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It is also interesting to note that the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been widely used in the United States in diverse other situations as founding a cause of action. The most notable instances are to be found in what may be called the "sub-contractor bid cases" in which a contractor about to tender for a contract, invites a sub- contractor to submit a bid for a sub-contract and after receiving his bid the contractor submits a tender. In such cases, the sub-contractor has been held unable to retract his bid and be liable in damages if he does so. It is not possible to say that any detriment which the contractor may be able to show in these cases would amount to consideration in its strict sense and these decisions have plainly been reached on an application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. One of such cases was Drennan v. Star Paving Company(1) where Traynor, J. explicitly adopted as good law the text of Article 90 of the Restatement of the law of Contracts quoted above and stated in so many words that "the absence of consideration is not fatal to the enforcement of such a promise". There are also numerous cases where the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been applied against the Government where the interest of justice, morality and common fairness clearly dictated such a course. We shall refer to these cases when we discuss the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the Government. Suffice it to state for the present that the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been taken much further in the United States than in English and Commonwealth jurisdictions and in some States at least, it has been used to reduce, if not to destroy, the prestige of consideration as an essential of valid contract. Vide Spencer Bower and Turner's Estoppel by Representation (2d) page 358.

But if the acts or omissions of the officers of the Government are within the scope of their authority and are not otherwise impermissible under the law, they "will work estoppel against the Government."

When we turn to the Indian law on the subject it is heartening to find that in India not only has the doctrine of promissory estoppel been adopted in its fullness but it has been recognized as affording a cause of action to the person to whom the promise is made. The requirement of consideration has not been allowed to stand in the way of enforcement of such promise. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied against the Government and the defence based on executive necessity has been categorically negatived. It is remarkable that as far back as 1880, long before the doctrine of promissory estoppel was formulated by Denning, J., in England, A Division Bench of two English Judges in the Calcutta High Court applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel and recognised a cause of action founded upon it in the Ganges Manufacturing Co. v. Surajmuli and other(1). The doctrine of promissory estoppel was also applied against the Government in a case subsequently decided by the Bombay High Court in Municipal Corporation of Bombay v. The Secretary of State.(2) The facts of this last-mentioned case in Municipal Corporation of Bombay v. The Secretary of State (supra) are a little interesting and it would be profitable to refer to them. The Government of Bombay, with a view to constructing an arterial road, requested the Municipal Commissioner to remove certain fish and vegetable markets which obstructed the construction of the proposed road. The Municipal Commissioner replied that the markets were vested in the Corporation of Justices but that he was willing to vacate certain municipal stables which occupied a portion of the proposed site if the Government would rent other land mentioned in his letter, to the Municipality at a nominal rent, the Municipality undertaking to bear the expenses of levelling the same and permit the Municipality to erect on such land "stables of wood and iron with nobble foundation to be removed at six months' notice on other suitable ground being provided by Government". The Government accepted the suggestion of the Municipal Commissioner and sanctioned the application of the Municipal Commissioner for a site for stabling on the terms set out above and the Municipal Commissioner thereafter entered into possession of the land and constructed stables, workshops and chawls on the same at considerable expense. Twenty-four years later the Government served a notice on the Municipal Commissioner determining the tenancy and requesting the Municipal Commissioner to deliver possession of the land within six months and in the mean time to pay rent at the rate of Rs.12,000/- per month. The Municipal Corporation declined to hand over possession of the land or to pay the higher rent and the Secretary of State for India thereupon filed a suit against the Municipal Corporation for a declaration that the tenancy of the Municipality stood determined and for an order directing the municipality to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 12,000/- per month. The suit was resisted by the Municipal Corporation on the ground then the events which had transpired had created an equity in favour of the Municipality which afforded an answer to the claim of the Government to eject the Municipality. This defence was upheld by a Division Bench of the High Court and Jenkins C.J., speaking on behalf of the Division Bench, pointed out that, in view of the following facts, namely:

