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8. In Addl. CIT vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association (1979) 13 CTR (SC) 378 : (1980) 121 ITR 1 (SC), the hon'ble apex Court held that where the main or primary objects are distributive, each and every object must be charitable in order that the trust or institution May be upheld as a valid charity. But if primary and dominant purpose of the trust is charitable, another object which by itself May not be charitable but which is merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant purpose, would not prevent the trust or institution from being a valid charity. It was observed that the primary and dominant purpose in the present case was promotion of commerce and trade in art silk etc., was an object of public utility not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit within the meaning of s. 2(15) ; and that the assessee was entitled to exemption.

I.T.A. No. 503/Jodh/2023

9. In CIT vs. K.H. Kusumgar (1987) 63 CTR (Bom) 70 : (1988) 169 ITR 370 (Bom), the Bombay High Court observed that where the object of a charitable trust was, inter alia, imparting of education and encouragement and promotion of the study and practice of the Shewatamber Jain Murtipujak religion amongst students of ashrams, boarding-houses, gurukuls, vidyalayas, pathshalas and shravikushramas and also amongst all persons without distinction of sex, caste, creed, place or religion, a gift of immovable property made to such charitable trust could not be said to be for a purpose the whole or substantially the whole of which was of a religious nature and the gift would be entitled to exemption under s. 5(1)(v) of the Gift-tax Act.

32. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and given my thoughtful consideration to the facts of the present case and the case law cited at the Bar.

33. This Court is of the considered opinion that mere one contribution by the charitable trust to another trust which carried out repair and renovation of Lord Vishnu's temple does not disentitle the petitioner-trust from renewal of its exemption I.T.A. No. 503/Jodh/2023 certificate under s. 80G of the Act. The line of distinction between religious purposes and charitable purposes is very thin and no water tight compartment between the two activities can be very well-established. Unless objective of the charitable trust in question itself is for spending its income for a particular religion and it is so found in the trust deed, the Income-tax Department cannot reject the renewal of the trust as charitable trust under s. 80G of the Act merely because one particular expenditure is for an activity which May be termed as spending for a particular religion. In the present case the repair and renovation of Lord Vishnu's temple does not necessarily mean that expenditure in question was for a particular religion only. All people who have faith in Lord Vishnu's temple belong to different sects and have faith in different religions and also visit such temple of Lord Vishnu. The Revenue has not shown that entry in the said temple was restricted to the persons of one particular community or sect practising one religion. Hinduism is not one particular religion and different sects following Hindu philosophy do visit temples of Lord Vishnu, be they Jains, Sikhs, Brahmins etc. There is no water tight compartment between different castes or sects following one particular religion. Freedom of religion is guaranteed in the Constitution of India under art. 25 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, taking such a pedantic and narrow approach, it cannot be said that the character of the charitable trust is lost if one particular expenditure is made for repair and renovation of Lord Vishnu's temple and that too by way of contribution to another trust. A perusal of the trust deed of the petitioner produced on record shows that objective of the trust was clearly charitable and was not for any particular religion even wholly or substantially. Nothing has been pointed out in the impugned order that the petitioner-trust has been constantly spending money for a particular religion.

37. The aforesaid case is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case as there is no clause in the trust deed in the present case which indicates that income of the petitioner-trust was to be applied wholly or substantially for any particular religion. Therefore, the said case has been clearly wrongly applied by the learned Commissioner of Income-tax in the present case. In Marudhar Kesari's case (supra).also relied upon by the learned counsel for the Revenue, the facts of the case were distinguishable in the said case. Thus, the judgments cited and relied upon by the learned counsel for the Revenue are distinguishable on facts and do not support the case of the respondents. Since the law in the case of Upper Ganges' case (supra).was laid down while dealing the case of deduction under s. 80G of the Act in the hands of donor so also in the case of Marudhar Kesari's case (supra).by this court, those judgments do not advance cause of the Revenue. On the other hand, the case law relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner fully support the case of the petitioner when the courts have consistently held that it is the dominant object of the trust which is important and contribution and expenditure incurred by the petitioner- trust has to be viewed in the light of the objects with which charitable trust in question was constituted.