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3. that, even if it be held that the acknowledgment in question was an acknowledgment of liability, the acknowledgment must be limited to the liability to pay Rs. 325/- only, as is specifically mentioned in the said bond of 1932.

The relevant portion of the recital in the mortgage bond dated 15-11-1932 (Exhibit 1), which, according to the plaintiffs, contains an acknowledgment of liability, runs as follows: "Chun man mokir wo Chanderdeo Narain Shahi bhatija haqiqi ne Qita tamasuk makfull markuma mo: 15 June san 1927 isvi ijmalan tahrir wo tamil kardai (sic) banam Babu Kapildeo Narain Shahi U: Baban Shahi sa: Minapur pargana Tirsath jiske hisab aj tarikh imroze asal mai sud dar sud mo: pachis sau untis rupeya hota hai wo min mokir wo Chanderdeo Narain Sahi mazkur ne bamah Asarh san 1334 sal apas men ilahade wo tafrikul tarn wo tafrikul karbar ho gaye rasdi nisf rupeya mazkurebala men mo: barah sao sarhe chausath 1264-8-0 rupeya hota hai wo jumle rasdi mazkur ke mo: ath sao sarhe unchalis 839-8-0 rupeya bahazar kabahat apne tahbil se wo digar eraji farokht kar ke bandobast kia hai ab bakie mo: char sao pachis 425/- rupeya yaftane mazkurebala wo mo: tin sao pachis rupeya 325/- min jumle asal mai sud darsud barue tamasuk makfuli mobaine nishani registry markuma mo: 17 June san 1930 isvi yaftani Babu Kishuna Prasad Shahi sa: Minapur par-gana Tirsath jumla har do mahajanan mo: sat sau pachas 750/- rupeya wajbul dain hai jis ki adaekari siwae likhne tamasuk makfuli ke dusra koi surat najar nahi ata hai.......... wo bhi bakie mo: tin sao pachis 325/- rupeya yatfani Kishun Prasad Shahi mundarje bala ko adae wo bebak kar ke dastawez ke pusht par wasuli likhwa kar sabut adaekari hasil kar ke waste sabut ainde apne pas rakhen......"

6. There is no doubt that Section 19 speaks of acknowledgment of liability, in other words, acknowledgment of a debt which still remains to be paid and has not been paid off. If there is a mere acknowledgment of debt without more, that acknowledgment may not be enough, if that acknowledgment does not show that the debt is still payable. If the debtor admits that there was a certain debt in favour of the plaintiff, that cannot possibly be construed as an acknowledgment of liability under Section 19. The admission amounted only to the fact that there was once a debt and not to any liability under that debt. I would, therefore, accept the argument of Mr. Lall that there is a difference between a mere acknowledgment of debt and an acknowledgment of liability. In the present case, however, it is quite clear from the recital in the deed of 1932, already quoted, that the debtor, defendant No. 1, In unequivocal terms said that certain money was payable towards the mortgage bond in suit (1930). Whether the money due under the bond was Rs. 325/- or more is a different matter, but he did say in the aforesaid bond that the money under the bond in suit was payable by him. In my judgment, therefore, the present acknowledgment, as contained in the recital mentioned above, was an acknowledgment not of mere debt but it was an acknowledgment of liability under the mortgage bond in suit.

At page 1030, their Lordships said:

"But in English law it is the acknowledgment of liability, which is the ground upon which a promise to pay is inferred, so that the requirements of English law are, if anything, more, and not less stringent than those of Indian Law, which seems to be bad reason for holding that the English cases have no application to the present enquiry."

In English law, from an acknowledgment of liability an inference of promise to pay arises and, therefore, their Lordships said that the English law is more stringent than the Indian law where a mere acknowledgment of liability is enough.

12. Mr. Prem Lall has placed before me several cases, and I would like to consider them. In -- 'Rangaswami Chetti v. Thangavelu Chetti', AIR 1919 Mad 317 (O), it was found that exhibit B, which was relied upon in that case as containing the acknowledgment, did not acknowledge a subsisting liability as the deponent said distinctly that he had discharged the debt. It was, therefore, held that the statement in exhibit B did not amount to an acknowledgment of any subsisting liability.

In -- 'Parasram Shukul v. Bindeshari Pandey', AIR 1953 All 33 (P), all that was said was that an acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act necessarily implied a conscious acknowledgment of liability. I respectfully agree with that view, but this case again, is of no assistance because there was no question raised whether it was payment of whole or part of the debt in respect of which liability was acknowledged.