Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

35. We also hold that the respondents 1-3 ought to have implemented the interim order passed by the Division Bench of this Court on 5.2.2019 and taken back the petitioner into service as Asst.Labour Officer, Warangal without waiting for the fate of the vacate stay application to be decided.

36. In Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd11. the Supreme Court held that where an objection to jurisdiction of a civil court is raised to entertain a suit and to pass any interim orders therein, the Court should decide the question of jurisdiction in the first instance but that does not mean that pending the decision on the question of jurisdiction, the Court has no jurisdiction to pass interim orders as may be called for in the facts and circumstances of the case. A mere objection to jurisdiction does not instantly disable the court from passing any interim orders. It can yet pass appropriate orders. At the same time, it should also decide the question of jurisdiction at the earliest possible time. The interim orders so passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and effective till the court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. These interim orders undoubtedly come to an end with the decision that this Court had no jurisdiction. It is open to the court to (1997) 3 SCC 443, at page 457 ::16:: MSR,J & PKR,J cc_456_2019& wp_45786_2018 modify these orders while holding that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Indeed, in certain situations, it would be its duty to modify such orders or make appropriate directions. For example, take a case, where a party has been dispossessed from the suit property by appointing a receiver or otherwise; in such a case, the Court should, while holding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, put back the party in the position he was on the date of suit. But this power or obligation has nothing to do with the proposition that while in force, these orders have to be obeyed and their violation can be punished even after the question of jurisdiction is decided against the plaintiff provided the violation is committed before the decision of the Court on the question of jurisdiction. It quoted the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hadkinson v. Hadkinson 12. It held :

"23. In Hadkinson v. Hadkinson, the Court of Appeal held:
"It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void. Lord Cottenham, L.C., said in Chuck v. Cremer13 (at p. 342): 'A party, who knows of an order, whether null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it.... It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves judge whether an order was null or valid -- whether it was regular or irregular. That they should come to the court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question. That the course of a party knowing of an (1952) 2 ALL.E.R 567 47 ER 820 ::17:: MSR,J & PKR,J cc_456_2019& wp_45786_2018 order, which was null or irregular, and who might be affected by it, was plain. He should apply to the court that it might be discharged. As long as it existed it must not be disobeyed.' Such being the nature of this obligation, two consequences will, in general follow from its breach. The first is that anyone who disobeys an order of the court (and I am not now considering disobedience of orders relating merely to matters of procedure) is in contempt and may be punished by committal or attachment or otherwise. The second is that no application to the court by such a person will be entertained until he has purged himself of his contempt." (Emphasis supplied)