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B. The Civil Court vide judgment and decree dated 31.1.1994 allowed Civil Suit Nos.61 and 62 of 1986 in favour of the respondent. C. Aggrieved, the appellant filed First Appeal Nos.1451, 1452 and 1453 of 1994 before the High Court of Gujarat challenging the said judgment and decree dated 31.1.1994. The High Court vide common judgment and order dated 18.3.1997 held that the Civil Court at Mehsana did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suits. Therefore, the said judgment and decrees passed in the civil suits were set aside and the Civil Court at Mehsana was directed to return the plaints to the respondent so that the same may be presented before the appropriate court having jurisdiction.

Hence these appeals.

3. Shri Parag P. Tripathi, learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant duly assisted by Shri Nishant Menon, Advocate has submitted that the plaints had initially been instituted at Mehsana Court which had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain these suits and even after being decreed, the High Court vide order dated 18.3.1997 had rightly set aside the judgment and decrees and asked the court at Mehsana to return the plaints to the respondent so that the plaintiff could present them before the court of competent territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, the order of the High Court has to be understood to have been passed in view of the provisions of Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) and not a case of transfer of a suit from the Court at Mehsana to the Civil Court, Surat. Once the plaint is presented after being returned from the court having no jurisdiction, it is to be treated as a fresh suit and even if the trial was conducted earlier, as in the instant case, it had to be done de novo. The only protection could be to take advantage of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Limitation Act’) and the court fees paid earlier may be adjusted but by no stretch of imagination it can be held to be a continuation of the suit. Had it been so there would be no occasion for the High Court to set aside the judgment and decree of the civil court at Mehsana at such a belated stage. Thus the impugned judgment and order is liable to be set aside.

4. Per contra, Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that in fact, the suits had been instituted at Mehsana Court in 1986 and the civil court therein had decreed the suit. The High Court in the impugned order has clearly stated that the suits were transferred from Mehsana Court to Civil Court at Surat and therefore, the respondent was entitled for interest from the date of institution of suit at Mehsana. The judgment and decree dated 21.9.2006 clearly reveals that the suits were received and registered on 24.3.1986. The appellant had not applied for correction of the said judgment and order by filing an application under Section 152 CPC. Therefore, no interference is called for and the appeals are liable to be dismissed.

18. The judgment and decree dated 21.9.2006 clearly provided for future interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the suit till the realisation of the amount. The Executing Court vide judgment and decree dated 28.9.2007 rejected the claim of the respondent observing that the respondent had wrongly filed suit at Mehsana and the said court had no jurisdiction, and the “wrong doer cannot get benefit of its own wrong” i.e. the benefit of interest on the amount from the date of filing the suit in Mehsana court. The Appellate Court in its order dated 12.3.2010 reiterated a similar view rejecting the appeal of the respondent observing that “a public undertaking cannot be penalised for the mistake committed by the plaintiff by choosing a wrong forum”. Before the High Court when the matter was taken up on 14.9.2010, a similar view had been reiterated that the respondent cannot be allowed to take advantage of the words “from the date of the suit”, and conveniently overlook its own wrong of initially filing the suit in 1986 in the court at Mehsana. Though the court did not have jurisdiction, the plaintiff/respondent is now claiming interest for the period from 1986 to 1999 i.e. for 13 years by taking advantage of its own wrong and for that purpose, the plaintiff/respondent is trying to misconstrue the words mentioned by the learned trial court in the operative portion of the judgment dated 21.9.2006, viz., from the date of filing of the suit. However, while passing the impugned order, the High Court has used the language that the case stood transferred from the Mehsana court to the court at Surat and, therefore, interest has to be paid from the date of initiation of the suit at Mehsana i.e. from 1986 and in view thereof, allowed the claim.