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3. Bai Ishwari having died during the pendency of the suit respondent No. 2 and his father Govindlal, were" substituted as her heirs and legal representatives, Govindlal having since died respondent No. 2 is now the sole representative of the interest of the original mortgagee in the property.

4. The property in suit was owned by one Bhupatrai Lallubhai. The original defendant No. 1, Bai Ishwari, was Bhupatrai's full sister, She was married to one Govindlal. Bhupatrai had two sons, Trikamlal and Jivanlal and a daughter Atilaxmi. Plaintiffs Nos. 2, 8, and 4 are the sons of Atilaxmi. Trikamlal died on April 11, 1911, leaving no issue but a widow Bai Devmani, plaintiff No. 1. By a registered rent note, dated December 5, 1910, Bhupatrai had leased the property in suit to Govindlal for five years. On October 12, 1911, Bhupatrai exe? euted in favour of his sister Bai lshwari a usufructuary mortgage of the property in suit for five years for Rs. 599. The deed was executed by Bhupatrai and his surviving son Jivanlal, and Bai Ishwari was put in possession under the deed. Jivanlal died early in 1912 unmarried and childless. On June 23, 1912, Bhupatrai made a will whereby he appointed his grandsons, plaintiffs Nos. 2, 3 and 4 his heirs and universal legatees. The will was registered. In 1914 plaintiff No. 1 filed a suit against Bhupatrai,: being suit No. 678 of 1914, claiming from him suitable provision, for residence and maintenance. In that suit a compromise was arrived at and the Court passed a decree on January 6, 1915, in; terms of the compromise. The decree inter alia provided that Bhupatrai was to give to plaintiff No. 1 for her residence for her lifetime the property in suit on the expiry of the term of the mortgagethe remaining term of the mortgage was put down in the decree as being two years. The property was to become redeemable on and after October 12, 1916. Before the expiry of the mortgage period, Bhupatrai, by a sale deed dated June 1, 1916, conveyed the property to the father of respondent No. 1 for a consideration of Rs. 1,499 therein mentioned. The consideration was made up as follows :Rs. 599 to be paid to the mart-gagee in possession for redemption of the mortgage, Rs. 145 to be paid to the mortgagee for expenses she had incurred for repairs of the property, Rs. 400 to be paid to the vendor or heirs on the death of plaintiff No. 1 who had a right of residence in the property during her life and the balance of Rs. 355 was acknowledged by Bhupatrai as having been received by him in cash from the vendee.

5. After the expiry of the mortgage period Bhupatrai having failed to put plaintiff No. 1 in possession of the property as provided by the terms of the compromise decree, plaintiff No. 1 applied for execution of the decree. Bnupatrai appeared and showed cause in the darkhast proceedings. He alleged that the property consisted of two compartments under separate census numbers and that plaintiff No. 1 was entitled to reside in one compartment only. The vendee, according to Bhupatrai, had kept that compartment vacant and ready to be delivered over to plaintiff No. 1 and the other compartment was in possession of the vendee. He contended that plaintiff No. 1's remedy in respect of the other compartment was not against him but against the vendee who was the owner of it. The execution Court decided that plaintiff' No. 1 was entitled to residence in the whole house comprising both the census numbers and added : "on the whole it appears that the just demand of the plaintiff (plaintiff No. 1) is sought to be thwarted by his (Bhupatrai's) ingenious device." Bhupatrai appealed against the decision of the execution Court. On October 30, 1918, Bhupatrai's appeal was dismissed, the appeal Court remarking : "This is clearly an unfair attempt to thwart the respondent in executing her decree." The execution proceedings being thereafter resumed plaintiff No. 1 was obstructed in obtaining possession of the property. She, therefore, on January 30, 1919, put in an application to have Bhupatrai arrested and his property attached. Bhupatrai showed cause against the application and by his reply, dated June 23, 1919, stated that he was unable to redeem the property, that he could not be forced to redeem the property in execution proceedings and that plaintiff No. 1 might be asked to file a suit if so advised to enforce her alleged right. By its order dated September 27, 1919, the execution Court held that plaintiff No. 1 could not get relief of the kind she sought in execution proceedings and dismissed the application. Bhupatrai died soon thereafter and plaintiff No. 1 in conjunction with plaintiffs Nos. 2, 3 and 4, who are the heirs and universal legatees under the will of Bhupatrai, filed this suit.

