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There is no doubt or dispute to the fact that the provision of s.153C of the Act is a procedural provision. Law of procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid of substantial and real justice and not to foreclose even an adjudication on the substantial rights of citizens of property, personal and other laws. In the case of STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH VS SINGHARA SINGH (AIR 1964 SC 358),the Apex Court quoted with approval the decision in the case of TAYLOR VS TAYLOR (1875) 1 CH D 426, for the proposition that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of dealing with the matter are necessarily forbidden. Further, in contrast to statutes dealing with substantive rights, statutes dealing with merely matters of procedure are presumed to be retrospective unless such a construction is textually inadmissible [DELHI CLOTH & GENERAL MILLS CO.LTD. VS CIT (AIR 1927 PC 242)]. Further, as stated by Lord Denning that the rule that an act of Parliament is not to be given retrospective effects applies only to statues which affect vested rights. It doesn't apply to statues which only alter the form of procedure or the admissibility of evidence, or the effect which the IT(SS).A.82,84-86/Kol/2011 Trishul Hi-Tech Industries A.Yrs.2004-05 to 2006-07 courts give to evidence [BLYTH VS BLYTH (1966) 1 ALL ER 524 (HL)]. If the new act affects matters of procedure only, then, prima facie, it applies to all action pending as well as future [K.EAPIN CHACKO VS PROVIDENT FUND INVESTMENT COMPANY(P) :TD (AIR 1976 SC 2610)]. In stating the principle that a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively, it was settled that with approval the reason of the rule as expressed by Maxwell that no person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending, and if, by an act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed to the altered mode [TIKARAM & SONS VS CST (AIR 1968 SC 1286)]. The factum of satisfaction of the Assessing Officer that the documents seized are incriminating in nature so as to castigate the other person is a matter of procedure. No substantive or vested right of a party is affected thereby. Thus, the provision is remedial of the erstwhile legislation, designed to eliminate unintended consequences which was causing undue hardship on the subjects and is also clarificatory in nature. It is settled that rule 1BB is essentially a rule of evidence as to the choice of one of the well-accepted methods of valuation in respect of certain kinds of properties with a view to achieving uniformity in valuation and avoiding disparate valuations resulting from application of different methods of valuation respecting properties of a similar nature and character and accordingly is a procedural law which is applicable to pending cases [CWT VS SHARVAN KUMAR SWAMP & SONS (1992) 210 ITR 886 (SC)]. In the facts of the instant case, due to the unintended interpretation of the scope of the provisions of s.153C of the Act, the law was amended to ensure a reasonable approach or as otherwise, due to conflicting decisions on the subject, the construction of such provisions was leading to absurdity. Without taking the aid of the amended provision, the scope and ambit of such provision was leading to ambiguous proposition which is not the intendment of the Legislature. It, therefore, follows that the amended provision of s.153C of the Act is also declaratory. It seeks to clarify the law so as to remove doubts leading to the Courts giving conflicting decisions. Being clarificatory in nature, it must be held to be restrospective in the facts and in the circumstances of the case. The Legislature may pass a declaratory Act to set aside what the Legislature deems to have been a judicial error in the interpretation of statute. It only seeks to clear the meaning of a provision of the principal Act and make explicit that which was already implicit. It is settled that section 154 is a procedural provision. It is settled law that an amendment of a procedural law is normally regarded as retrospective in operation because no one has any vested right in a procedural law and the Tribunal was therefore, justified in holding that section 154(1)(bb) which was inserted during the financial year 1964-1965, could be applied for the assessment year 1963-1964, and the IAC had jurisdiction under section 154(1)(bb) to rectify the mistake in the penalty order dated 4-3-1970 for the assessment year 1963-64 [NURUDDIN & BROS VS CIT (1979) 116 ITR 704 (CAL)]. Thus, the provisions of s.153C of the Act as amended by Finance (No.2) Act, 2014 was made applicable on and from 01-10-2014 and is relevant for the assessment year under dispute as it cures the infirmities of the previous legislation and also makes the provisions workable by avoiding absurd consequences. Accordingly, such provision is to be given retrospective operation and is also applicable to pending proceedings. That being so, the action of the Ld.Assessing Officer is fraught with illegality as he proceeded de hors any incriminating materials to assume jurisdiction u/s 153C of the Act in the instant case and accordingly, his action is liable to be quashed being ab initio void, ultra vires and ex-facie null in law."