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" A license is not annexed to the property in respect of which it is enjoyed, nor is it a transferable or heritable right, but is a right purely personal between grantor and licensee. Unless a different intention appears it cannot be exercised by the licensee's servants or agents."

This view has been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Savithri V. Rao v. Commissioner, Corporation of the City of Mangalore, . Indeed, this Court had an occasion to consider whether the Corporation was entitled under Section 370 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 as amended by Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1977 to evict occupants of public markets without recourse to the procedure provided under the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974. The Division Bench to which I was a party referring to the provisions of Section 370 held as follows at p. 2175 :--

"It is true that the 1974 Act is a special enactment which prescribes a special procedure for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and having regard to the definition of the word 'public premises' in the said Act, every premises belonging to a local authority like the Corporation is a public premises. But it is also a general provision applicable to all premises of the State and all its instrumentalities including local authorities. Section 370, however, is a special provision applicable to public markets belonging to the Corporation. It has been incorporated designedly by the Legislature to regulate the occupation of public markets. It has no application to all other buildings/ premises of the Corporation, that is, other than public markets. In respect of buildings/ premises other than public markets, the Corporation, in order to evict an unauthorised occupant, has to resort to the 1974 Act.... It-is also significant that the Municipal Corporations Act is a later enactment than the 1974 Act. The incorporation of Section 370 into the Municipal Corporations Act makes it clear that the Legislature considered that a special provision as the one contained in the said section was essential in order to control markets and the power to evict a person occupying a premises in a public market on any one of the grounds specified in Section 370 of the Act was essential in public interest, and, therefore, the Legislature has considered that such a special power has to be conferred on the Commissioner of the Corporation under Section 370 of the said Act. The contention advanced, if accepted, would render Section 370 otiose and therefore should be rejected. Under the said section a Corporation is entitled to evict any person occupying a premises in a public market, if any one of the grounds mentioned in the said provision was available."

36. There the contention that the premises held by the Corporation would come within the purview of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974 and that therefore persons in occupation of the markets could not be evicted without recourse to the procedure provided in the 1974 Act was repelled by holding that the provisions of the said Act were not applicable to the markets held and controlled by the Municipal Corporations as the same were governed by the special provisions of Section 370 of the Corporation Act of 1976. Thus, a person who had been enjoying right of license cannot contend that he has a right to be evicted only under the Public Premises Act. It is also made clear in the above decision that a licensee has no right of protection of the statute against action of eviction. Therefore, it is not possible to concede to the submission of Sri Shankar that persons doing business in the stalls belonging to the Corporation on the basis of the licences granted to them can seek protection under the statute. Secondly, all the 87 persons who were originally granted licences by the Corporation are not before this Court. Some of the unauthorised persons or the legal representatives of the original licenses are before us. The question is whether they would be entitled to protection under the statute. My answer is 'no' because, when a person enjoying certain right under a license himself has no protection under the statute against eviction, his legal representatives or any unauthorised person cannot have better right and hence none of them would be entitled to such protection. This is the view taken by the Madras High Court. That being so. it is needless to point out that no protection under the statute would be available to third persons who have come before this Court merely on the ground that they are members of the petitioner-society. To say in one word, such persons do not have locus standi to maintain these petitions.

44. Another aspect that is required to be considered in this case is that the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 1977) is a self-contained Code and apart from the special power conferred upon the Corporation under Section 370, there are other provisions particularly Section 369 which deals with power of municipal authorities in respect of public markets in regard to imposition and collection of fees for the sale of goods in public markets etc. The fees imposable and recoverable under S. 369 are in respect of public markets established and run by the Corporation and let out under licences. As 1 have already stated that it is an undisputed fact that a licence issued in respect of a public market is revocable and the licence granted by the Corporation to an individual citizen in respect of a stall in the public market is neither transferable nor heritable as held by the Madras High Court in Chinnan's case, referred to above. In that view of the matter, let alone others, even the 87 stall holders originally granted licences as contended by Sri Holla, learned counsel for respondent-l, and as stated in the statement of objections, have no transferable or heritable rights. In other words, any right arising out of a licence not being transferable or heritable, any third person based upon such licence cannot contend that he has a right to remain in the stall after the expiry of the period of licence. Admittedly, the licences issued were for a period of two years and without the same being renewed from time to time, such licensees cannot have any right or interest to continue in the stalls and in the absence of any contract or statutory right, it is impermissible for the stall holders to contend that they have a right to remain in the stalls till alternate arrangements are made. As already stated, it is for the Corporation to allow them to be in, or evict them from the stalls maintained by it, in the interests of public. According to Sri Holla, learned counsel for respondent-l, accommodation provided in the Nehru Maidan to the stall holders and fish vendors was only a tentative arrangement and when the full-fledged stalls were constructed in the new market and were offered for occupation, the stall holders entitled to occupy the stalls offered cannot contend that they would continue in the present place until adequate facilities are provided in the new market. His contention is that in order to comply with the statutory obligation, respondent-l has to take action for eviction of the stall holders. 1 have already held that the stall holders have no statutory right conferred on them to continue their business in the stalls in question. The eviction of stall holders from the Nehru Maidan is required to comply with the statutory obligation on the part of respondent 1 to prevent nuisance or obstruction in any market-place and to maintain hygienic conditions in the interest of general public and the Corporation has undoubtedly got power to do so vested in it under Section 370 of the Act as hold by this Court in Savitri's case. In the circumstances, they cannot contend that they are entitled to continue to be in the temporary stalls at the Nehru Maidan until alternate arrangements are made in the new market. Hence, I answer point No. 5 in the negative.