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3. As the term of the elected Committee was to expire by 30-6-1975 and a new Committee had to be elected by the General Body of the Society, the lst respondent was appointed as Election Officer to conduct the elections of the members of the Committee of the Society. The lst respondent called for nominations the last date for filing the same being 18-6-1975. The date 19-6-1975 was fixed for scrutiny of the nominations. The last date for withdrawal of the nominations was 20-6-1975. The election was fixed to take place, if necessary, on 26-6-1975. The lst petitioner filed his nomination for the election of a member of the committee. On 19-6-1975 during the scrutiny of the nominations, the 3rd respondent raised objections to the lst petitioner's nomination alleging that he was appointed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies as one of the members of the nominated Committee which continued till 30-12-1962. Subsequently he was also nominated by the Registrar as person-in-charge of the Society in October, 1968 and continued in that capacity till 30-6-1971 either singly or along with others. He was thereafter elected as one of the members of the first elected Committee and held office fro 1-7-72 to 30-6-1975 and he became the President of that Committee also. Section 21-C of the Act prescribes a condition that a person who has held office as a member of the Committee for two consecutive terms shall not be eligible for being chosen as a member of the Committee for a third term in continuation. Therefore, the lst petitioner is not eligible to be elected as it would be a third consecutive term for him.

16. Points 2 and 3:-- It is provided under Section 21-C that a person who holds or has held office as a member of the committee for two consecutive terms shall not be eligible for being chosen as a member of the Committee for a third term in continuation. The expression "committee" will take in both an elected committee and a nominated committee. If the legislature intended by the expression "committee" used there as meaning only an elected committee, they would have said so clearly. When they intended it to be an elected committee, when they said that in between two terms of office of the committee if a period intervenes during which there was no elected committee those two terms should be regarded as being consecutive terms mentioned in the main section. Even in the Explanation when reference is made to the two terms of office there also they said only 'committee' and not 'elected committee' as mentioned in the earlier portion of then for the committee during the intervening period. Therefore, a plain reading of the main section and the explanation together makes it abundantly clear as to what the Legislature meant when they used only the expression 'committee' both in the main section and in the Explanation without using the expression 'elected committee'. They must have meant it to be both an elected committee and a nominated committee. The reason also is obvious when we got the objects and reasons for enacting this provision to disqualify a person to hold office as a member of the committee continuously for three (terms). In the Amendment Act by which S. 21-C was introduced, it was mentioned that at the conference of Chief Ministers and Ministers of the States in charge of co-operation held at Madras on 12th June, 1968, certain recommendations were made for amending the Co-operative Societies Act in force in the States so as to make a provision among other matters for curbing the growth of vested interests in co-operative societies ad to impose a restriction on holding membership in the committee of co-operative societies consecutively for more than two terms. Therefore, the intention of the Legislature in enacting the restriction in Section 21-C of the New Act is to prevent the growth of vested interests in co-operative societies by imposing a break in continuity in office for more than two terms. If that was the object in enacting Section 21-C of the New Act, it is clear that the Legislature would not have intended the holding of office as a member of the committee only with regard to an elected committee and not a nominated committee and that too for the two consecutive terms to take place only subsequent to the introduction of Section 21-C without any reference to the holding of office as a member of the committee prior to the enactment of that section. For the restriction to operate that the Legislature intended both the subsequent and the previous holding of office as a member of the committee is clear from the language used in the Section when it said "a person who holds or has held office". This expression used in the section clearly indicates that though the restriction is only for being chosen as a member of the committee for a third term after coming into force of Section 21-C the holding of office as a member of the Committee both at the time the section came into force and also the office held earlier have to be taken into account for the purpose of the two consecutive terms mentioned therein.

