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not only based on equity, good conscience and justice but is also a principle of public policy. No party can claim exemption from the application of this doctrine on the ground of bona fide or good faith. Further, this Court referred to another of its earlier decisions in Guruswamy Nadar Vs. P. Lakshmi Ammal7 where it was held that the principle of lis pendens will apply irrespective of whether the subsequent purchaser had bought the property, which is a subject-matter of a pending proceeding, in good faith or not.

42. It may be mentioned that in a recent judgment of this Court in M/s. Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Katta Sujatha Reddy8 it has been held that the doctrine of lis pendens kicks in the moment a proceeding is instituted (2008) 5 SCC 796 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214 irrespective of whether such institution or filing is defective or notice is yet to be issued by the court.

43. One of the questions which fell for consideration in Danesh Singh Vs. Har Pyari9 is whether transfer of the suit property in favour of respondent Nos.1 and 2 is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and the doctrine of lis pendens? It was in that context this Court looked into Section 52 and held as follows:

65. In the aforesaid factual background, it is clear as day light that the rights of the appellants who are subsequent purchasers are subservient to the rights of the decree holder. After the judgment and decree of the trial court and following execution of the sale deed by the Court Commissioner, a valid title qua the suit property passed on to respondent No. 1 (decree holder). Admittedly in the present case, the transfer of the suit property is pendente lite. Therefore, the doctrine of lis pendens as encapsulated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is squarely applicable. All the courts have recorded a clear finding of fact that the appellants were fully aware of the pendency of the suit. However, even that is not necessary. As has been held by this Court in Silverline, the scope of adjudication is limited to the only question as to whether the objector who has resisted execution is a transferee pendente lite or not and if the finding is in the affirmative, then such a transferee has no right to resist. In so far the present case is concerned, the rights of the appellants have been duly adjudicated under Order XXI Rules 97 to 102 CPC to the complete satisfaction of the Executing Court. That being the position, there is no merit at all in the case projected by the appellants and the Executing Court rightly passed the order dated 29.02.2020.