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5. Per contra, Mr. Umesh Aggarwal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent argues that the petition itself is not maintainable, on account of the fact that the petitioner has not availed of the remedy of filing an appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act. It is submitted that the 4 of 18 proceedings under the DV Act have been initiated after filing of the written statement therein and therefore, the petitioner, at this juncture, is not entitled to seek quashing of the same. It is also argued that the respondent can avail of the remedy available under Sections 498-A, 506, 504 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act as well as under the DV Act. Under the FIR, the respondent had alleged cruelty on account of demand of dowry, whereas under the DV Act, the relief sought is for maintenance etc. It is further argued that the maintenance as awarded is only interim maintenance based on the financial capacity of the petitioner, which is not on the excessive side. It is also submitted that the courts at Chandigarh would have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, since the petitioner is residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts at Chandigarh, along with her sister and brother-in-law. Her son is now admitted in a local school herein within the tricity of Chandigarh. It is further submitted that dismissal of the transfer application, seeking transfer of the divorce petition from Bangalore to Chandigarh, could not be read as a bar to the proceedings being instituted here within the jurisdiction of the courts at Chandigarh.

15. The third question that would arise for consideration is whether concealment of fact regarding pendency of the FIR at Bangalore would dis- entitle the respondent to any relief under the proceedings initiated under the DV Act?

16. Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code was incorporated in the 10 of 18 Indian Penal Code in the year 1983 when there arose a need to protect women against cruelty inflicted upon her, by her husband and member of his family, on account of bringing inadequate dowry. Despite the protection granted to women on account of inadequate dowry, a woman is subjected to various other abuses within the home, which necessitated introduction of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. As per Section 3, the term 'domestic violence' is wide enough to include physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal abuse, emotional abuse or even economic abuse within the matrimonial home. The scope and ambit of domestic violence is much wider than cruelty as envisaged under Section 498-A of IPC. At this juncture, it would be pertinent to take note of the fact that the reliefs sought for under the DV Act as provided under Sections 12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 of the DV Act are reliefs, which are not available under Sections 498-A of Indian Penal Code. In the instant case, an FIR had been instituted under Sections 498-A, 506, 504 of Indian Penal Code, which provisions would not have provided respondent with the right to get relief of residence, maintenance, compensation, custody etc. Therefore, this court is of the opinion that non-mentioning of the aforesaid FIR does not amount to concealment of material fact, which would dis-entitle the respondent to claim relief under the DV Act, as the relief claimed is entirely different. Therefore, this question is answered against the petitioner.

Chapter IV of the DV Act pertains to the procedure as to be followed by the Magistrate to grant relief to an aggrieved person. Under Section 12 of the DV Act, an application has to be presented by an aggrieved person, either by the person herself or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person to the Magistrate, seeking relief as provided under the DV Act. A proviso has been added to Section 12(1) of the Act, that before passing any such order on any application received, the Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or the Service Provider. Section 9 of the DV Act entails the duties and functions of a Protection Officer, whose primary duty is to assist the Magistrate in the discharge of his functions under the Act, to make a domestic incident report to the Magistrate in the form prescribed, upon receipt of a complaint of domestic violence, while forwarding copies of the complaint to the Police Officer in charge of the Police Station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, domestic violence is alleged to have been committed, as well as to the Service Provider. Section 9(2) of the DV Act further provides that the Protection Officer shall be under the control and supervision of the Magistrate and shall perform the duties imposed on him by the Magistrate and the Government. Moreover, Section 4 of the DV Act provides that any 13 of 18 person, who has reasons to believe that an act of domestic violence has been, or is being, or is likely to be committed, may give information about it to the concerned Protection Officer.

20. In the case of Abhiram Gogoi vs. Rashmi Rekha Gogoi, (2011) 4 Gau LR 276, it was held by Hon'ble Gauhati High Court that it is not mandatory for a Magistrate to obtain a domestic incident report before the Magistrate passes a maintenance order under Section 18 of the DV Act. A similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Shambhu Prasad Singh vs. Manjari, 2012 SCC Online Del 1371, that receipt of domestic incident report is not a pre-requisite for issuing a notice to the respondent. Insistence to take into consideration the domestic incident 14 of 18 report of protection officer would not apply at the stage of initiation of enquiry under Section 12 of the DV Act, because a Magistrate, on the basis of an application supported by affidavit, on being satisfied can even grant ex parte orders in favour of the aggrieved person under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 or 22 of the DV Act. Even this High Court in the case Jagdish Kumar Bakhri vs. Manju Bakhri, 2012 SCC Online P&H 395, observed that a bare perusal of Section 12 of the DV Act would signify that it is not mandatory for the Court to call for domestic incident report on each and every date of hearing, before passing any order. If no domestic report is received in the court, then in such eventuality, there is no bar for the court to pass an order under Section 12 of the DV Act. The judgment relied upon by the counsel for the respondent in the case of Dharmendra and others vs. State of M.P. and another, 2014 SCC Online MP 5388, is contrary to the judgments referred to by this court. On a reading of the judgment, this court is not inclined to concur with the same. In the said case, it has been held as under;-