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11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents argued that in the plaint the main thrust is that the impugned deeds of gift were void, ab initio and only declaratory court fees had been paid, as declaration was sought against deeds of gift. He also averred that some deeds of gift were executed by Paspat Prasad in the year 1983 in favour of the plaintiffs and he kept 04 Dhurs and 8 ½ Dhurkis of homestead market land for his eldest daughter defendant no.2 and respecting of his wishes his widow defendant no.1 executed the deed of gift dated 25.05.1988 with respect to the homestead land in favour of defendant no.2 whereafter defendant no.2 came in possession and constructed her house in the year 1988. Hence, he claimed that the plaintiffs had full knowledge of the deed of gift which was a registered document and also had knowledge of possession of defendant no.2 at least by the constructions made by her. He also averred that the impugned deeds were dated 25.05.1988 and 31.05.1991 whereas the suit was filed on 26.07.1994 i.e. much after three years of the said deeds, although, Article 59 of the Limitation Act specifically provides that it should be filed within three years of knowledge and here due to registration of the said deeds the legal presumption would be that the defendants had knowledge of the said impugned deeds on the dates of their registration itself and onus was squarely upon the plaintiffs to prove lack of knowledge. He also argued that explanation II and III (c) of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act specifically provided that construction of house amounted to knowledge, whereas the provision of Registration Act also provided that registration of a document amounted to knowledge to all . It was also claimed that the impugned deed of gift dated 25.05.1988 was with respect to homestead market land and thus it was beyond the scope of the Consolidation Act, whereas even with respect to the impugned deed of gift dated 31.05.1991 the transaction may be void with regard consolidation proceeding and the said transaction was not void inter-se the transferor and the transferee. In that regard, he relies upon a decision of a Division Bench of this court in a case of Ram Raji Sharma and another Vs. The State of Bihar and others, reported in 2007(4) PLJR 449. He also stated that only plaintiff no.2 has claimed about knowledge of the impugned deeds in the year 1994 and that too was through her husband, who was not examined and hence, the evidence with regard to knowledge is not reliable.

15. So far the question of absence of knowledge of the plaintiffs with regard to the impugned deeds of gift is concerned, they had specifically claimed that earlier they had no knowledge of the said deeds and they only came to know about them in July, 1994 when they heard rumours about it whereafter they applied for certified copies of the said deeds which were made available to them on 11.07.1994 and 15.07.1994 whereafter they filed the suit on 26.07.1994 within a month of their knowledge. This statement is supported by oral evidence adduced by the plaintiffs as well as documentary evidence, namely certified copies of the said deeds. On the other hand, the defendants claimed that the registration of any document leads to a legal presumption about knowledge to all and hence, when the said deeds were registered in the year 1988 and 1991 which would be legally presumed that the plaintiffs had knowledge about the same immediately after their registration. The second point raised by the defendants in that regard is that after their purchase of the homestead market land in the year 1988 defendant no.2 made constructions over the same and hence, the said constructions amounted to knowledge as per section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act.