21. Coming to the fourth point, the argument of Sri Chowdary is that it is the fundamental right of the General Body to choose as to who should manage the affairs of the society and that right is being taken away by means of Section 21-C of the New Act by restricting the membership of the Committee for a person to two consecutive terms and that restriction enacted in Section 21-C would amount to an abridgment of the right to form an Association guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (c) of the Constitution, the only restriction to that right being the one mentioned in the relevant limitation clause (4) of Article 19 and the restrictions imposed on a perform from being a member of the Committee for a third consecutive term, not having anything to do with any one of the limitations contained in clause 4 of Article 19, Section 21-C is unconstitutional. The limitation imposed under Clause (4) of Article 19 to otherwise complete freedom to form an association guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (c) is the right given to the State for making any laws imposing, to the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions. If the restriction imposed under Section 21-C of the New Act attracts Article 19 (1)(c) it is true that that restriction is not one of those restrictions mentioned in clause (4) of Article 19 for imposing which the State can make a law. But the point is whether Article 19 (1) (c) of the Constitution has any application to the question before us and the restriction imposed under Section 21-C from becoming a member of the committee for a third consecutive term can be said to the violative of the fundamental rights to form Associations guaranteed under it.

25. In the decision Bidhu Bhusan v. State of West Bengal AIR 1962 Cal 901 the Calcutta High Court has held that Art. 19 (1) (c) which speaks of the right of a citizen to form Associations or Unions refers to the ordinary right which is enjoyed by all citizens. It has no reference to a right which is conferred by a particular statute to act as members of a body which is the creation of the statute itself.

26. Apart from the Committee being a committee of the co-operative society registered under the Act, we do not think the restriction in question imposed on becoming a member of the Committee for more than two consecutive terms violates the fundamental right to form Association guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (c) of the Constitution. It is not the case of the petitioners that they are restricted from forming a co-operative society under the Act, or there was any compulsion on them to form a society under the Act or to become members of a society registered under the Act. Simply for the reason that some restrictions are imposed in connection with the working of the Society, that does not amount to curtailing the freedom of forming a society unless the restriction goes to the very root of the matter, which amounts to taking away the freedom to form an Association. In the present case the restriction is only to become a member of the Committee for a consecutive third term. That means one cannot become a member of the Committee for more than two terms continuously. There is no restriction on becoming member of the Committee once again there after for two ore terms. With an interval of one term in between one can become a member of the Committee consecutively for two terms any number of times. This restriction the Legislature in their wisdom thought to be necessary in order to prevent vested rights being established in the Societies which is not very healthy for proper working of the Societies. Therefore, this is not a matter which touches the very right to form a society. We are unable to agree with the argument of Sri P.A. Chowdary that if such restriction is imposed that would be abridging or taking away the right to form a society or an Association. In this connection Sri Chowdary placed strong reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court. Smt. Damyanti Naranga v. Union of India and O.K.Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph . In the first decision referred to above, the validity of the Hindi Sahiya Samelan Act (1962) was in question. Under Section 4 (4) of the Act apart from persons who are members of the Society, some more members have been added without any option being available to the existing members of the Society to elect or refuse to elect them as members which was the right they possessed under construction of the Society itself. The Supreme Court said that the Act does not merely regulate the administration of the affairs of the society; what it does is to alter the composition of the Society itself. The result of this change in the composition is that the members, who voluntarily formed the Association, are now compelled to act in that Association with other members who have been imposed as members by the Act and in whose admission to membership they had no say. Such alternation in the composition of the Association itself clearly interferes with the right to continue to function as members of the Association which was voluntarily formed by the original founders. The right to form an Association implies that the persons forming the Association have also the right to continue to be associated with only those whom they voluntarily admit in the Association. Any law, by which members are introduced in the voluntary Association without any option being given to the members to keep them out, or any law which takes away the membership of those who have voluntarily joined it, will be a law violating the right to form an Association. Therefore, the Supreme Court said on the fact of that case, that the provision of law by which committee members have been added to the Society without any opinion being available to the existing members of the Society to elect or refuse to elect them as members is violative of Art. 19 (1) (c) of the Constitution. Thus, the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts before us. In the present case, the only restriction imposed under Section 21-C of the Act is to be a member of the Committee continuously for a third term. This is not a provision which restricts the right to continue the Association with its composition as voluntarily agreed upon by the persons forming the Association. In this case, the Supreme Court referred to their earlier case, which is the second case mentioned above.