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11. I need notice, at this stage, another admission made by the learned Advocate General. At first he was not prepared to admit that the Chief Minister was aware of the pendency of Matter No. 369 of 1965 (Sm. Kusum Kumari Ghosh v. The State of West Bengal) at the time when he broadcast the speech. But towards the close of his argument, the learned Advocate General made the admission that the Chief Minister has constructive knowledge of the pendency of the Rule. I had both the admissions recorded, by an order dated March 1, 1966, which I set out below:

"So that there may not be any misgiving or misunderstanding about the scope of the argu ment advanced by the learned Advocate General on behalf of the respondent Chief Minister, let the two admissions made by the learned Advocate General, in course of his argument, he recorded, namely,
(a) that the Chief Minister delivered the speech, which is marked Ex. J, over the All India Radio on November 25, 1965;
(b) that although the Chief Minister might not have actual knowledge of the pendency of Matter No. 369 of 1965 Smt. Kusum Kumari Ghosh and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Anr. on the day he delivered his speech, he had constructive knowledge of the same, because the Rule had already been served upon the State Government and the Secretary of the Department of Animal Husbandry."
"If the English decisions on the subject be carefully examined it will be clear that though want of knowledge of the pendency of a case has, in special circumstances, been held to be a good reason for not proceeding for contempt, there is no invariable rule that unless knowledge of the pendency is affirmatively established, the offence ol contempt is not committed". Almost similar view was expressed by the Allahabad High Court in Rajendra Kumar Garg v. Shafiq Ahmad Azad and by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Padmawati Devi v. R. K. Karanjia . In the instant case it is not necessary for me to consider this argument any further. In the facts of this case, the learned Advocate-General had to concede, at the end, that the Chief Minister must be deemed to have constructive knowledge of the pendency of Writ Petition, when he did broadcast his speech. The Chief Minister himself goes further, in the affidavit affirmed by him and filed towards the close of the hearing. He admits that he knew of the issue of the Rule Nisi in Matter No. 369 of 1965 but had no knowledge of the details. Were I do express my views on the point, I would have respectfully agreed with the opinion expressed by the Allahabad, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa High Courts, in the three cases referred to hereinbefore. But it is not necessary for me to do so, in this case, regard being had to the turn that events took.

20. Mr. Advocate General recast his argument, after the realisation that it would be futile for the Chief Minister to deny either actual or constructive knowledge of the pendency of the Writ petition. He therefore argued that even if the Chief Minister had constructive knowledge of the pendency of the Writ petition, he was within his legitimate rights in broadcasting his justification of the Control Order and the benefits it was to bring to the general public. In this context he strongly relied on certain observations contained in the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case between AIR 1958 Mad 558 (supra). I need recall in my mind the background in which those observations were made. Ramaswami, the applicant before the Madras High Court, was or claimed to be the leader of an agitation in the State of Madras known as Dravida Kazhagham. He was committed to a sessions court of stand his trial, inter alia, on a charge under Section 117 of the Indian Penal Code, for having abetted commission of violent offences by the public. The charge related to three speeches, wherein the applicant Ramaswami was alleged to have incited the public to kick, stab and kill Brahmins and set fire to their houses. While the trial of the applicant was pending, Prime Minister Nehru visited the State and delivered a speech, in course of which he said: