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6. It was explained by Mulla, in the said article, that to understand the formation of a coparcenary, it was important to note the distinction between ancestral property and separate property. Property inherited by a Hindu from his father, father's father or father's father's father was ancestral property. Property inherited by him from other relations were his separate property. The essential feature of ancestral property was that if the person inheriting it had sons, grandsons or great-grandsons, they become joint owners with him, they become entitled to it by reason of their birth. Ancestral property was only a species of coparcenary property. In Article 214 Mulla explained the formation of a coparcenary. The concept of a joint Hindu family constituting a coparcenary was that of a common male ancestor with his lineal descendants in the male line within four degrees counting from and inclusive of such ancestor or three degrees exclusive of the ancestor. It was further reiterated that a coparcenary was purely a creature of law and it could not be created by an act of parties, save in so far that by adoption a stranger might be introduced as a member thereof. Article 212 along with other articles, which we have set out hereinbefore, in Chap. XII of Mulla's Hindu Law explains that a joint Hindu family consists of, unlike a coparcenary, all persons lineally descended from a common ancestor and includes their wives and unmarried daughters. It is further reiterated that a joint and undivided family is the normal condition of a Hindu society. An undivided Hindu family is ordinarily joint not only in estate but also in food and worship. The existence of a joint estate is not an essential requisite to constitute a joint family and a family which does not own a property may nevertheless be a joint family. Where there is a joint estate and the members of the family become separate in estate, the family ceases to be joint. Mere severance in food and worship does not operate as a separation. It has been further explained in Article 212 that a joint or undivided Hindu family may consist of a single male, member and widows of deceased male members. The property of a joint family does not cease, to be a joint family property belonging to any such family merely because the family is represented by a single male member. Our attention was drawn to Article 227 which deals with property thrown into common stock. It stipulates that property which was originally the separate or self-acquired property of a member of a joint family may, by operation of the doctrine of blending, become joint family property if it has been voluntarily thrown by him into the common stock with the intention of abandoning all separate claims upon it. A clear intention to waive his separate rights must be established and it will not be inferred from the mere fact of his allowing the other members of the family to use it conjointly with himself nor from the fact that the income of the separate property was used to support a son nor from the mere failure of a member to keep separate accounts of his earnings. In Clause 2(a), it is reiterated by the learned editor of Mulla's Hindu Law that the basis of the doctrine is the existence of coparcenary and coparcenary property as well as the existence of the separate property of a coparcener and the doctrine cannot be applied to a Hindu female who has acquired immovable property from her father, for, she is not a coparcener at all. The said article, appearing in Chap. XII, deals with Mitakshara school of Hindu law. In Clause (2b) of Article 227 it is stated that the act by which the coparcener throws his separate property into the common stock is a unilateral act and a matter of individual volition. As soon as he declares his intention to treat his self-acquired property as that of the joint family the property assumes the character of joint family property. Mulla further states that the above rules which deal with coparcenary property in Hindu law would apply also to brothers living together and forming a joint family governed by the Dayabhaga. Chapter XIII which deals with the incidence of Dayabhaga law reiterates in Article 273 that according to the Mitakshara law, each son acquired at his birth, an equal interest with his father in all ancestral property held by the father, and on the death of the father the son takes the property, not as his heir, but by survivorship. According to the Dayabhaga law, the sons do not acquire any interest by birth in ancestral property. Their rights arise for the first time on the father's death. On the death of the father, the sons take such of the property as was left by him, whether separate or ancestral, as heirs and not by survivorship. Since the sons did not take any interest in ancestral property in their father's lifetime there could be no coparcenary in the strict sense of the word between a father and sons, according to the Dayabhaga law, so far as regards ancestral property. In Article 275 it has been, reiterated that since the sons, according to the Dayabhaga law, did not acquire any interest by birth in ancestral property, they could not demand a partition of such property from the father as they could under the Mitakshara law, nor could they call for an account of the management thereof from the father as they could under the Mitakshara law. As great reliance was placed on Article 227, it may not be inappropriate to set out the said article which is as follows :

