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4 The CBLR-2013 was brought into force by notification dated 21st June, 2013 in exercise of powers conferred by Sub-section (2) of Section 146 of Customs Act, 1962 by superseding the existing CHALR-2004. The present case revolves around the existing CBLR-2013 where a specific time limit has been prescribed under Regulation 19, which contains a provision for suspension and revocation of licence. Further, a time frame has also been prescribed in Regulation 20 which prescribes a procedure for revocation of licence or imposition of penalty. The grievance raised in the set of SSK 12 Custom Appeal 88-16 Appeals before us is either that the notice was not issued by the Revenue to the customs broker within stipulated period of 90 days from the date of receipt of offence report or cases, where the entire inquiry has not been completed within the time limit specified in Regulation 20.

7 In the background of the statutory provisions, we would deal with the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties. We have extensively heard Mr. Jetley appearing for the Principal Commissioner of Customs, who would finds fault with the impugned orders passed by the said CESTAT. Mr. Jetley would submit that the CESTAT has erred in holding the period prescribed in the CBLR-2013 to be imperative and in holding that there is no provision for extension of the time line prescribed for completion of proceedings. He would argue that the findings of the CESTAT that the learned Commissioner did not adhere to the time line prescribed for SSK 19 Custom Appeal 88-16 completion of inquiry proceedings and therefore he has no legal right to keep the customs broker licence under suspension for unlimited period, is erroneous. He would submit that reliance placed on the judgments of the Tribunal, wherein it had consistently taken a view that if inquiry proceedings are not completed within overall period of nine months, a time line prescribed in CBLR-2013, the suspension of the customs broker licence cannot be continued do not lay down correct position of law. He would submit that the Tribunal has erred in taking the said view in the backdrop of the judgment of the same Tribunal of CESTAT, West Zonal Bench, Mumbai, in the case of Unison Clearing Pvt Ltd vs. Commissioner of Customs (General Mumbai) to which one of the Member Judicial (Ramesh Nair) was a party. He would place heavy reliance on the said judgment delivered by the Tribunal in Appeal No.C/85867/2015-MUM on 5th June, 2015, where the Tribunal by its exhaustive judgment has held that the time line prescribed in the CBLR-2013 is construed to be directory and the matter is closed on this basis. He would submit that the purpose of Regulation would get defeated and SSK 20 Custom Appeal 88-16 so would the intention of legislature in framing the Regulation. He would submit that the Tribunal in the said judgment had held that since there are no consequences provided in the regulation for non-adherence of the time period for conducting the inquiry, the non-compliance of the time line cannot become fatal to the outcome of inquiry. Mr. Jetly would invite our attention to the observations made by the Tribunal in paragraph 4.2 of the judgment and to the conclusion drawn by it that the time line laid down in the Regulations are directory in nature. According to the learned Counsel, the duty of a customs house agent is to render assistance in the export and import business at the port and the purpose of the the Regulation, 2013 is to streamline the working of the customs brokers. The learned Counsel Mr. Jetly would submit that if the provision is construed as mandatory, it would result into serious consequences but he would fairly submit that even if it is construed to be directory, it does not mean that it is open for the custom authorities to continue the suspension for an indefinite period.

He would rely upon the series of judgments SSK 24 Custom Appeal 88-16 delivered by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court and Madras High Court, which have consistently taken a view that the time limit prescribed in the Regulation is mandatory and sacrosanct. The High Courts had taken a view that the time limit in the CHALR-2004 for issuance of show cause notice to the CHA licence holder and completion of the inquiry within 90 days of its issuance are mandatory and the said time limit has been engrafted in Regulation 22 of CHALR-2004 by notification dated 8th April, 2010. The judgments of these Courts have consistently emphasised the mandatory nature of the aforesaid time limit in several of its decisions and the violation of the said time line has resulted into declaring the action of the Commissioner of Customs revoking the CHA licence to be unsustainable in law. The Hon'ble Madras High Court has also laid great emphasis on the time limit prescribed in the back drop of its object, being to curb the smuggling of goods and by considering the object of the provision, and specifically by referring to the transformation of the CHA Regulation into CBLR-2013 Regulations. The Court had held that earlier Regulation did not have time limit SSK 25 Custom Appeal 88-16 to complete the proceedings but by Circular No.9/10 dated 8th April, 2010, the necessity to specify the time limit for initiating action was addressed by the board after field inspection and by notification dated 8th April, 2010 prescribing the time period for initiating action and completion of the procedure was introduced and given effect to by notification dated 20th January, 2014. The Hon'ble Madras High Court has further held that under CBLR-2013 the necessity was felt to prescribe a time schedule on the recommendation of the CBEC, a statutory authority and therefore, a time frame came to be consciously introduced in the Regulation and the use of the term "shall" in the Regulation makes it imperative to construe the said time schedule as "mandatory". In this regard, Mr. Shah relies on the following decisions:

Therefore, when a time limit is prescribed in Regulations, which empowers action in Regulation 18 and procedure in Regulation 20(1), the use of the term "shall" cannot be termed as "directory". It is pertinent to mention here that the CBLR, 2013 have replaced the CHA Regulations. The CHA regulations did not have any time limit to complete the proceedings. Therefore, by a Circular 9/2010, dated 8-4-2010, the necessity to include a time limit for initiating action was addressed by the Board after field inspection and by a notification dated 8-4-2010, amendments prescribing time period for initiating action and completing proceedings was made. The same was given effect by notification dated 20-1-2014. Whereas, under the CBLR, 2013 having found the necessity to prescribe a period, the Central Board, the statutory authority had included the same in the Regulations itself, when they were brought into force. Therefore, when a time limit is prescribed in Regulations, which empowers action under Regulation 18 by following the SSK 55 Custom Appeal 88-16 procedure in Regulation 20(1), the use of the term "shall" cannot be termed as "directory". Under such circumstances, the rule can only be termed as "Mandatory".