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15. At the hearing of the appeal in the Court below only two pleas were urged: (1) the reports to the Sub-Inspector (Exs. 2 and 14) were privileged statements: and (2) even if they were not so privileged the defendant having undergone his trial in the criminal Court, been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, no further action could be taken against him in a Court of civil jurisdiction so as to fasten upon him liability in the shape of damages.

16. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge held, in agreement with the Munsif, that the complaint to the Magistrate (Ex. 1) was absolutely privileged and in support of his view referred to the Pull Bench ruling in Chhuni Lal v. Narsingh Das [1918] 40 All. 341. He further held that there was no difference in principle between a complaint addressed to a criminal Court and a report made to a Sub-Inspector. They were on the same footing, and, therefore, the reports to the Sub-Inspector were absolutely privileged and as such could form no basis for a civil action. On the second point, he held upon the authority of Gopal Chander v. Grish Chander 25 W.R. 22, that the defendant having been convicted by the criminal Court for having made a false report the civil Court was not bound as a matter of law to award damages to the plaintiff for the wrongful act of the defendant, the plaintiff not having proved that he had suffered any actual damage. In the result, he allowed the defendant's appeal, and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. In appeal before this Court it has not been seriously argued that, however defamatory the statements contained in the complaint addressed to the Magistrate on 9th February 1922, it could in law constitute an actionable wrong. But what was strenuously argued was that the statements made to the police officer in Exs. 2 and 14 were not privileged statements, and that the plaintiff's suit should not have been dismissed on the bare ground that he had failed to tender evidence of actual damage.