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5. Mr. Baldota submitted that the company seeks to have filed this case in Bombay, mainly on the basis that the company has its registered office in Bombay and that the files of the company are kept in Bombay and that all accounting of income and lossess, assets and liabilities are done in Bombay and is accountable in Bombay. He submitted that the draftsman of the complaint thinks that the charge of section 406, Indian Penal Code, can be brought home at a place where the accused has to "account for" under section 181(4), Criminal Procedure Code, meaning thereby where the "account of the accused is miantined by the company". This is what the company says in the complaint. He submitted that the words "accounted for" will have no application to a case of this type, where it is alleged that the accused has not returned the very property which is entrusted to him. He submitted that wherever the allegation is that the propety has not been returned in specie, that would be covered by the words "any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned", as provided under section 181(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But it is possible, where the property is converted into money or where money is entrusted for a particular purpose and is misappropriated, to say that the words "accounted for " under section 181(4). Criminal Procedure Code, would apply. That is not the case here.

7. At the outset, I may say that while it is possible for the company to contend that the withholding of the property or failure to return the property might attract section 630 of the Companies Act, I cannot understand how, having regard to the averments made in the complaint, there can ever be a charge under section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. In para 3 of the complaint, it is pleaded that the officers and employees are given accommodation and they are entitiled to such accommodation only as far as it is part of the conditions of service and as one of the facilities made available to them. Then the complaint in the said para says : "The complainant submits that consequently the right of occupation stands automatically terminated when the relationship between the company and the officer/employee concerned comes to an end, that is, when his service with the company is terminated or he is retired from the services of the company. The complainant submits that all the properties in question regard-less of where they are situate, vest in the company which is a juridical person and which is functioning from its registered office at Bombay." In para 4 of the complaint, what is pleaded is that the accused was only a licensee, and the relevant portion is as follows : "The complainant submits that the accused was no more than a licensee of the said premises at the dicretion and will of the company for a period of time coterminous with his services with the company on a nominal payment of Rs. 17 per mensem." In para 5 of the complaint, it is stated that the entrustment was for a specific purpose and for a specified prescribed petiod and that the accused had dominion over the property and was never permitted to convert the same to his own use. In para 6 of the complaint, the company to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the said premises. Since the accused did not comply with the same , the company submits that "the accused with dishonest intention, wrongfully withheld the possesssion of the said premises and thereby wrongfully deprived the company of the use of the premises for its ohter working employees reulting in loss of money in the form of allowing house rent allowance to other employees entitled to the said premises." Needless to say, if these submissions are carried to its logical end, in every case of leave and licence or in every case of service occupantc, if the occupant does not vocate, but asserts a right, it becomes a cirinal breach of trust. I am pointing this out only to show that these submissions are as absurd as what has been submitted in para 8 of the complaint. Realising that the substance of the company's case is withholding possession of the premises for which the court in Bombay would have had no jurisdiction, the draftsman had to necessrily, but artificially, plead what is et out in para 8 of the complaint. If what is pleaded therein is accepted as true, there is not even a plea that the accused has to account for withholding the premises, in Bombay. What is pleaded is the company's liability to account form in Bombay. But there is nothing that accused has to account for, in Bombay, When I asked Mr. Lahiri whether there is no difference betweebn the words "retained" or "required to be returned" and the words "accounted for " as appearing in section 181(4), Criminal Procedure Code, he would not answer the same. The only answer is that accountability is a question of fact and the learned Magistate will decide the same.

9. I do not understand how this would help the company in the present case. There is no plea in the present case that the residential quarters are required, by law or contract, to be returned or accounted for the propert. In the present case, the withholding or retaining of the property itself is evidence of the offence. This has taken place at Jamshedpur. It is there where the property has been retained. When that is so, there is no question of the accused becoming liable to "account for" in section 181(4), Criminal Procedure Code, would apply only where there is no evidence of the offence other than failure to return or accounted for the property in any local area, so as to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in that area. Any other inerpretation would suffer from the vice of tautology rendering teh words used in the statute redundant.

10. The intial inspiration for the draftsman of the complaint must have come from judgment of a single judge of the Calcutta High Court in the case of T. S. Satyanath v. J. Thomas and Co. [1985] 57 Comp Cas 648. In that case, in a similar situation, while the premises were in Cochin, a case under section 630(1)(b) of the Companies Act, was filed in Calcutta. When the accused filed a petition under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, for quashing the proceedings on the ground of want of teritorial jurisdiction, as also on anohter ground, it was argued across the Bar, on behalf of the complainant company that the accused could have delivered possession by sending a note posted at Calcutta or that the he could have delivered possession by sending a note posted at Calcutta or that he could perhaps send the key of the property to the head office at Calcutta . The learned judge, however, does not decide any to these questions, but he leaves this question open, granting liberty to the petitioner to reagitate these points after evidence has been adduced at the trial. Therefore, this case is no authority for determining the question of jurisdiction within the meaning of ection 181(4), Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Lahiri, however, teing the same line as sounsel for the company in the above case did, submitted that the complainant can deman that the property be given to the company in Bombay, though he could not spell out whether that could be done by sending the key or a note. Again, why should it be in Bombay ? Mr. Lahiri says that it is because the company can receive its property only at its registered office ? Why not Kashmir ? Why not kanyakumari ? Therfore, the company can as well deman at any provision of law, common sense and not sutble subterfuges which have the effect of subverting a judicial process, should be the guiding factor. The esence of the offence boht under section 630(1)(b) of the Companies Act, and under section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, is the wrongful withholding or retention of the property. The offence is complete when such retention takes place. It is at Jamshedpur where the retention has taken place and it is but natural that the case be filed at Jamshedpur.