We must also refer to the decision of this Court in M. Ramanatha Pillai v. The State of Kerala & Anr.(1) because that was a decision strongly relied upon on behalf of the State for negativing the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel against the Government. This was a case where the appellant was appointed to a temporary post and on the post being abolished, the service of the appellant was terminated. The appellant challenged the validity of termination of service, inter alia, on the ground that the Government was precluded from abolishing the post and terminating the service on the principle of promissory estoppel. This ground based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel was negatived and it was pointed out by the Court that the appellant knew that the post was temporary, suggesting clearly that the appellant could not possibly be led into the belief that the post would not be abolished. If the post was temporary to the knowledge of the appellant, it is obvious that the appellant knew that the post would be liable to be abolished at any time and if that be so, there could be no factual basis for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel for the purpose of precluding the Government from abolishing the post. This view taken by the Court was sufficient to dispose of the contention based on promissory estoppel and it was not necessary to say anything more about it, but the Court proceeded to cite a passage from American Jurisprudence, Vol. 28 (2d) at 783, paragraph 123 and observed that the High Court rightly held "that the courts exclude the operation of the doctrine of estoppel, when it is found that the authority against whom estoppel is pleaded has owed a duty to the public against whom the estoppel cannot fairly operate." It was this observation which was heavily relied upon on behalf of the State but we fail to see how it can assist the contention of the State. In the first place, this observation was clearly obiter, since, as pointed out by us, there was on the facts of the present case no scope for the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Secondly, this observation was based upon a quotation from the passage in paragraph 123 at page 783 of Volume 28 of American Jurisprudence (2 d), but unfortunately this quotation was incomplete and it overlooked, perhaps inadvertently, the following two important sentences at the commencement of the paragraph which clearly show that even in the United States the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applied against the State "when justified by the facts": "There is considerable dispute as to the application of estoppel with respect to the State. While it is said that equitable estoppel will be invoked against the State when justified by the facts, clearly the doctrine of estoppel should not be lightly invoked against the State" (emphasis supplied). Even the truncated passage quoted by the Court recognised in the last sentence that though, as a general rule, the doctrine of promissory estoppel would not be applied against the State in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity, the Court would unhesitatingly allow the doctrine to be invoked in cases where it is necessary in order "to prevent fraud or manifest injustice". This passage leaves no doubt that the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be applied against the State even in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. It is difficult to imagine that the Court citing this passage with approval could have possibly intended to lay down that in no case can the doctrine of promissory estoppel be invoked against the Government. Lastly, a proper reading of the observation of the Court clearly shows that what the Court intended to say was that where the Government owes a duty to the public to act differently, promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent the Government from doing so. This proposition is unexceptionable, because where the Government owes a duty to the public to act in a particular manner, and here obviously duty means a course of conduct enjoined by law, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be applied in teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law.

tion from sales tax granted under the Notification dated 6th April, 1959 and would not withdraw it, and the Notification dated 2nd April, 1969 could not, therefore, be assailed as being in breach of any such representation or promise. There was accordingly, no factual basis for making good the plea of promissory estoppel and the observation made by the court in regard to the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government was clear obiter. That perhaps was the reason why the Court did not consider it necessary to refer to the earlier decisions in Century Spinning & manufacturing Co.'s case and Turner Morrison's case and particularly the decision in the Indo-Afghan Agencies case where the court in so many terms applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government in the exercise of its executive power. It is not possible to believe that the Court was oblivious of these earlier decisions, particularly when one of these decisions in the Indo-Afghan Agencies case was an epoch making decision which marked a definite advance in the field of administrative law. Moreover, it may be noted that though, standing by itself, the observation made by the Court that "there can be no question of estoppel against the Government in exercise of its legislative, sovereign or executive powers" may appear to be wide and unqualified, it is not so, if read in its proper context. This observation was made on the basis of certain decisions which the Court proceeded to discuss in the succeeding paragraphs of the judgment. The Court first relied on the statement of the law contained in paragraph 123 at page 783, Volume 28 of the American Jurisprudence (2d), but it omitted to mention the two important sentences at the commencement of the paragraph and the words "unless its application is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice" at the end, which clearly show that even according to the American Jurisprudence, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not wholly inapplicable against the Government in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity, but it can be invoked against the Government "when justified by the facts" as for example where it is necessary to prevent fraud or injustice. In fact, as already pointed out above, there are numerous cases in the United States where the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been applied against the Government in the exercise of its governmental, public or executive powers. The Court then relied upon the decision in the Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co.'s case, but that decision was confined to a case where legislation was sought to be precluded by relying on the doctrine of promissory estoppel and it was held, and in our opinion rightly, that there can be no promissory estoppel against the legislature in the exercise of its legislative function.