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"6. It is true that in submitting its tender accompanied by a cheque of the Union Bank of India and not of the State Bank clause No. 6 of the tender notice was not obeyed literally, but the question is as to whether the said non-compliance deprived the Diesel Locomotive Works of the authority to accept the bid. As a matter of general proposition it cannot be held that an authority inviting tenders is bound to give effect to every term mentioned in the notice in meticulous detail, and is not entitled to waive even a technical irregularity of little or no significance. The requirements in a tender notice can be classified into two categories - those which lay down the essential conditions of eligibility and the others which are merely ancillary or subsidiary with the main object to be achieved by the condition. In the first case the authority issuing the tender may be required to enforce them rigidly. In the other cases it must be open to the authority to deviate from and not to insist upon the strict literal compliance of the condition in appropriate cases. This aspect was examined by this Court in G. J. Fernandez v. State of Karnataka, , a case dealing with tenders. Although not in an entirely identical situation as the present one, the observations in the judgment support our view. The High Court has, in the impugned decision, relied upon Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, , but has failed to appreciate that the reported case belonged to the first category where the strict compliance of the condition could be insisted upon. The authority in that case, by not insisting upon the requirement in the tender notice which was an essential condition of eligibility, bestowed a favour on one of the bidders, which amounted to illegal discrimination. The judgment indicates that the Court closely examined the nature of the condition which had been relaxed and its impact before answering the question whether it could have validly condoned the shortcoming in the tender in question. This part of the judgment demonstrates the difference between the two categories of the conditions discussed above. However it remains to be seen as to which of the two clauses the present case belongs."

7. The aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court in Poddar Steel Corporation is squarely and fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The only mistake committed by the petitioners was that they annexed the demand draft issued in favour of other Corporation. That was only a technical irregularity and did not in the facts of the case could be said to violate the essential conditions of the tender notice. It was only because of inadvertence that the demand drafts purchased by the petitioners got interchanged. Under the terms and conditions of the tender notice, inter alia, for the satisfaction of financial credibility of the bidder, the condition is that earnest money of Rs. 12000/- by way of crossed demand draft/pay order from the scheduled bank in favour of concerned corporation is deposited with the bid. The Corporations, viz. IOC, HPCL and BPCL ought not to have given strict construction to Clause 7 of the tender which provided that the earnest money deposit as provided in Clauses 5 and 6 by crossed Demand Draft/Pay Order drawn on any Scheduled Bank, be in favour of concerned Corporation like Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (MD), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (MD) and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation (MD). The essential clause concerning an interest free earnest money deposit of Rs. 12000/- finds place in Clause 6 which, of course, was required to be construed strictly, but Clause 7 could not have been given effect in meticulous detail as has been sought to be given when the petitioners did purchase demand draft in favour of concerned corporation in the required sum from scheduled bank - the only mistake, these drafts got interchanged at the time of submission of tenders and this mistake reflected at all necessarily places in the tender form. The contention of Mr. Siodia that this Court should not interfere in administrative decision when admittedly there was some mistake by the petitioners in the facts of the present case does not deserve to be accepted. If an administrative decision is based on hypertcchnical approach by treating a non-essential condition of the tender notice as essential condition, such administrative decision shall be ceased to be fair and lack reasonableness warranting interference in suitable and deserving cases under Article 226.