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The learned Chief Justice then went on to say that Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code did not take away the powers that the High Court had as the successor of the old Supreme Court. The learned Judges based their decision on the assumption that they had this inherent power beyond any jurisdiction conferred under Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code. It is conceded that in view of the Privy Council decision in Ryots of Garabando v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi (1943) 2 M.L.J. 254 : L.R. 70 I.A. 129 : I.L.R. 1944 Mad. 457 (P.C.) the High Court had no such inherent jurisdiction. We are unable, therefore, to find in this decision any authority for the position that the order passed by this Court in Crl. M.P. No. 439 of 1948 is a civil order. For the position that an order passed under Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, is a civil order, the learned advocate for the petitioner relies on a dictum of Mitter, J., in a case decided by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. A.E. Porter I.L.R. (1944) 1 Cal. 489. At page 520, Mitter, J., said: