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10. It is in the backdrop of these provisions generally that it has to be seen as to whether the interpretation put forward by the Full Bench in two separate but concurrent judgments, is correct or not. Though the question referred to the Full Bench was restricted to the correctness of the interpretation of the term `unprotected worker' in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act as given in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd.

Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), in our opinion, the scope of the question has to be properly understood. In that case, it was held by the Division Bench of that Court that the workers who were working in the factory of the petitioner could not be termed as `unprotected workers'. It was held specifically that the Mathadi Act did not deal with the employees engaged on monthly basis, as such workers were protected under the Shops and Establishments Act and other enactments. It was further held that it was only the casually engaged workmen, who would come within the purview of the Mathadi Act. The High Court further said that where the material produced on record clearly show that the workmen are protected workmen, more particularly, with reference to the Agreement under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Act in question would not apply. Therefore, the referred question was whether it was only casually engaged workers, who came within the purview of the Act. The majority judgment gave a straight answer to this question that the meaning of the term `unprotected worker' was only the casual workman, was not correct, while the Learned Single Judge did not stop at that and gave a broader answer interpreting Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and held that every manual worker engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment, irrespective of whether he is protected by other labour legislations or not, would be termed as `unprotected worker', and further that the definition was not restricted to those manual workers who are casually engaged. Though the judgment of the Learned Single Judge was criticized by Shri J.P. Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that it went beyond the reference made, we feel that the Learned Single Judge has not travelled beyond the reference. The reference has to be read as requiring the correct interpretation of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and the term `unprotected worker' and, therefore, in our opinion, it would have to be explained as to what is the true scope and meaning of the term `unprotected worker' as envisaged by Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. In that, the debate cannot be restricted to the narrower question as to whether the term means only the casually engaged workers. In our opinion, the true impact of the term `unprotected worker' has to be considered and it will have also to be pointed out as to who can be said to be `unprotected worker'. The objection in that behalf raised by the appellant to the Full Bench judgment is not correct. When we see the judgment in Kay Kay Embroideries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Cloth Market and Shops Board, Mumbai & Ors. [2006 III LLJ 824 Bom], it is clear that the Court had posed two questions:-

12. As against this, Shri K.K. Singhvi and Smt. Indira Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Vimal Chandra S. Dave, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents raised various contentions. Legal Submissions on behalf of the respondents A. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents contended that in the absence of any ambiguity, no harm can be caused to the plain language of the Statute. According to all the Learned Counsel, impugned judgments of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court were in accordance with the plain language of the Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi Act. Numbers of authorities for this proposition were relied upon. Reliance was also placed on Sections 21 and 22 of the Mathadi Act and Clauses 4(c), 11(3), 16(3), 16(4), 16(5), 33, 35(6) and 36 of the Scheme framed under the Mathadi Act. In short, it was contended that under Section 21, the workmen could retain the privileges and benefits under any Act, Award or Contract, if such privileges were better than the ones offered by the Act and in that sense, even if the manual worker was protected under the various labour laws, he could still be governed by the Mathadi Act. Same argument was in respect of Section 22 of the Mathadi Act, providing that a manual worker, who is in receipt of better benefits from his employer either on the date of commencement of this Act or at any time thereafter, he could seek exemption from all or any of the provisions of the Mathadi Act. Reference was made to Clauses 4(c), 11(3), 16(3), 16(4), 16(5), 33, 35(6) and 36 of the Scheme framed under the Mathadi Act.

14. On these conflicting claims, we have to interpret Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and also the scope of the definition in the Section. We have already quoted the provisions of Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi Act in the earlier part of the judgment. There can be no dispute that the term "worker" is used in the definition of "unprotected worker" in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. Therefore, while considering the Section 2(11), the scope of the term "worker", which is separately defined by Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act, would have to be taken into consideration. The definition of the term "worker" is an inclusive definition. It includes a worker, who is engaged by the employer directly or through any agency and it is not necessary that such worker gets the wages or not. The term "wages" is also defined vide Section 2(13) of the Mathadi Act. Therefore, even if such person does not earn the wages, as contemplated in Section 2(13), such person who is engaged to do manual work in any scheduled employment, would be a worker. Further, even if such worker is not employed in the strict sense of the term by an employer or a contractor, but is working with the permission or under the agreement with the employer or contractor, even then such worker would be a "worker" within the meaning of Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act. The only exception is that such worker should not be a member of employer's family. As per the plain meaning, when such worker is engaged or is to be engaged in the scheduled employment, he becomes the unprotected worker. It has been correctly held in the judgment of the Learned Single Judge (Hon'ble Deshmukh, J.) that these two definitions ("worker" and "unprotected worker") given in Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi Act would have to be read together for realizing the scope of the Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. Therefore, insofar as the language of Section 2(11) is concerned, it is plain, unambiguous and clear. It means that every worker, who is doing manual work and is engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment, would be covered by that definition and would become an unprotected worker. The question is whether we should accept this plain language. The appellants take strong exception to this approach.

39. The other argument raised was on the basis of maxim of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima In Lege, shortly stated, Contemporanea Expositio. According to the Black's Law Dictionary, this is the doctrine that the best meaning of a statute or document is the one given by those who enacted it or signed it, and that the meaning publicly given by contemporary or long professional usage is presumed to be the true one, even if the language may have a popular or an etymological meaning that is very different. Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants argued that in the Committee's Reports, right from 1963 clearly only those workers were viewed, who did not have the protection of the other labour laws and the Committee had identified only those manual workers who were engaged in loading and unloading operations. The reliance was made on a letter No. (c) 20206 dated 7.9.1992, written by one Shri G.K. Walawalkar, Desk Officer, informing that in an establishment till the workers doing Mathadi type work are on their muster roll as direct workers and they are getting total protection and benefits under the various labour laws, till then such establishment shall not be included in the Mathadi Act or the schemes thereunder. Two other letters were also referred to by the Learned Senior Counsel. First Letter was dated 10.5.1990 addressed to the Western India Corrugated Box Manufacturers' Association, authored by one Divisional Officer, informing to the Chairman, Western India Corrugated Box Manufacturers' Association that the provisions of Mathadi Act are not applicable to the directly employed workers (employed no permanent basis) by the company. Another letter was dated 3.10.1991 addressed to the Secretary, Mumbai Timber Merchants Association Ltd., specifying that the direct labourers of the employer doing loading/unloading work would not be covered by the said Act. Though these two letters were never procured, they were produced before us. Further, a reference is made to the letter of Mathadi Board (Bombay Iron and Steel Labour Board) dated 17.11.1983, wherein the Mathadi Board understood and applied the Act only to that special class of workers doing loading and unloading operations in scheduled employments, who were in the regular employments of an employer and, therefore, were not protected by other applicable labour legislations. It was also urged that only after the impugned judgment was passed, the Mathadi Boards have started asking the employers to register them under the Act even if they are engaging regular full time workers. It was urged that in Irkar Sahu's & Anr. Vs. Bombay Port Trust (cited supra), the Mathadi Board had taken such a position and they could not now turn back from their stance. From this, the Learned Senior Counsel urged that since the State Government itself understood the provision in a particular manner, such understanding should be honoured by the Courts.