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"....Section 14 provides for an order in ejectment being made by the Controller appointed under the Act on any of the grounds mentioned in it but not otherwise. Section 50, therefore, bars the jurisdiction of a civil court to try a suit for the eviction of a tenant, that is to say, a tenant as defined in the Act. It would not bar a suit for eviction against a person who is not a tenant as so defined. Under the ordinary law applicable to landlords and tenants, a tenant who has suffered an ejectment decree is not considered a tenant any more; he has after the decree none of the rights which as tenant the earlier possessed."

44. Learned Counsel for defendants/appellants took objection grant of mesne profits against the defendants/appellants by way of impugned judgment and decree on the ground that a claim for mesne profits is not maintainable until an order/decree for eviction is passed. In this connection, she referred to Section 2(1)(A) of the Rent Act, which provides that any person against whom an order or decree for eviction has been made, except where such decree or order for eviction is liable to be reopened under the proviso to Section 3 of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976 (18 of 1976), is not a tenant, as defined under Section 2(1) of the Rent Act. Learned counsel for defendants/appellants probably thought that defendants/appellants continued to be tenants in respect of the suit premises even after expiry of one year from the date of death of the statutory tenant, late De.Suraj Prakash. The argument is fallacious. As already held neither of the defendants/appellants inherited the right o statutory tenancy under Section 2(1)(iii) of the Rent Act and had thus no right to continue in possession of the suit premises after lapse of one year from the date of death of late Dr.Suraj Prakash. In the absence of any right to hold possession of the suit premises, the defendants/appellants were reduce to the status of a trespasser/unauthorised occupant. In the circumstances, no order or decree for their eviction, as contemplated under Section 2(1)(A), was required to maintain a suit for a covery of mesne profits against them.

"Heard learned counsel for the parties.
In view of the Constitution Bench decision in Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar & Ors., the statutory tenancy is heritable. The widow and the children of the tenant would step into the shoes of the tenant as defined in Section 2(L) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. On the date when the suit out of which the present appeal arises was filed, the widow was a tenant and, therefore, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and pass a decree for her ejectment.

50. There is no controversy with respect to the proposition of law that a widow of a deceased tenant would fall in the category of tenant, as defined in Section 2(1) of the Rent Act as irrespective of the fact whether she was financially dependent or not on the deceased tenant on the date of his death, she has in any case a right to continue in possession of the tenanted premises for a period of one year from the date of death of the deceased tenant. It was in this context that the defendant/appellant No.1 was held to be a tenant on the date of institution of the suit No.456/72. It is clearly inferable from the order Ex.PW-4/9 that on behalf of plaintiff/respondent's dependent on the deceased tenant, Dr.Suraj Prakahs, on the date of his death and that the period of one year from the date of death of the deceased tenant having already elapsed long back, she had no right to continue to occupy the suit premises. However, such plea was not entertained on the ground that the trial court's jurisdiction had to be determined with reference to the date of the institution of the suit and once it was held htat the widow(0 No.1) was a tenant, the civil court was found to have had no jurisdiction. The order dated 10.12.1986 is quite clear and unambiguous leaving no scope to import therein an argument like the one being advanced on behalf of the defendants/appellants. It is abundantly clear that the judgment in suit No.456/92 was vacated purely on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and pass a decree for ejectment again the defendant/appellant No.1. The Order could not be stretched to find support to the argument that there had been a final adjudication by the Supreme Court that the defendant/appellant No.1. was financially dependent on the deceased tenant on the date of his death and that she acquired, by succession, the right to continue in possession of the suit premises for the whole life.