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41. The amendment of Article 227 by the 42nd Amendment was with the object of restricting the jurisdiction only to superintendence over all Courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction and it was not to be exercised to question any judgment of any inferior Court which was otherwise not subject to appeal or revision.

42. Admittedly, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal passed under Section 95 of the Act, was not subject to any appeal or revision before the High Court under the provisions of that Act. Nor, was the Revenue Tribunal subject to appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, The appellate jurisdiction mentioned in Sub-article (1) and the appeal or revision in Sub-article (5) of Article 227 could be reasonably interpreted to have been confined to statutory provisions in the respective Acts. There having been no clear provisions for appeal or revision to the High Court in the Act, the impugned order could not be interfered with by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, as it stood after the 42nd Amendment and before the 44th Amendment.

44. Though this revision petition was filed when the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution was in force, the amendment has since been repealed by the 44th Amendment and the pre-amendment position has now been restored. As the position stands at present, the High Court has superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. There is no doubt that the High Court can exercise superintending jurisdiction over the Revenue Tribunal, after the 44th Amendment.

45. This leads us to the question as to whether while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court should act under the old provisions (as amended by 42nd Amendment) which prevailed when the petition was filed or after the 44th Amendment which prevails at present while the petition is being decided. The jurisdiction under the Article being one of superintendence no question of exercising jurisdiction under it as it was in the past may, perhaps arise. The Court under this principle has perhaps to exercise jurisdiction as it stands at the time of decision.

50. It is an accepted principle that interference under Article 227 should be sparingly done in exceptional cases for the ends of justice. When substantial justice has already been done, no such interference is called for. In the instant case, it is clear that the State has done distributive justice between the parties. There is no reason why this distributive justice should be disturbed by this Court under Article 227. Mere errors of fact are not liable to be interfered with. The result is that this application is not maintainable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the Tribunal is not a Court subordinate to the High Court. The jurisdiction under Article 227 being different from that under Section 115, C.P.C., it is not permissible to convert the application into one under that Article. Even if that Article is allowed to be invoked, it is discretionary for this High Court to exercise or, not to exercise jurisdiction. Article 227 as amended after the 44th Amendment confers jurisdiction and even though this application was filed when the 42nd Amendment was in force, it is open for this Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 as it stands today. But that jurisdiction will be sparingly exercised to keep the Tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction and will not be exercised when there is no miscarriage of justice. The Tribunal in this case though cannot be said to have properly approached the question of limitation, yet distributive justice between the parties has been done. It is, therefore, not a fit case where this Court should intervene under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.