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25. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that a legislative exercise is required to be carried out by the State Legislature keeping in mind the overall objective specified in Article 40 and the entries contained in the Eleventh Schedule for the purpose of determining how the Panchayats should be endowed with the power and authorities to function as institutions of self-government. This Constitutional provision also leaves it to the wisdom of the State legislature to determine to what extent such devolution of powers and responsibilities upon the panchayats would be effected and what would be the conditions for devolution of such power. Sub-Clause (b) of Article 243G deals with empowering the panchayats with respect to implementation of schemes pertaining to economic development and social justice which might be introduced including those in relation to the matters provided in the Eleventh Schedule. The very fact that the State Legislature is required to undertake a legislative exercise for the purpose of endowing panchayats with power pertaining to implementation of schemes in relation to entries in the Eleventh Schedule, in my opinion, leads to the inference that this exercise is within the legislative domain of the State Legislature and not a specific mandate of the Constitution on the strength of which the State legislature could be compelled to vest or endow the Panchayats with all matters pertaining to entries prescribed in the Eleventh Schedule. This issue has been left to be decided by the State Legislature. The ratio of the judgment of the case of Jogendra Singh (supra) does not apply in the instant case as in that authority, the expression, "may" has been construed as "shall" as the Supreme Court found that the whole purpose of the Rule which was the subject of controversy before the Court in that case would have been frustrated if the word "may" in the said Rule was not construed as "shall". On the other hand, in my opinion, if the expression "may" is given the meaning of "shall", in the context of the aforesaid provision, and the constitutional mandate is held to be imperative, even then legislative exercise would be required to be undertaken to shift obligations pertaining to primary education to Panchayats from the Council or other statutory bodies which are functioning in this field now. Mr. Gupta had referred to different provisions of Part IX of the Constitution, in which the auxiliary Verbs "may" and "shall" have been employed. In the case of Mahaluxmi Rice Mills Vs. State of U.P. [(1998)6 SCC 590], dealing with a statutory provision in which both these expressions had been used, the Supreme Court observed:-