14. By throwing a self-acquired property into the common hotchpot it could be made a joint family property. Learned advocate for the revenue sought to urge that it was possible only, if there was a coparcenary property, which in the case of a Dayabhaga school of Hindu law would only be the property, which would be enjoyed by the brothers living in a common mess, worship and estate, that the throwing of the self-acquired property into the joint hotchpot can arise. In this connection he referred to the decision in the case of Goli Eswariah v. CGT . There the Supreme Court observed that the unilateral declaration of a Hindu coparcener, whereby he threw his self-acquired property into the common stock of joint family property, did not amount to a transfer so as to attract the provisions of the G.T. Act, 1958. The doctrine of throwing into the common stock inevitably postulated that the owner of a separate property was a coparcener who had an interest in the coparcenary property. The separate property of the coparcener ceased to be separate property and acquired the characteristics of joint family or ancestral property not by any physical mixing with the ancestral property but by his own volition and intention and by his waiving and surrendering his separate rights in it as separate property. The Supreme Court at p. 678 of the 76 ITR observed as follows:

"To pronounce on the question of law presented for our decision, we must first examine what is the true scope of the doctrine of throwing into the 'common stock' or 'common hotchpot'. It must be remembered that a Hindu family is not a creature of a contract. As observed by this court in Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai v. Desai Mallappa, , the doctrine of throwing into the common stock inevitably postulates that the owner of separate property is a coparcener who has an interest in the coparcenary property and desires to blend his separate property with the coparcenary property. The existence of a coparcenary is absolutely necessary before a coparcener can throw into the common stock his self-acquired properties. The separate property of a member of a joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by him into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein. The separate property of a Hindu ceases to be separate property and acquires the characteristics of joint family or ancestral property not by any physical mixing with his joint family or his ancestral property but by his own volition and intention by his waiving and surrendering his separate rights in it as separate property. The act by which the coparcener throws his separate property in the common stock is a unilateral act. There is no question of either the family rejecting or accepting it. By his individual volition he renounces his individual right in that property and treats it as a property of the family. No longer he declares his intention to treat his self-acquired property as that of the joint family property, the property assumes the character of joint family property. The doctrine of throwing into the common stock is a doctrine peculiar to the Mitakshara. school of Hindu law. When a coparcener throws his separate property into the common stock, he makes no gift under Chapter VII of the Transfer of Property Act, In such a case there is no donor or donee. Further, no question of acceptance of the property thrown into the common stock arises."

"The question which falls for our decision is : Does this principle apply in regard to a property held by a Hindu female as a limited owner ? In bur opinion, it is difficult to answer this question in favour of the appellants. The rule of blending postulates that a coparcener who is interested in the coparcenary property and who owns separate property of his own may by deliberate and intentional conduct treat his separate property as forming part of the coparcenary property. If it appears that property which is separately acquired has been deliberately and voluntarily thrown by the owner into the joint stock with the clear intention of abandoning his claim on the said property and with the object of assimilating it to the joint family property, then the said property becomes a part of the joint family estate; in other words, the separate property of a coparcener loses its separate character by reason of the owner's conduct and get thrown into the common stock of which it becomes a part. This doctrine, therefore, inevitably postulates that the owner of the separate property is a coparcener who has an interest in the coparcenary property, and desires to blend his separate property with the coparcenary property, There can be no doubt that the conduct on which a plea of blending is based must clearly and unequivocally show the intention of the owner of the separate property to convert his property into an item of joint family property. A mere intention to benefit the members of the family by allowing them the use of the income coming from the said property may not necessarily be enough to justify an inference of blending, but the basis of the doctrine is the existence of coparcenary and coparcenary property as well as the existence of the separate property of a coparcener. How this doctrine can be applied to the case of a Hindu female who has acquired immovable property from her father as a limited owner, it is difficult to understand. Such a Hindu female is not a coparcener and as such has no interest in coparcenary property, She holds the property as a limited owner, and on her death the property has to devolve on the next reversioner. Under Hindu law it is open to a limited owner like a Hindu female succeeding to her mother's estate as in Madras or a Hindu widow succeeding to her husband's estate, to efface herself and accelerate the reversion by surrender ; but, as is well known, surrender has to be effected according to the rules recognised, in that behalf. A Hindu female owning a limited estate cannot circumvent the rules of surrender and allow the members of her husband's family to treat her limited estate as part of the joint property belonging to the said family. On first principles such a result would be inconsistent with the basic notion of blending and the basic character of a limited owner's title to the property held by her. This aspect of the matter has apparently not been argued before the courts below and has not been considered by them. Thus, if the doctrine of blending cannot be invoked in regard to the property held by Channama, the appellants' claim in respect of the said property can and must be rejected on this preliminary ground alone."