Document Fragment View
Fragment Information
Showing contexts for: procedure of section 294 crpc in Gunjit Singh vs State on 23 January, 1996Matching Fragments
(9) The question for consideration is whether these documents which formed part of the charge sheet and relied by the prosecution and on which no reservation regarding its genuineness was made by the prosecution could be admissible in evidence without proof? Is the provisions of Section 294 Criminal Procedure Code . applicable to the facts of this case? To determine these questions, reference can be had to Section 294 Criminal Procedure Code ., which is reproduced as under : Section 294 Criminal Procedure Code .
(10) Before dealing with legal aspects of the matter, it must be kept in mind that the original sale agreement and letter of attornment were seized by the prosecuting agency from Mr.Sehgal and Mr.C.L.Laroya respectively. It was only counter part of the sale agreement which was recovered from the possession of the appellant. The original documents were seized during investigation. Public Prosecutor while placing reliance on these original documents got direction from the Court to the appellant to admit and deny the same. On the insistence of Public Prosecutor, the appellant admitted and denied these documents on 28th August,1989. On 3rd September,1991 some of these documents were again got admitted. On 10th March,1992 Public Prosecutor made a statement that he tendered in evidence these admitted documents. Hence the admitted documents were exhibited as EX.P1 to P.181. These documents were in fact owned by the Public Prosecutor as his documents. Public Prosecutor at no stage pointed to the Court or to the appellant that he doubted or disputed the genuineness of any of these documents, rather he tendered EX.P.1 to P.181 in evidence and placed complete reliance on the same. It is in this backdrop we have to consider and appreciate the provision of Section 294 Criminal Procedure Code .
(11) Sub Section 3 of Section 294 Criminal Procedure Code . clearly envisage that the documents produced by the prosecution on being admitted by the accused became authentic and the contents thereof became substantive evidence. In this case as discussed above, since documents were produced and relied by the Public Prosecutor as his documents, therefore, genuineness of the same could not be said to be in dispule. Such documents had to be read in evidence by the Court without proving the signatures of the person by whom it purported to have been signed. However, if the Trial Court, at any stage, found that mis-carriage of justice was going to. take place on account of these documents being admitted without formal proof, then he could suo moto call the attesting witnesses of the sale agreement and the purchaser Mr.Kuldeep Singh Sehgal. Having not done so, the Trial Court could not draw presumption that genuineness of these documents was in doubt. Hence, the observations of the Trial Court in this regard are not supported from the evidence on record. In fact the Trial Court fell in error in presuming and concluding in his judgment that the genuineness of these documents was doubted by the prosecution. In fact such an observation is not borne out from the testimony of any of the witness or from the statement of Public Prosecutor rather it appears to be the pigmentation of Court's own imagination. Trial Court drew this conclusion even though that was not the case set up by the Public Prosecutor. Observations in this regard are quite contrary to the facts placed on record. In view of the admitted facts, the Trial Court ought to have held that provision of Sub Section 3 of Section 294 Criminal Procedure Code . are applicable. Similar point came up before the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Saddiq & ors. Vs. State, 1981 CRL.L.J. page 379 where after analysing the provisions of Section 294 and in particular to Sub Section 3, the Court opined that under Sub Section 3 of Section 294 an injury report filed by the prosecution under Sub Section I of Section 294 may be read as substantive evidence. If the prosecution or the accused does not dispute the genuineness of a document filed by the opposite party under Sub Section I of Section 294 it amounts to an admission that the entire is true or correct. It does not only amounts to admission of it being signed by the person by whom it purports to be signed but also implies the admission of the correctness of its contents. Similar view was expressed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Shaikh Farid Hussainsab Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1983 CRL.L.J. page 487. In the present case also, admittedly the documents EX.P1 to P.181 were filed by the prosecution under Sub Section I of Section 294 Cr.P.C. each of such document was included in the list of documents relied and filed by the prosecution. The Public Prosecutor called upon the appellant to admit or deny the same. Hence, those documents after having been admitted by the appellant became authentic and contents thereof became substantive evidence.. Ex.P.174 fully establish that a sale agreement was executed between the appellant and Shri Kuldip Singh Sehgal regarding the sale of his house at Jallandhar. That Mr.Sehgal had paid a sum of Rs.7,50,000.00 as advance to the appellant on 1st 0ctober,1985. The letter of attornment EX.P.111 by the appellant to his tenant Mr.C.L.Laroya further fortifies the stand of the appellant regarding the sale of his house and handing over the symbolic possession of that property to Mr.Sehgal. Public Witness .3 confirmed that he paid the rent to the appellant only upto 30th September,1985 and w.e.f. 1st October,1995 it was paid to Shri Kuldeep Singh Sehgal. This fact is further corroborated by the testimony of PW.34 Shri Charanjit Singh who deposed that the appellant received Rs.7,50,000.00 from Shri K.S.Sehgal under the sale agreement Ex.P.174. The purchase of stamp paper for this agreement by the appellant is corroborated by the testimony of Public Witness .19 Shri Rakesh Sharma. He by his testimony refused to yield to the suggestion of the prosecution that stamp paper for sale agreement was anti dated. Rather he struck to his version that stamp paper was sold on the date given on the paper and it was sold to the appellant. His testimony clearly establish that stamp paper purchased from Public Witness .19 was genuine and not anti dated. At no stage, the prosecution doubted the genuineness of the stamp paper purchased by the appellant. It doubted the genuineness of the stamp paper purchased by Mr.Sehgal with which we are not concerned. Hence, the observations of the Trial Court in this regard are not only erroneous but based on no evidence at all.
(12) MR.S.LAL, counsel for the respondent in order to counter the arguments of Mr.R.L.Mehta placed reliance on the observations of the Trial Court and in particular where Trial Court observed that "prosecution had been disputing the genuineness of the documents produced by the accused during investigation, hence the admission of these documents by the accused had no consequences". Further that "since these documents were produced by the accused hence its admission would not attract the inference of its genuineness". Relying on these observations, Mr.Lal contended that since these documents were of the appellant hence advantage of Sub Section 3 of Section 294 Criminal Procedure Code . could not be taken by the appellant. I am afraid this argument of Mr.Lal and for that matter the observations of the Trial Court are contrary to the facts on record. There is not an iota of evidence to prove that the documents EX.P.1 to P. 181 were produced by the accused or that prosecution doubted .the genuineness of the same. In the absence of any such evidence the inference drawn by the Trial Court can be said to be against the facts and the law and hence not sustainable. Further observation of the Trial Court that these documents could not be called prosecution's documents or the burden of proof shifted to the accused or that he failed to discharge the same are nothing but the pigmentation of his own imagination. In other words these observations can be nothing but surmises and conjectures without any substance. Since these observations are not based on facts placed on record hence reliance on these observations by Mr.Lal is mis- placed. He cannot take any advantage on the basis of the observations of the Trial Court. He can succeed or fail on the basis of evidence produced by the prosecution. The evidence produced by the prosecution does not support these observations of the Trial Court hence Mr.Lal cannot put into his aid these observations which are not based on the material placed on record.