9. So far as the right to redeem of plaintiff No. 1 is concerned both the Courts have held in her favour and the respondents are not now questioning the right. With regard to plaintiffs Nos. 2, 3 and 4 they were not members of any joint Hindu family Consisting of themselves and Bhupatrai and they cannot be said to have any independent right to avoid the bale deed passed by Bhupatrai. As heirs and universal legatees of Bhupatrai they stand in the shoes of Bhupatrai and can avoid the sale deed only if Bhupatrai could have avoided it in his lifetime.

13. On the facts found, no doubt, Bhupatrai in his lifetime had by means of this collusive transaction succeeded in delaying plaintiff No. 1 in realising her right of residence in the property under the compromise decree. The fraud contemplated on plaintiff No. 1, however, was in the nature of a continuous act whereby she would be defrauded of her right to reside in the property during her lifetime. Had Bhupatrai lived it would have been open to him to retract from his fraudulent purpose and revoke the authority he had given to his confederates the vendee and the mortgages for carrying on the fraud. Plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 4 who now stand in the shoes of Bhupatrai have by their pleadings repudiated the fraud perpetrated by Bhupatrai and propose to redeem the property from the mortgagee which would carry out the intention of the compromise decree and enable plaintiff No. 1 to enjoy the right of residence conferred on her by the decree. On the evidence in the case it appears that plaintiff No. 1 is still a young widow and it would be a matter of speculation to Bay how many more years she is likely to live and enjoy the right of residence given to her under the compromise decree. Bhupatrai by his fraud kept plaintiff No. 1 out of that right from October 12, 1916, when the property should have been redeemed by him, until this suit was filed when Bhupatrai's heirs and universal legatees repudiated the fraud and offered to undo the wrong. In these circumstances, in my opinion, it cannot be said that the fraud has been substantially accomplished. Further, the position as between plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 4 on the one hand and the respondents on the other appears now to be this: that although plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 4 have resiled from the fraud as originally contemplated and are offering to act rightly and justly in respect of the property in suit, the respondents are to benefit by the fraud to the detriment not only of the heirs and universal legatees of Bhupatrai but also of plaintiff No. 1. There is no offer even now by respondent No. 1 to undo the wrong done to plaintiff No. 1 by redeeming the property and putting her in possession of it as contemplated by the compromise decree. The right given by the lower appellate Court to plaintiff No. 1 to redeem the property is not as substantial as that which would accrue to her if the heirs and universal legatees of Bhupatrai were to redeem the property and let plaintiff No. 1 reside in it in terms of the compromise decree. By redeeming the property herself all that plaintiff No. 1 would get would be the right which the mortgagee in possession now enjoys. Her residence in the property would be in virtue of the right of the mortgagee in possession and not in virtue of the compromise decree. By giving her the right to redeem the property the lower appellate Court has not effectively undone the fraud which was practised on plaintiff No. 1 by means of the sale deed, but has left that sale deed intact and operative and has allowed plaintiff No. 1 to get possession of the property only if she chooses to redeem the mortgage. That must necessarily mean that a widow who admittedly has no independent means of her own must find a sum of Rs. 599 to redeem the property. Under the decree of the lower appellate Court it would not be to the interest of plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 4 to find the money for plaintiff No. 1 to redeem the property, for on her death the property would go to the vendee on payment by him of Rs. 599 to the heirs of plaintiff No. 1. In my opinion the equities seem to be in favour of the plaintiffs and it has not been shown that the defendants are entitled to benefit by a transaction which has been proved to be fraudulent and collusive.