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9. In our view, a conveyance in the above terms passes unto the purchaser the entire rights of the vendors in or in respect of the disputed premises and that would include also all rights under a subsisting ejectment decree against a tenant of the premises, as, otherwise, transfer of the right of possession or enjoyment would not be complete The conveyance (Ext. 2), therefore, may very well be taken to be an assignment of the ejectment decree also, -- and as this transfer or assignment is by the conveyance, which is in writing, it may very well come within the expression or description "assignment in writing" in Order 21, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure and satisfy the requirements thereof It would thus be a case where Order 21 Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be immediately attracted and the respondent No. 1 will be entitled to apply for execution and execute the decree in question under the terms of the said statutory provision in place of the original decree-holders, who were her vendors. This view would be amply supported on principle by the decision of this Court, reported in Ananda Mohan Roy v. Promotho Nath Ganguli, 25 Cal WN 863= (AIR 1921 Cal 74), which, though concerning a decree for arrears of rent on the relevant point and not a decree for ejectment, would be a good and sufficient guide and authority on the above question of principle. The said decision appears to have been followed by this Court and accepted as good law in Jatindra Narain Bhaduri v. Chandra Nath Pramanik , and also Radharani Basu v. Dwarkanath Mandal, 41 Cal WN 608. The apparently contrary decisions in Mathurapur Zemindary Co. Ltd. v. Bhasaram Mandal , and Prabashini Debi v. Rasiklal Banerji , need not detain us. as, apart from anything else, they appear to be distinguishable on facts and may well be said to be not strictly relevant to the present question. The decision of the Supreme Court in Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. AIR 1955 SC 376, which was similar to the last cited Calcutta cases and , supra, and to AIR 1942 Mad. 21, dealt really with the question whether a decree not in existence at the date of the transfer or conveyance under consideration, but coming into existence on a later date, would be covered by the said conveyance as a future right, acquired or to be acquired by the vendor and intended to be passed under the same, on equitable principles. and the learned Judges, in all the above cases, answered the said question in the negative on the facts before them and refused to apply Order 21 Rule 16 of the Code in the said cases upon that finding. It is clear, however, from the judgment of S. R Das, J., vide AIR 1955 SC 376, as he then was that the authority of 25 Cal WN 863= (AIR 1921 Cal 74). supra, in the matter of a decree in existence at the date of the assignment or conveyance in question, remained unaffected that is, in regard to the cases, where upon a construction of the said conveyance, the same would cover the said decree, and to put it briefly, the said case was distinguished on that ground (Vide pp. 385. 391-2 of AIR 1955 S. C. ).

13. There is another way of looking at the matter. Even if Order 21, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be assumed not to apply to the instant case, on the ground that there is no express assignment of the decree in question under the conveyance (Ext. 2), the ultimate position would not be different in law as it cannot be contended with any force whatsoever that, in spite of the said conveyance (Ext. 21, the rights under the ejectment decree in question were retained by the respondent No. 1's vendors, the decree-holders. In other words, the said rights must be held to have passed under the said conveyance (Ext. 2) and, although there was no express assignment of the decree in question, it was clearly a case, in which the purchaser respondent No. 1 became entitled, in law, to the rights of her vendors, the decree-holders, in the matter of the said decree, and in any view would be entitled to be called their representative or "a person claiming under them" in respect of the said decree. Upon that footing, she would be entitled to execute the decree in question under Section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if not under Order 21 Rule 16 of the Code as assumed above, on the footing that there was transfer of the decree, at least, by implication or impliedly, if not expressly or in writing, and this position would be well supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Saila Bala Dassi v. Nirmala Sundari Dassi, , which has put a very wide and liberal interpretation to the said section, and also by the earlier decision of the same court, reported in AIR 1955 SC 376 (supra), where too a similar broad view of the said section was taken. With respect, we agree with the aforesaid wide and liberal interpretation of the statutory provision in question, namely, Section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as, otherwise, just rights would become unenforceable and would be defeated. In this view, the respondent No. 1 would be entitled to execute the decree in question as the legal representative of the original decree-holders--or, to put it in strict statutory language, as "a person, claiming under them," --under Section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and this right, as it has been held by the Supreme Court in the above cited authority would also include even the right to continue a pending proceeding.