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3. Mr. Maneesh Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate is absolutely unjustified in granting the application filed under Section 93(1) of the CrPC and would also submit that for investigation of an offence, that too for collection of evidence, no search warrant can be issued under Section 93(1)(c) of the CrPC. He would further submit that Section 93(1)(c) of the CrPC requires the Court to consider that for the purposes of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code, general search is required, then only search warrant can be issued. In the instant case, the learned trial Magistrate without application of mind, on mere asking by the police station that for collection of evidence, search warrant be issued, issued general warrant for search of locker which runs contrary to the provisions contained in Section 93(1)(c) of the CrPC, as it smacks complete non-application of mind and in aid of investigation for which no warrant under Section 93(1)(c) of the CrPC can be issued, as such, the order passed by the trial Magistrate and by the revisional Court perpetuating the illegality, deserve to be set-aside. He relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of V.S. Kuttan Pillai v. Ramakrishnan and another 1 to support his contention.

4. Mr. Mateen Siddiqui, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State / respondent, would submit that the petitioner is standing trial for the aforesaid offences, particularly Section 384 of the IPC, as he has extorted more than ₹ 1,90,00,000/- (Rupees one crore ninety lakhs only) from the complainant and therefore to collect evidence of such an offence committed by the petitioner / accused, search warrant has been obtained by the jurisdictional police which is strictly in accordance with Section 93(1)(c) of the CrPC. He would further submit that investigation is a proceeding under the Code within the meaning of Section 93(1)(c) of the CrPC and therefore general search warrant issued by the Magistrate in aid of investigation under the Code is valid. He placed reliance upon a decision of the M.P. High Court in the matter of Avadhesh Singh Tomar and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others 2 to buttress his submission.

7. It would be appropriate to mention that Section 93(1)(c) of the CrPC in particular is the pari materia provision to Section 96(1), clause

(c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, now repealed.

8. A careful perusal of Section 93(1)(c) of the CrPC would show that the Legislature has consciously used the words, "inquiry, trial or other proceeding", but has omitted the word "investigation". The word "inquiry" has been defined in Section 2(g) of the CrPC by stating that "inquiry" means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court. Likewise, the word "investigation" has been defined in Section 2(h) of the CrPC stating that "investigation" includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf.

14. In V.S. Kuttan Pillai (supra) wherein the provisions of Section 93(1)(c) of the CrPC were dealt with, it was held by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court that Section 93(1)(c) of the CrPC comprehends a situation where a search warrant can be issued as the Court is unaware of not only the person but even the place where the documents may be found and that a general search is necessary. It was also held that issuance of search warrant is a serious matter and it would be advisable not to dispose of an application for search warrant in a mechanical way by a laconic order. It was emphasised by Their Lordships that issue of a search warrant being in the discretion of the Magistrate it would be reasonable to expect of the Magistrate to give reasons which swayed the discretion in favour of granting the request. A clear application of mind by the learned Magistrate must be discernible in the order granting search warrant.