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Showing contexts for: dog bite in Ambalal Lallubhai Panchal vs L.I.C. Of India on 8 March, 1999Matching Fragments
3. The respondent-LIC by its written statement exhibit 12 contested the claim, contending that the deceased had not disclosed material facts regarding the state of his health and the medical treatment, which was taken by him and, therefore, the LIC was justified in repudiating the claim. It was contended that the contract of insurance had become null and void, in view of the suppression about the state of his health by the deceased. It was also contended that the death was suicidal.
4. The trial court held that the deceased Vikram had paid the premiums in respect of the two policies in question, which were of Rs. 50,000 each, taken out for assuring his life. It was also held that Vikram had died on April 28, 1989, due to dog bite, which he suffered on April 18, 1989. The trial court held that the death was caused due to cardiac respiratory failure that had resulted because of rabies caused due to a bite by a rabid dog and that the death was not suicidal, as was tried to be contended by the LIC.
5. The trial court, however, found that the ingredients of the accident benefit clause were not established because the injury and resultant death caused by a dog bite cannot be said to have been caused by an accident, as contemplated by that clause. It was, therefore, held that the appellant was not entitled to recover the additional sum payable under the accident benefit clause.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the death of Vikram was proved to have been caused by the bite of a rabid dog. The medical evidence consisting of the deposition of Dr. Mansingh Chaudhary at exhibit 50, and the medical case papers at exhibit 51 and exhibit 52 clearly showed that the death was caused due to rabies caused by a dog bite. It was submitted that the evidence clearly negatived the theory of death being caused by suicide. The vicera, which was sent for examination clearly showed that no poison was consumed by the deceased and the report of witness Poonambhai G. Kachhiya at exhibit 62, who is an employee of the LIC, as admitted by him, was based on conjecture drawn from the fact that the deceased had an unhappy married life. Counsel contended that the meaning of the word "accident" was wide enough to include such mishap that had occurred by a dog bite and the resultant death of Vikram. He therefore, submitted that the appellant was entitled to the additional payment under the accident benefit clause in these policies.
7. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporation contended that the injury due to a dog bite and death resulting therefrom cannot be said to be an accident. He submitted that any occurrence which is expected to happen, cannot be termed an accident. He argued that even if a person goes near a sleeping dog, he takes the risk of being bitten by it. According to him, what can be avoided by proper care and caution, cannot be termed as an accident. Giving an illustration, counsel submitted that if a person goes near a pet dog, which is not expected to bite and yet is bitten by such dog, that can be termed an accident, but if a person goes near a stray dog, then he should expect to be bitten by stray dog and since such event is expected, it would not be an accident. Learned counsel further argued that if a person is careless or negligent and the event occurs, then such an event cannot be termed an accident. A person should make an effort to avoid a mishap and should act with reasonable diligence to ensure that he does not put himself in peril of an accident. He submitted that if no attempt is made to avoid the danger or when the person acts negligently and carelessly, then the injury or harm that may be caused, cannot be said to have been caused by an accident.
12. The argument that if the occurrence could be avoided by reasonable diligence or that if negligence or carelessness have contributed to the event, it should not be treated as accident, if accepted, would abort the very purpose underlying such insurance policy which does not circumscribe the word accident beyond stating that it should have been caused by "outward violent and visible means". In its ordinary meaning the word accident does not negative the idea of negligence on the part of the person whose act brought about that event. An accident may arise from the carelessness of men, and the fact that the negligence of the person injured contributed to produce a result will not make it any the less an accident and in this sense accident can be defined as a fortuitous event which may be preventable but is not prevented or an unexpected or unforeseen event happening with or without human fault. The term accident is thus, more comprehensive than the term negligence, and, often the terms "pure accident", or "mere accident" or "unavoidable accident" are employed in the legal context where accidents occurring due to negligence are to be ruled out or excluded from the ordinary meaning of the word accident. In the context of an insurance policy to exclude negligence, by the very nature of things, will make the indemnity practically valueless. Therefore, barring the exceptions which are enumerated in the clause itself, all accidents which are caused by "outward, violent and visible means" would be covered whether or not caused by carelessness or negligence or whether or not expected and avoidable. The concept of duty to take reasonable cafe which is relevant in respect of liability arising out of the tort of negligence need not be imported in a clause of insurance policy which assures accident benefits in respect of the loss caused from any accident by "outward, violent and visible means". There is no warrant to qualify this clause by carving out any exception on the grounds such as carelessness, negligence, avoidability, etc. The only exceptions that apply are those which have been specifically enumerated and for all other eventualities which can be described as accident in its general and non-technical sense the liability to pay the accident benefit arises when the accident is caused by outward violent and visible means. This qualification is meant to provide for ascertainability of the event. A dog bite is not brought about by any design or intention. It is an unexpected harm. A dog bite is surely something that is outward, violent and visible by which the harm is brought about and the death resulting therefrom would therefore in our opinion be a death resulting from an accident caused by outward, violent and visible means within the meaning of the accident benefit clause of the policy under which the LIC was bound to pay an additional sum equal to the sum assured under the policy.